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TREATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT WITH RESPECT
Anita Bernstein*
What is sexual harassment? Individuals in the workforce need to know. Judicial
opinions do not fully inform them, and academic commentary has not linked doctrine to
everyday work experience or to an intelligible ethical philosophy that is widely
understood and shared. In this Article, Professor Bernstein undertakes to explain sexual
harassment using the concept of respect. She argues that a defendant charged with
hostile environment sexual harassment ought to be held to the standard of a respectful
person. This doctrinal device improves on approaches that now prevail, particularly
those emphasizing "reasonableness." After detailing the shortcomings of current law,
Professor Bernstein describes the virtues of a legal rule that affirms respect. These
virtues - which extend beyond sexual harassment - include the resonance of respect as
a value among ordinary people, the history of inclusion based on human dignity that
informs respect, the orientation of respect around the conduct of an agent (rather than
the reaction of a complainant, the focus of current rules), and congruence with a
tradition, found in many other areas of American law, of calling on citizens to render
respect.
INTRODUCTION
YTears of feminist effort created the term sexual harassment, now a
legal wrong and a cultural colossus. But as doctrine the phrase
remains elusive, connoting no specific type of harm. Once thought of
as a problem that has no name,1 sexual harassment is now a term that
brings no -clear image to mind - a name, as it were, that has no
problem. Decades of litigation in the federal circuits and the Supreme
Court have resulted in the promulgation of workable guidelines 2 but
prompted little vivid judicial writing and no courtroom-scene edifica-
tion; neither the Hill-Thomas pageant of i99i nor the spectacles that
followed shed much light on sexual harassment law.3
* Professor of Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
B.A. r98r, Queens College; J.D. 1985, Yale. I acknowledge with deep thanks the inspiration, and
challenges, of Carolyn Raffensperger, Chicago-Kent Class of 1994, who first proposed that we
write together on this subject. Carolyn's commitments later precluded her from being co-author
- or indeed sole author - of this Article. In my role of adoptive parent, I hope I have not be-
trayed the promise of her early ideas. Another former student from the same class, John Franc-
zyk, Jr., made several helpful remarks as I got started. Thanks also to Patricia O'Brien and Beth
Miller for research assistance; Ian Ayres, Jacob Corr6, Paul Fanning, Steven Heyman, Richard
Gonzalez, Herma Hill Kay, Peggie Ren~e Smith, and Alison Steele for sharing their ideas about
respect and sexual harassment; and the Marshall Ewell fund for financial support.
I See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED io6 (1987).
2 See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.ER. § 1604 (1996).
3 Numerous writings on sexual harassment spectacles include DAVID BROCK, THE REAL
ANITA HILL (1992); JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF
CLARENCE THOMAS (1994); Douglas R. Kay, Note, Running a Gauntlet of Sexual Abuse: Sexual
Harassment of Female Naval Personnel in the United States Navy, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 307 (1992);
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Attempting to fill this void, legal scholars have struggled to observe
the rigors of doctrine and at the same time to understand sexual ha-
rassment as it is experienced. Appropriately focusing on hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment in the workplace, 4 these commentators ex-
plain this phenomenon as expressions of gender hierarchy, economic
inefficiency,6 free speech, 7 and misplaced pluralism., But few of these
descriptions have achieved widespread acceptance in the judicial or
academic communities. 9 Among those who undertake to describe the
nature of sexual harassment, 10 a division has emerged. One group of
writers, expressing a sunny view of human relationships, offers a
paradigm of workplace hostile environment sexual harassment as mis-
communication. These observers envision a man who provokes fear
or anger, perhaps unintentionally, when he approaches a colleague or
and Susan B. Jordan, A Profession of Packwoods?, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 21, 1995, at 6. On the
vagueness of the term "harassment," see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Re-
view in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1009, 1012-18 (1996).
4 Sexual harassment occurs in a variety of settings; within case law the workplace is the most
important of these settings. Workplace sexual harassment, according to an early manifesto by
Catharine MacKinnon, divides into two categories: quid pro quo harassment and hostile or abu-
sive environment harassment. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN 32 (1979). This division, accepted by American courts, has become less in-
formative since its formulation. Quid pro quo harassment, or explicit sexual blackmail, occupies
a minuscule fraction of sexual harassment case law; only extraordinarily reckless and blatant be-
havior by a harasser permits a plaintiff to pursue this cause of action. See Susan Estrich, Sex at
Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 834 (iggx). Accordingly, much harassment has been diverted into
the hostile environment category, such that references to a hostile environment no longer add
meaning to sexual harassment in the workplace.
5 See Morrison Torrey, We Get the Message - Pornography in the Workplace, 22 Sw. U. L.
REV. 53, 60-67 (1992).
6 See Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigm for Sexual Harassment: Toward the Optimal Level of Loss,
47 VAND. L. REV. 427, 436-76 (1994); cf Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-
Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1157 (igg5) (defining sexual harassment as conduct
"that would lead a rational woman to alter her workplace behavior [to avoid the conduct] if she
could do so at little or no cost).
7 See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the
First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 481 (iggi); Michael P. McDonald, Unfree Speech, i8 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 479, 484-85 (1995); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Work-
place Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992).
8 See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men. The Ideology of Reasonable-
ness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. I177 (1990).
9 Cf Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment? 49 STAN. L. REv. 69i,
694 (1997) (noting that the problem of same-sex harassment reveals "malaise" and "laziness" in
sexual harassment jurisprudence).
10 Some writings on sexual harassment omit this description. The omission appears to be de-
liberate in economics-focused writings, see Reilly, supra note 6, at 434, and consistent with the
general reluctance of economic analysis to judge the normative value of individual choices, see
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14-15 (2d ed. 1971), even the choice to
harass. Whether intentional or accidental, the absence of a working notion of what sexual ha-
rassment means is harmful to scholarship on the subject. On the persistence of this omission, see
pp. 448-49 below.
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ventures a joke." ' For other writers, the paradigm of workplace ha-
rassment is coercion, an obscene gauntlet forced on a woman who
needs her job.12 At the root of this difference lies contention over
whether claims of harassment ought to be judged from the vantage
point of the object of harassment or from the perspective of the puta-
tive harasser.
A separate division reveals itself in the crafting of causes of action
and legal remedies. Should fault be pivotal? On one hand, "harass-
ment" connotes wrongful conduct inflicted by one individual and suf-
fered by another; tort remedies for sexual harassment comport with
this perspective. On the other hand, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
(and, as I have argued elsewhere, the approach to sexual harassment
that prevails in Europe 3) takes a different approach by focusing on
atmosphere or working conditions rather than fault.
The gap between competing perspectives on sexual harassment, so
indicative of confusion and disagreement, has never been satisfactorily
bridged. Meanwhile, the topic expands in notoriety. While judges and
scholars try to define and explain hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, its meaning - a nimble Houdini of legal doctrine - continues
to escape their chains.
Even the redoubtable Justice Scalia could not get a lock on the
phrase, and hostile environment sexual harassment may go down in
Supreme Court history as the subject that left him at a virtual loss for
words. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , 14 the Court was called on
to provide an explanation of this concept. Quickly and unanimously,
the Justices acknowledged the injury of hostile environment harass-
ment but could add little descriptive detail. Justice O'Connor resorted
to synonyms: a hostile environment is an "abusive" one, filled with
"severe [and] pervasive" conduct.' 5 Refusing to provide "a mathemati-
cally precise test," Justice O'Connor insisted that a hostile environment
"can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances."'1 6 Justice
11 See Sara P. Feldman-Schorrig & James J. McDonald, Jr., The Role of Forensic Psychiatry in
the Defense of Sexual Harassment Cases, ig J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 6-8 (1992); David Thomas,
Fatal Attractions, TIMES (London), May 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Archives
File (referring to innocent overtures that are misunderstood); What 222,653 Teens Said, USA
TODAY, Sept. 8, 1996, at io, I2 (noting that jokes may be misperceived as harassment and vice
versa).
12 See MACKINNON, supra note 4, passim; Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman"
Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing
Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 402-08 (1996).
13 See Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1228 passim (1994).14 51o U.S. 17 (1993).
15 Id. at 21, 22.
16 Id. at 22. Though reluctant to give readers the guidance that Justice Scalia would have pre-
ferred, Harris adds emphasis to a prior Supreme Court holding that hostile environment sexual
harassment constitutes a Title VII violation when it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."' Meri-
tor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 .2d
[Vol. 111:445
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Scalia wrote a separate concurrence, confessing that he could not de-
fine hostile environment. "I know of no alternative"1 7 to this defini-
tional void, admitted the Justice - a man confident about the true
meanings of separation of powers,18 just compensation, 19 the dormant
commerce clause,20 substantive due process, 21 national security,2 2 free-
dom of speech,23 and race neutrality.
4
The word "abusive" or "hostile," Justice Scalia continued, "does not
seem to me a very clear standard - and I do not think clarity is at all
increased by adding the adverb 'objectively' or by appealing to a 'rea-
sonable person['s]' notion of what the vague word means."'2 Because
courts have been unable to enunciate a clear standard, juries remain
unguided, as do men and women in the workplace. Justice Scalia
added a telling comparison to negligence.' 6 Although "negligent," like
"hostile," means what a jury says it means, at least in negligence cases
physical harm limits the number of potential plaintiffs.27  In hostile
environment cases abusiveness is the harm, unless plaintiffs are re-
quired to prove psychological injury or other severe detriment, a bur-
den the Court rejected in Harris.'8 Thus the doctrinal enigma is to be
reiterated in an infinity of future hostile environment claims.'
9
Strange to relate, the beginning of a resolution may be found in a
short opinion by Justice Scalia himself. In one of his early concur-
rences, Justice Scalia attacked the Miller v. California3 ° standard of
obscenity law,3' especially its search for "value" by reference to com-
munity standards: "Since ratiocination has little to do with esthetics,
the fabled 'reasonable man' is of little help in the inquiry, and would
897, 904 (iith Cir. I982)). Meritor reached the Court in part because of what Justice O'Connor
later called the "appalling conduct" alleged there, including rape. Harris, 5io U.S. at 22. But in
Harris, Justice O'Connor observed that "egregious examples" of hostile environments "do not
mark the boundary of what is actionable." Id.
17 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., concurring).
18 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426-27 (i989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United
States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
19 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-37 (1987).
20 See American Tucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202-05 (i99o) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
21 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 12X-30 (1989).
22 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 615-2i (x988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (i992).
24 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
25 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5io U.S. 17, 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 20-22.
29 See id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
30 413 U.S. i5 ('973).
31 See id. at 24 (holding that a court should look to whether the work as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest, whether it "depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way," specific sexual
conduct, and whether the work lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
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have to be replaced with, perhaps, the 'man of tolerably good taste' -
a description that betrays the lack of an ascertainable standard."32
Imagine "the man of tolerably good taste." Though he eludes legal
definition, this man is more central than the reasonable person to an
understanding of offensive conduct; in questioning the importance of
reason in evaluating obscenity, Justice Scalia was certainly right. The
reasonable man, woman, or person advances the analysis of conduct
when that conduct is challenged as wasteful, imprudent, negligent,
reckless, excessive, or inadequate. But reason and reasonableness have
little to do with offensiveness 33 as it exists in our laws of obscenity and
sexual harassment, and reason is especially useless in evaluating both
the conduct of an alleged harasser and the reaction of a complainant.
34
How, then, to understand sexual harassment? This Article ven-
tures an explanation. Hostile environment sexual harassment, I argue,
is a type of incivility or - in the locution that I prefer - disrespect.35
For purposes of doctrine, accordingly, hostile environment complaints
should refer to respect; the plaintiff should be required to prove that
the defendant - a man, or a woman, or a business entity36 - did not
conform to the standard of a respectful person. This respectful person
standard would rightly supplant references to reason and reasonable-
ness; respect is integral to the understanding and remedying of sexual
harassment, whereas reason is not.
3 7
In giving content to the ideal of equality behind Title VII as well as
the ideal of individual autonomy behind dignitary-tort law, this re-
spectful person standard would fit within the two most important legal
bases for redressing sexual harassment in the workplace. 38 Focus on
32 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Jeff Rosen,
'Miller' Time, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. I, i99o, at 17 ("Reasonable people attacked Manet's Ddjeuner
SurL'Herbe and Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy' as indecent.").
33 See 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO
OTHERS 35-36 (I985).
34 See Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 12 14-32; infra pp. 467-68.
3s For one judge's expression of this idea, see Stephen Reinhardt, Foreword to BARBARA
LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW at xiii (1992).
Reinhardt argues: "[W]e [must] learn to treat all individuals with respect and afford them the per-
sonal dignity they deserve. If we do, sexual harassment will largely be a thing of the past." Id.
36 Research indicates that about "90% of workplace sexual harassment cases arise from men
harassing women." HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 833
(4 th ed. 1996). Accordingly, this Article, like most writings on sexual harassment, uses nouns and
pronouns consistent with this gender division, although other gender permutations are discussed.
37 A role remains for reasonableness. See infra pp. 498-504.
38 Of these various legal remedies, 'itlie VII receives primary attention in this Article. I devote
little time to other devices such as workers' compensation and the criminal law of extortion, be-
cause they are relatively unimportant in sexual harassment case law. Several courts have allowed
dignitary-tort remedies for sexual harassment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d
1437, 1439 (ioth Cir. 1997) (allowing a pendent claim for battery in a Tile VII action); Rudas v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 96-5987, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16g, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 1997)
(allowing a claim for assault and battery); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987) (ap-
proving a judgment against a defendant corporation for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
[Vol. 111:445
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respect addresses the concerns of both those who identify with the im-
perfect humanity of the accused harasser and those who seek foremost
to purge sexual coercion from the workplace. Respect also reconciles
competing perspectives on fault, simultaneously recognizing the tort-
like wrong of sexual harassment and the Title VII emphasis on work-
place discrimination.39 It gives shape to a problem whose outlines
have been blurred and contested. Despite its apparent novelty, the re-
spectful person standard is intelligible, easy to execute, and not espe-
cially vulnerable to abuse or confusion. In short, it is likely to help re-
duce the incidence of hostile environment sexual harassment and to
provide a remedy for injured plaintiffs.
This proposed standard may eventually achieve acceptance in other
areas of law: it is imaginable that hostile environment sexual harass-
ment can serve as a circumscribed testing ground for a respectful per-
son standard that will develop more general utility. Just as the nine-
teenth-century reasonable man went on to find a place in doctrines
other than negligence, where he first flourished, the respectful person
is a device that may work well outside of sexual harassment. For now,
however, I confine my argument to the bounded, though expanding,
territory of hostile environment sexual harassment.
This limited approach may not satisfy some readers, inasmuch as
respect resembles other affirmative ideals such as altruism and charity.
Indeed it is nearly a tenet that in the liberal state legal rules cannot be
deployed solely to dictate virtue - or, in the more commonly evoked
phrase, to legislate morality.40 In this view, the virtues that law is com-
tress). On equality and autonomy - the ideals honored by the respectful person standard - see
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C. L. REV. 375, 383 (I985), in which Ginsburg finds the concepts important to an understand-
ing of sex discrimination in the abortion context.
39 Some commentators on Title VII exaggerate the dichotomy between tort-like discrimina-
tion-as-wrong and discrimination-as-social-inequality. To them, fault inquiries appear counter-
productive. See MACKINNON, supra note 4, at I58 (claiming that tort remedies are flawed be-
cause they hold women to "traditional male and female norms" and do not facilitate equality);
Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case
Against "Tortification" of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1994). Legislative
history does not support a rejection of the fault-based approach. See MACK A. PLAYER,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 201-02 (I988) (noting the absence of traditional sources of
legislative history). One major revision of Title VI, the Civil Rights Act of i99i, brings fault to
center stage. Enumerating four purposes, the Act lists first its goal "to provide appropriate reme-
dies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace." Civil Rights Act
of i99i, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(I), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (i99I). On the burgeoning role of fault
in the federal civil rights statutes, see Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1gg: From
Conciliation to Litigation - How Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, i4i MIL. L. REV.
I, 4 (1993), and compare George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV.
117, ii9 (1995), which refers to "the whole regime of fault on which employment discrimination
law has been based." Id.
40 This principle is implicit in such influential works as JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Hafner Press 1948) (1789), and H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
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petent to enforce do not extend much beyond nonaggression and toler-
ance.41 Although a strong alternative tradition, which maintains that
the liberal state ought to overcome its agnosticism about virtue and
promote an edifying vision of the good life,42 opposes this view, I be-
lieve that my proposal is consistent with a traditional liberal outlook.
For current purposes, consider the Latin etymology of respect -
"respicere," to look back, or to take a second look.43 The reader is in-
vited to regard again this familiar word, apart from its connotation of
moral virtue.
"Respect" more than other words expresses what is wrong about
the creation or maintenance of a hostile working environment. As
philosophers have elaborated, a fundamental meaning of respect, apart
from a separate meaning of esteem, is recognition of a person's inher-
ent worth. Respect in the sense of recognition is owed to all persons,
and thus workplace sexual harassment betrays the ideal of recognition
respect, regardless of whether the harassed worker deserves high es-
teem. Respect also illuminates what is appropriate about the search
for a legal remedy of this wrong and, more generally, which goals are
attainable in the law's continued endeavor to shape conduct. The
word is at the center of a rich philosophical literature, yet is equally
integral to ordinary lives, suggesting that it can unite ideals with day-
to-day practice. Legal recognition of respect, then, does not merely
exhort a citizenry to improve its morals; it enhances the function and
the intelligibility of doctrine.
The functioning of respect as an element of sexual harassment law
emerges in a study undertaken in the five parts of this Article. I begin
with Title VII doctrine.44 A plaintiff alleging hostile environment sex-
ual harassment in violation of this statute must prove two elements
about the challenged conduct, one subjective and one objective. She
must contend that she perceived her environment to be hostile or abu-
LAW (1961). Also, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 115 (Mark De Wolfe Howe
ed., 1963), disdains "the purpose of improving men's hearts." Id.
41 See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68-69 (Penguin Books i982) (1859). Building upon the works
of Mill and Rawls, this posture is a variation on a claim that the right is prior to the good. See
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 218 (1993); John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of
the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 260-64 (1q88). Because no vision of the good may be dem-
onstrated as superior to another, the state in this view may not promote any ideals except those
that protect or expand the autonomy of individuals. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal
State Can Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1351 (1991).
42 See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 252-55 (iggi); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 46 (1987); KEN-
NETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION passim
(1989); William A. Galston, Two Conceptions of Liberalism, xo5 ETHICS 516, 518 (1995); Suzanna
Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 231, 232 (1995),
43 See Robin S. Dillon, Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration, 22 CANADIAN J. PHIL.
105, 108 (1992).
44 'Utle VII doctrine is in important respects congruent with the plaintiff's burden of proof in
dignitary-tort actions alleging injury caused by sexual harassment
[Vol. 111:445
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sive; put another way, she must have regarded the challenged conduct
as unwelcome at the time it occurred. The environment must also
have been objectively hostile or abusive.45 When considering the ob-
jective element of the prima facie case, virtually all courts resort to the
words "reason" or "reasonable." Throughout this Article, I maintain
that the concept of respect lies below, undetected, while references to
reason purport to govern case outcomes.
Part I details the futility of reasonableness standards for sexual
harassment law. H6stile environment sexual harassment is an indig-
nity, not a violation of norms about prudence or cost avoidance; thus
inquiries about reason or reasonableness have little to say about hostile
environment sexual harassment. This point has been made by writers
at opposite ends of the political spectrum.46 Elaborating on these
foundational objections to a reasonableness standard, I contend in Part
I that the standard cannot be salvaged, no matter which meaning is
used for the word "reasonable." If this word means "characterized by
reason," as some argue,47 then it can tell us nothing whatsoever about
whether any given defendant harassed a plaintiff. Reference to reason
in hostile environment sexual harassment may be worse than beside
the point: it subtly denigrates some claimants and minimizes or denies
the nature of their injury. If the word instead means something like
sensible, moderate, centrist, or willing to accept shared norms, the
standard is equally opaque; like the definition of "reasonable" as "ra-
tional," this alternative meaning is also capable of doing harm by
tending to marginalize and oppress subordinated groups.
Working with similar themes, writers have built a vast critical lit-
erature about reasonableness standards. These judicial and academic
efforts to revise the objective criteria of hostile environment sexual
harassment are examined in Part II, where I discuss the consequences
of a misplaced commitment to reasonableness in American sexual ha-
rassment law. With "reasonable" locked firmly into doctrinal place,
courts and scholars use it to modify various nouns: reasonable woman,
reasonable victim, and more. This unending process of modification is
a quandary because, as advocates of each standard argue cumulatively,
all reasonableness standards are defective. "Reasonable person" has
been challenged by "reasonable woman," which has been attacked in
turn by what I call the tinkerers, whose revisions (reasonable target,
reasonable victim, reasonable person of the same gender as the victim,
4s The prima fade case includes other elements less pertinent to this Article. See Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 9o3-oS (zith Cir. 1982) (applying a five-part burden of proof).
46 Compare pp. 448-49 (summarizing the views of Justice Scalia), with Ehrenreich, supra note
8, at 1230-32.
41 See supra pp. 448-49 (noting the views of Justice Scalia); see also Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr.,
The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report on the "Odious Creature", 23 OKLA. L.
REV. 410, 420-24 (1970) (distinguishing the reasonable man from the average man, the attentive
man, the ideal man, the composite man, and the subjective standard).
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ad infinitum) are in turn condemned by those who decide to return to
the reasonable person. This circular contest of flawed standards re-
calls the children's game of rock-paper-scissors. A small but eloquent
cohort of lawyers and scholars express their discontent with the rea-
sonableness standard by arguing in favor of a purely subjective ap-
proach, where the plaintiff would need to allege little more than that
she found sex-based workplace conduct unwelcome. This bold pro-
posal, though cogent, throws away too much. Retaining an objective
standard is necessary to affirm the reality - the genuine, non-
idiosyncratic injuriousness - of sexual harassment. Yet reasonable-
ness cannot anchor sexual harassment law.
Part III describes my alternative standard, the respectful person.
This Part of the Article, aided by philosophy and moral theory, deems
respect the pivotal concept of a legal standard for hostile environment
sexual harassment cases. Fundamentally a wide-ranging description of
relations between human beings, respect in this Part stays within Title
VII boundaries. Thus the second half of Part III unites respect with
other elements of the statute and its judicial gloss, including "hostile
environment," "pervasiveness," and "discrimination on the basis of
sex." These additional concepts bring respect into a group-focused ref-
erent that would build coherent and stable doctrine.
The respectful person standard is a conservative reform. Like
other rules governing civil litigation, the standard would sometimes
undergird summary judgments - and in so doing keep complainants
from juries, assist defendants whose conduct was blameworthy, and
bar the claims of individuals who have been genuinely hurt.48 Never-
theless, the ideal of a respectful person is also a source of change. It
can reduce the type of disrespect now condemned, but not directly ad-
dressed, by sexual harassment law, and allow everyday civility to
flourish. Its connection to philosophy does not render the respectful
person a utopian dream for intellectuals. Many qualities of this indi-
vidual are similar to those of the prevailing reasonable person: as Kant
taught, reason and respect are related ideals. Moreover, current
American law, both statutory and judge-made, already values the
quality of respect. The respectful person is someone each of us can
become, without undue departure from existing norms. The attain-
ability of respectful personhood is one of several virtues of this stan-
dard noted in Part IV, where I argue that in contrast to reason, with its
tradition of exclusion, respect transcends the divisions created to clas-
sify human beings.49
48 A recent article defends the value of summary judgment in sexual harassment cases. See
Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne Seidman, Seeking a "Safe Harbor". The Viability of Summary Judg-
ment in Post-Harris Sexual Harassment Litigation, 20 S. ILL. U. LJ. 223, 230-32 (1996).
49 The switch from reason to respect implicitly acknowledges numerous African-American
women whose workplace experiences built such a great share of hostile environment law. See,
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The proposed standard has numerous other virtues. Disrespect
rather than unreason fits with the dignitary injury of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment. In contrast to the gendered pedigree of the
reasonable person and the gendered slant of both "reasonableness" and
"reasonable woman," the respectful person comes close to gender neu-
trality. And following the approach taken in virtually every other sub-
category of law that uses the reasonable person, the respectful person
standard focuses on the conduct of an actor rather than the reaction of
a complainant.50 The respectful person is also a device that jurors can
employ well.5I
Perhaps most important, identification of the respectful person
makes a guarded contribution to the melding of moral reasoning and
law. This project of melding, identified by James Barr Ames in his
classic essay on the duty to act in behalf of' another,5 2 improves the law
by making it more congruent with the dictates of morality, while trying
to avoid the dangers of authoritarianism, sanctimony, utopian fantasy,
procedural infirmity, and overreaching beyond competence. The legal
enforcement of respect falls within this tradition of melding morality
and law. Furthermore, though it shapes conduct, it would restrain no
liberty that statutory civil rights law, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, does not already limit. The respectful person is thus both a re-
form and a clarification of what civil rights and dignitary-tort law now
demand.
I. ON REASON AND REASONABLENESS AS THEY PERTAIN TO
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Consider two ways to interpret references to the reasonable person
in hostile environment sexual harassment law. The first is traditional
and literal: a reasonable person possesses certain cognitive traits, uses
a faculty for analysis to solve problems, and believes in principles of
causality, deductive logic, probabilistic calculation, and other exem-
e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966 (ioth Cir. i99I); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 88i
F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Disrespect, not unreason,
drove these plaintiffs to the courts. The goal of respect is also an important theme in writings
about women in the workplace that focus on class. See JOAN SANGSTER, EARNING RESPECT:
THE LIVES OF WORKING WOMEN IN SMALL-TOWN ONTARIO 1920-1960, at iio-i6 (1995); cf.
TONI GILPIN, GARY ISAAC, DAN LETWIN & JACK McKIVIGAN, ON STRIKE FOR RESPECT: THE
CLERICAL & TECHNICAL WORKERS' STRIKE AT YALE UNIVERSITY (1984--85), at 18-32 (1988)
(discussing the intersection of class and respect in the labor strike context).
50 See Franke, supra note 9, at 751 (noting the advantage of emphasizing the harasser's be-
havior rather than the victim's reaction); cf. OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1038 (I98O) (describ-
ing the reasonable man as a standard to evaluate the conduct of a defendant).
S5 I address Justice Scalia's concern about jury guidance by drafting, and commenting on, a
partial jury instruction to be used in hostile environment cases. See infra pp. 522-24.
S2 See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 111-13 (i9o8). A more recent
essay in this direction is Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: Awareness, Par-
ticipation, and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 470, 470-72 (1993).
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plars of Western thought.53 In this view, phenomena that philosophers
contrast to reason - such as faith or experience - might influence the
reasonable person,5 4 but ratiocination guides his or her decisionmak-
ing. The second possibility, explored by Judge Marie Garibaldi in a
judicial opinion,55 by Michael Saltman in his book on the reasonable
man,56 and by other writers in law reviews,5 7 is to build a meaning of
"reasonable" apart from "reason," to mean something like sensible, or-
dinary, moderate, or average. Veering from etymology, this approach
to the reasonable person within the context of hostile environment
sexual harassment need not refer to reason. Neither meaning, how-
ever, aids in understanding hostile environment sexual harassment.
A. The Trouble with Reason
Reason - in the sense of a faculty or intellectual process - is alien
to the remedying of hostile environment sexual harassment for three
reasons. First, the word has been used for centuries to slur and ex-
clude women, racial minorities, and the less-educated - all groups
that are harmed by sexual harassment out of proportion to their num-
bers.58 Second, a tradition defines reason in contrast to emotion, even
though the concepts of harassment, hostility, and abusiveness are uni-
maginable without reference to emotion. A third tradition views rea-
son as opposite to sex, 9 but sex is an inevitable part of sexual harass-
ment. These dichotomies - reason versus the unreasoning mass of
humanity; reason versus emotion; reason versus sexual impulse - are
mostly false. But they endure and continue to influence American law.
Because of these prejudicial effects, sexual harassment doctrine ought
to look at reason with skepticism.
i. The Tradition of Exclusion. - For centuries Western philoso-
phers agreed that reason was not a widely and universally shared trait
S3 See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, THE FUNCTION OF REASON 1-28 (1929).
54 See G.J. Warnock, Reason, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 83, 84 (Paul Edwards ed.,
reprint ed. 1972).
55 See Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 458 (NJ. 1993).
56 See MICHAEL SALTMAN, THE DEMISE OF THE 'REASONABLE MAN': A CROSS-CULTURAL
STUDY OF A LEGAL CONCEPT passim (1991) (expunging "reason" from "reasonable man").
S7 Cf Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 807-08
(1993) (describing a reasonable person standard that incorporates "all of the shortcomings and
weaknesses tolerated by the community"); Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal
Process: A Profile of the "Reasonable Man", 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 311, 314 (1977) (noting possible
meanings such as "individual perfection" and "a community ideal").
S8 See Susan Ehrlich Martin, Sexual Harassment: The Link Joining Gender Stratification,
Sexuality, and Womens Economic Status, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 22, 25, 32 (JO
Freeman ed., 5th ed. 1995) (correlating traits of women with the experience of being harassed at
work).
59 This view is a common one, notwithstanding Judge Posner's effort to conjoin the two. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
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among human beings. 60 From ancient Greece tfirough nineteenth-
century Europe and beyond, intellectual leaders justified social and
political inequality with reference to the transcendent gift of reason.
Those who could reason best were most fit to govern, to control prop-
erty and its laws, and to make use of lesser creatures.61
On this subject, great minds thought alike.62 According to Aris-
totle, "the deliberative faculty in the soul is not present at all in a
slave; in a female it is present but ineffective; in a child present but
undeveloped." 63 And for Aristotle there could be no good life without
reason: thus a woman's life is always slavish, never fully human.64
Kant wrote that women were not "capable of principles" 65 and that
their "philosophy is not to reason, but to sense.166 For Hegel, women
could not "attain to the ideal" of rational thought: "The difference be-
tween men and women is like that between animals and plants." 67
Rousseau denounced women as incapable of thought and unsuited to
education;68 his "highest accolade"69 for a woman was "Oh lovely igno-
rant fair!"70  Schopenhauer described women as "in every respect
backward," lacking in reason and reflection.71 The great British En-
lightenment philosophers, notably Hobbes, Locke, and Adam Smith,
did not craft misogynous aphorisms about reason as they constructed
their view of the state. Rather, their writings, which refer continually
to the individual, presume the absence of women's thought, consent,
and decisionmaking.7 2
60 See ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 36-37 (1983).
61 See DIANA H. COOLE, WOMEN IN POLITICAL THEORY: FROM ANCIENT MISOGYNY TO
CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM 29-31, 85, 141, IgS-96 (2d ed. 1993) (describing the recurrent argu-
ment in western political thought that men should have political power over women because of
men's superior ability to reason).
62 The celebrated exception is Mill, who championed the equality of women. See JOHN
STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN I (Susan Moiler Okin ed., Hackett Publ'g Co.
1988) (1869).
63 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (J.A. Sinclair trans., 1962). For a discussion of Aristotle's mi-
sogynous view of reason, see Linda R Hirshman, The Book of "A", 70 TEX. L. REV. 971, 979-80
(1992).
64 See Marcia L. Homiak, Feminism and Aristotle's Rational Ideal, in A MIND OF ONE'S
OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND OBJECTIVITY I, 7 (Louise M. Antony & Charlotte
Witt eds., 1993).
65 IMMANUEL KANT, OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEELING OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME
81 (John T. Goldthwait trans., i96o).
66 Id. at 79.
67 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 263 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1952).
68 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE (Barbara Foxley trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1974)
(1762).
69 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, FEMININITY 109 (1984).
70 Id. (quoting 3 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILIuS (Edinburgh, A. Donalson trans., 1768)
(1762)).
71 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, On Women, in SELECTED ESSAYS OF SCHOPENHAUER 338, 346
(Ernest Belfort Bax ed. & trans., 1926).
72 See CAROLE PATEMLAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 43-50, 52-53 (1988) (discussing Hobbes
and Locke); id. at 50-52 (alluding to the subordination of women in classical contract theory).
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As the history of female education demonstrates, these beliefs about
the nature of women have justified the exclusion of girls and women
from schooling and have perpetuated the image of women as incompe-
tent to reason. The belief that intellectual training should be available
to female persons has been widely held in the United States for less
than a century.73 Speaking in the name of reason, authority figures
have long used the language of science to keep women uneducated. 74
Vestiges of these historical beliefs persist,75 as girls and women con-
tinue to learn that reason remains masculine territory.76
This territory is also white: a parallel tradition links reason with
race.77 In his classic, The Mismeasure of Man, Stephen Jay Gould re-
counts the perpetual effort to equate cognitive strength with the traits
of white European men: again and again commentators have falsely
claimed that intellect correlates with skull size, brain weight, facial
features, geographic origin, and other constructs of physical anthropol-
ogy.78  Going further than the white-supremacist researchers that
73 See MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
CHEAT GIRLS 15-41 (1994) (discussing the development of women's education in the United
States).
74 One prominent physician, Edward Clarke, wrote in 1873 to a heeding audience that girls
should not pursue prolonged education because the effort involved would divert blood needed for
menstruation from their wombs to their brains. See id. at 30-31, 231.
75 Today American girls and women are more likely than their male classmates to face neglect,
condescension, sexual exploitation, and biased measurement of their school performance. See id.
at 1-14. Attacks on the Sadkers' work, which have not refuted this general conclusion, are sum-
marized in Carl Horowitz, Does Education Cheat Females?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Oct. 21,
1994, at Ax, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnews File.
76 A continuing national preoccupation with gender difference may now exacerbate unequal
access to the domain of reason. Both feminists and anti-feminists have endeavored to harmonize
the idea of reason with the female experience. In one famous effort, Carol Gilligan argues that
moral reasoning encompasses care and connection to others, a perspective traditionally associated
with women. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 64-66, 105 (1982). Some read Gilligan as construing morality as "an
intertwining of emotion, cognition, and action, not readily separable," whereas the contrasting
perspective, identified with the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, emphasizes "formal rationality."
Lawrence A. Blum, Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory, in AN ETHIC OF
CARE: FEMINIST AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 49, 52 (Mary Jeanne Larrabee ed.,
1993). But see John M. Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender
Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, in AN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMINIST AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 112, 120-24 (Mary Jeanne Larrabee ed., 1993) (arguing that
the distinction between the views of Gilligan and Kohlberg is overdrawn). Although it is too early
to predict how Gilligan's revision will ultimately affect the way reason is understood, thus far it
appears that her ethic of care has expanded the terrain of reason while leaving its traditional un-
derstanding intact.
77 See ASHLEY MONTAGU, THE NATURAL SUPERIORITY OF WOMEN 46 (rev. ed. 1992) ("Ev-
erything that has been said about almost any alleged 'inferior' race has been said by men about
women.").
78 See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 113-22 (1981). Gould critiques a
controversial modem continuation of this argument in Stephen Jay Gould, Mismeasure by Any
Measure, in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS 3, 4-5 (Russell Ja-
coby & Naomi Glauberman eds., 1995).
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Gould surveys, one writer claimed in i868 that "reformers" and
"friends of humanity" were hopelessly naive to struggle against the
manifest design of God:7 9 A black man, wrote John Van Evrie, is inca-
pable even of walking erect, let alone of learning on par with white
men.80 Physicians of the nineteenth century commonly believed that
black women were brutes, entitled to little recognition as human crea-
tures of reason.8' The naturalist Oliver Goldsmith blamed a hot Afri-
can climate for relaxing the "mental powers" of the local population,
rendering Africans "stupid" and "indolent. ' 2
Native Americans received a similar judgment from the white men
who colonized them in the New World. Spanish commentary divided
between noble-savage condescension ("God created these simple people
without evil and without guile," wrote Bartolom6 de Las Casas 3) and
hatred ("What could one expect from a people whose skulls are so
thick and hard that the Spaniards had to take care in fighting not to
strike on the head lest their swords be blunted?"8 4). Americans of
British descent had a similar view of the native population; their con-
cept of a vast frontier conveniently presupposed that no rational be-
ings populated the Americas before the settlement of Jamestown and
Plymouth Rock.85
The last century has eroded these beliefs.8 6 And a century or two
earlier, to be sure, reason prodded the Enlightenment, helping to effect
79 J.H. VAN EVRIE, WHITE SUPREMACY AND NEGRO SUBORDINATION 93-94 (New York,
Van Evrie, Horton & Co., 2d. ed. X870).
80 See id.
81 See BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIILDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF
THE EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN 112 (1978) (describing the use of African-American women
in surgical experiments); Charles S. Johnson & Horace M. Bond, The Investigation of Racial Dif-
ferences Prior to 1go, 3 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 334 (1934) (citing a comparison of black women to
monkeys).
82 I OLIVER GOLDSMITH, A HISTORY OF THE EARTH AND ANIMATED NATURE 213 (Glas-
gow, Blackie & Son I86o).
83 LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FORJUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA II
(1949) (quoting Bartolomd de Las Casas, Colecci6n de tratados 7) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
84 Id. (quoting Gonzalo Fernd-dez de Oviedo, Historia general y natural de las Indians) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
85 See WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB, THE GREAT FRONTIER 3 & n.3 (I952).
86 Yet it remains respectable - even fashionable - for serious writers to argue that women
possess a type of intelligence different from that of men, and that African-Americans possess an
inferior intelligence. On the peculiar nature of women's intelligence, see Broughton, cited above
in note 76, at 113, which describes Lawrence Kohlberg's conclusion that adult men reason at "'le-
galistic' stage 4" while adult women languish in "'conformist' stage 3," and compare GEORGE
GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE 5-18 (1986), which identifies gender differences resulting from
reproductive roles, and POSNER, supra note 59, at 88-98, which identifies those same differences.
For allegations of African-American intellectual inferiority, see RICHARD J. HERRNSTEN &
CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN
LIFE 269-315 (1994), and ARTHURR JENSEN, GENETICS AND EDUCATION 160-63 (1972).
The O.J. Simpson criminal-trial verdict of October 1995 revealed a belief held among some
white observers that African-Americans applaud Simpson's acquittal because of the antirational-
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a repudiation of caste oppression. One might argue accordingly that
progressives should embrace, rather than worry about, reason as a le-
gal concept.8 7 Yet the concept of reason, developed in centuries of
inequality, monarchy, and white-male supremacism, formed an identity
before democracy and the ideal of fidelity to the law could properly in-
form it. Traditions still hold reason to stand for privilege and exclu-
sion. In order to make reason work against sexual harassment, law re-
formers must affirm an understanding of reason of comparable
strength to balance the weight of historical injustice that the concept of
reason bears.
2. Emotion. - Despite warnings by David Hume, Friedrich
Nietzsche, and others that reason and emotion are not paired oppo-
sites,88 the notion persists that reason fuels order and justice while
emotion explodes, at irregular intervals, to disrupt the calm.89 Emo-
tion destabilizes justice. It can be a part of bias, distraction, or over-
identification with another person.90 Reason can, and must, tame this
wayward force. In this view, emotion is the polar opposite of reason. 91
One feminist scholar argues that contractarian political philosophy
equates feminine emotion with the state of nature that civil society
must control.92 Elemental, weak, swayed by immoderate passions,
trapped in their physiology, women are deemed incapable of coming
together to create a just and principled society.93 As Susan Brown-
ist, emotional lens through which they see the world. See Unreasonable Doubt, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 23, 1995, at 7, 8 (attacking the Simpson jury's "emotional refusal to find guilt in the face of
overwhelming evidence). "Apparently [the jury's] decision was based on emotion that overcame
reason," commented prosecutor Gil Garcetti, whose office lost the case. Alexander Cockburn,
White Rage: The Press and the Verdict, NATION, Oct. 30, 1995, at 491. Cockburn's article also
quotes Norman Mailer: "Take a very large generalization: Whites, for example, believe in technol-
ogy. Blacks, I would say, have more belief in divine forces, dark and light." Id.
87 See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEo. LJ. 453, 453-54 (1996) (de-
fending reason from attacks by left- arid right-wing writers).
88 See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN 91-96 (1994); DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
io5 (Charles W. Hendel ed., Liberal Arts Press I957) (1751); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative,
and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cui. L. REv. 361, 368 (1996) ("Emotion and cognition...
act in concert to shape our perceptions and reactions.'). For a summary of various philosophical
critiques of the dichotomy between emotion and reason, see Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I
See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1030 (1996).
89 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON (1983) (equating reason with justice);
see also WMTEHEAD, supra note 53, at 72 (describing reason as a "tendency upwards" that cre-
ates universal order).
90 See Payne v. Tennessee, 5oi U.S. 8o8, 856-57 (199I) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 One founding father of reason as an American legal standard, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
viewed his own temperamental detachment as an asset. See LivA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM
BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 289 (i99i). Baker elabo-
rates that "Holmes's commitment to the external standard, the objective criterion... allowed him
to indulge a personal tendency to detachment from human affairs .... Committed to objectivity,
he need never factor either the human mind or heart into a judicial decision." Id.
92 See PATEMAN, supra note 72, at oo.
93 See id. at 101-02.
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miller elaborates, this stereotype of feminine emotion does not compen-
sate for its alleged deficiencies by encompassing a "deeper emotional
range" or a "greater sensitivity" to nature or subtle feeling.94 When as-
cribed to women, emotion merely buffets. Only reason, deployable by
those who possess the facility, can conquer emotion. And because of
the perceived dichotomy between reason and emotion, valorization of
the one may be had only at the expense of the other. Accordingly, a
legal standard that rests on reason mismeasures the emotional element
of sexual harassment and underdescribes its effects.
Sexual harassment is incomprehensible without the language of
emotion. A hostile working environment is necessarily a cauldron of
intense feelings. As a lawsuit progresses, emotions often escalate, espe-
cially the rage of harassers95 and the harassed.96 Headaches, facial
tics, cardiac ailments, gynecological complaints, and clinical depression
are among the many physical effects of emotional distress that ha-
rassed workers have reported to the courts .97  Below the surface of
court pleadings, one will often discern contempt, glee, sympathy (for
example, the emotional support of friends that encourages a worker to
persist in her complaint), cravings for revenge, and stubborn resolve.
94 BROWNMILLER, supra note 69, at 2o8. Regina Austin notes that the emotion stereotype
generally applies only to the white bourgeoisie. Although working class women and women of
color escape the "emotional" adjective, they do not achieve its opposite designation, "rational."
The adjective opposite to "emotional," applied to them, is "physical" - carnal, brutelike, a re-
source to be used. Regina Austin, Remarks at the Association of American Law Schools Work-
shop on Torts, Washington, D.C. (June 7, 1996); cf Central R.R. v. Whitehead, 74 Ga. 441, 450
(1885) (Hall, J., dissenting) (explaining the custom of assisting white female passengers but not
their black counterparts).
95 See Jackson-Colley v. Department of Army Corps of Eng'rs, 655 F. Supp. 122, 127 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (summarizing testimony that the defendant habitually cursed "at the sky" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Joseph Posner, Attacking a Stone Wall - Examination of the
Alleged Sexual Harasser, in LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE: A GUIDE FOR
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 237, 241-47 (Juanita B. Luis ed., 1994) [hereinafter
LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE] (describing the emotions and psychology of ha-
rassers).
96 See Peggy Crull, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile of the Experiences
of 92 Women, in SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ROMANTIC AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS AT
WORK 67, 69-7o (Dail Ann Neugarten & Jay M. Shafritz eds., 198o) (reporting that 96% of ha-
rassment victims experienced psychological symptoms, including anger); Martin, supra note 58, at
62 (citing a survey in which 78% of harassment victims reported anger).
97 Sexual harassment plaintiffs have claimed to suffer a wide variety of physical effects re-
sulting from emotional distress. See Bristow v. Drake St. Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 350 (7th Cir. r994)
(hives, stomach pains, and vomiting); Schweitzer-Reschke v. Avnet, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1187, 1196-
97 (D. Kan. 1995) (vomiting, diarrhea, and rapid heartbeat); Chester v. Northwest Iowa Youth
Emergency Servs. Ctr., 869 F. Supp. 700, 708 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (headaches, nightmares, cry-
ing, and weight gain); froutt v. Charcoal Steak House, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 899, 9oi (W.D. Va. 1993)
(sleeplessness and depression); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 583 (Ariz. 1987) (suicide attempt
and new facial tic); Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457, 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(heart palpitations and serious drinking problem); see also LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 35,
at 551 & n.112 (describing varied effects of post-traumatic stress disorder that can result from
sexual harassment).
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The neglect or discounting of emotion - an inevitable effect when
reason is the legal standard - not only mischaracterizes the experience
of sexual harassment but also cheapens the measure of the plaintiff's
damages. As American courts have acknowledged following the Har-
ris decision, the core of hostile environment sexual harassment dam-
ages is a disturbance of inner equilibrium, a notion inherently con-
nected to emotional turmoil.98 The I99i amendments to the Civil
Rights Act, allowing monetary damages and expanded redress for psy-
chological injury,99 raised the price of discrimination in the workplace.
By occluding the emotional nature of harassment, a legal standard of
reason harms the prospect of relief for emotional injury that Title VII
now requires.
3. Sex and Reason. - Even more than emotion, sex has been said
to embody the irrational. Sexual pleasures, Aristotle wrote, are "an
impediment to rational deliberation" 00 and displace reason. Proverbs,
slang expressions, literary plots, and other cultural expressions indicate
contemporary Western society's agreement with this ancient declara-
tion. Many social practices (such as sex segregation in education) and
belief systems (such as Augustinian philosophy) affirm it. The disso-
ciation of sex from reason is so strong that even in Sex and Reason,
Richard Posner pauses repeatedly to defend his project of viewing sex
through the lens of rationality; while writing the book he was appar-
ently haunted by the thought that sex and rationality cannot coexist.1' 1
To be sure, sexual harassment is hardly synonymous with sexual
impulse; it therefore does not follow that, because reason is deemed
unrelated to sexual impulse, it is in fact equally unrelated to sexual
harassment. Nonetheless, the sexual dimension of sexual harassment
contributes to the problem of defining hostile environment by an ob-
jective standard. Courts and jurors must judge the nature of a work
environment, but they have little to go on. "Hostile" or "abusive" is a
conclusion rather than a piece of information. So is "harassment."
The victim's subjective experience, according to doctrine, does not
belong in this analysis. What then does the faculty of reason have to
work with? Mainly sex - sex-related conduct, or conduct directed at
98 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (referring
to conditions "[making] it more difficult to do the job" (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,
858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Steiner v. Showboat Oper-
ating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994); Mart v. Dr Pepper Co., 923 F. Supp. i38o, 1384 (D,
Kan. 1996); Paterson v. State, 915 P.2d 724, 728 (Idaho x996).
99 See Civil Rights Act of ix99, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (i99i) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § z981a).
100 POSNER, supra note 59, at I (quoting ARISTOTLE, NIcOIACHEAN ETHICS, bk. VII, at XI)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
101 See id. at 4 (noting that his project may seem "quixotic'); id. at 9-io (suggesting that one
who writes scholarship about sex "is apt to be thought a little off"); id. at 1i6 (referring to "ihe
tendency to think of sex in terms of biological or psychological compulsion').
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the individual because of her sex. 10 2 Reason must understand and ex-
plain an instance of sex.
Here the futility of reason as a standard becomes evident. Unless
courts and juries are committed to a feminism that views sexual ag-
gression as coercion and dominance - following the writings of Susan
Brownmiller on rape'0 3 or Catharine MacKinnon on pornography 0 4
- the presence of sex in the plaintiff's story will tend to suggest ambi-
guity and mystery, beyond the ken of reason. Courts and juries may
see sexual overtures as cool extortion or open hostility but also as de-
mands that originate deterministically, in nature. 05 Unwanted and
unreturned sexual attention makes some observers think of romance,
beauty, and poignant courtship. 0 6 Crude working environments have
received indulgent treatment by writers who combine a sociobiological
outlook with whimsy.07 Once cast as sex, workplace conduct can de-
mur to the inquiries of reason.
This line of thought suggests that attempts to combine sexual be-
havior in the workplace with reason are likely to make the workplace
more like a state of nature, with hostile or abusive conduct rendered
unto Eros, and reason cast aside as irrelevant to the inquiry. At the
same time, however, the opposite danger also lurks: reason may be
taken too seriously, as opposed to ignored. The employer informed by
reason (that is, the "reasonable person," if "reasonable" is deemed to
refer to the capacity for ratiocination) may fear sexually impelled be-
havior because it generates risks and costs. Taking reason seriously
might justify strong efforts to keep sexuality out of the workplace; the
reason-driven employer might try to purge a workplace of flirtation
102 It is true that this phrasing conflates the possible meanings of "sex" - sex as gender and sex
as sexuality. But this overlap reflects the current state of doctrine in sex discrimination and sex-
ual harassment case law. See generally Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 1O5 YALE L.J.
I, 16-18 (995) (discussing judicial confusion about the meanings of sex, gender, and sexual orien-
tation). The idea of sex, despite the definitional inadequacy, serves the taxonomical function of
bringing allegations of sexual harassment together, as a category within legal doctrine.
103 See SUSAN BROWNMMILER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE passim (975);
BROWNMILLER, supra note 69, at 200-01.
104 See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note I, at 146; CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS 9-I1 (1993).
105 See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 5io (9th Cir. 1994) (expressing reluctance to "chill the
incidence of legitimate romance" and stating that "increased proximity breeds increased volitional
sexual activity'); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (noting that sexual
attraction is a "natural" part of work life), rev'd, 6oo F2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
106 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9 th Cir. iggi) (suggesting an analogy to Cyrano de
Bergerac).
107 See, e.g., Jones v. Wesco Invs., Inc., 846 F2d 1154, 1157 n.6 (8th Cir. 1988) (declaring that
too much liability for sexual harassment would cause "either the collapse of our commercial sys-
tem or the end of the human race" (quoting Brief for Appellants at 23, Jones (No. 87-1992)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Lloyd P, Cohen, Sexual Harassment and the Law, SOCIETY,
May/June 1991, at 9 (recalling nostalgically a female colleague who groped the male author at
work).
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and erotic energy.108 This outcome is highly unlikely to occur,109 but it
illustrates the perils of a meaningful definition of reason - reason
with teeth - as a device to interpret and regulate sexual conduct.
Despite these infirmities, reason is pertinent to the prevention and
redress of sexual harassment in at least three ways. First, an actor in-
clined to harass ought to use reason to moderate his passions.110 Sec-
ond, a target of harassment ought to use reason in reacting: there may
be a right way to respond to provocation.' Third, a person charged
with the task of factfinding or dispute resolution ought to use reason in
framing the standard to which an accused individual may be held. 2
Thus the error of current doctrine is not its celebration of reason, but
rather its identification of reason as an end in itself. For purposes of
sexual harassment law, reason is instead a means necessary to the
larger goal of protecting and affirming individual dignity.113
B. The Trouble with a Reasonable Person Standard
Consider now the possibility of expunging reason from the meaning
of "reasonable." The definition of the word then becomes mysterious,
as trial judges have learned to their discomfiture. For generations, ap-
pellate courts have found reversible error in trial judges' attempts to
explain the reasonableness standard to juries," 4 even though appellate
case law itself has proved unequal to this task." 5 Accordingly, the
dimensions of the reasonable person have remained vague. As far as
one may construct the reasonable person from negligence law, this per-
108 See Hon. Alex Kozinski, Foreword to LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 35, at v, ix-xi.
109 See Lisa Jenner, Office Dating Policies: Is There a Workable Way?, HR Focus, Nov. 1993,
at 5 (reporting the reluctance of surveyed human-resource managers to "get involved" in workers'
private lives); see also Lawrence A. Michaels & Tracy L. Thornburg, Although Employers' Re-
strictions on Relationships Between Employees Can Give Rise to Claims, Some Restraints on Of-
fice Romances May Withstand Challenge, NAT'L L.J., Apr. I, 1996, at B5 (noting that no-dating
policies may provoke lawsuits).
110 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 8r (Martin Oswald trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1962) (describing the duty to moderate one's passions).
111 Cf. Joshua Dressier, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REv.
467, 469-70 (1988) (suggesting that certain responses to provocation are not justified, even if they
are excused); Rachel J. Littman, Adequate Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the Decon-
struction of Free Will, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1167 (1997) (arguing that the provocation defense
should be interpreted to encourage individuals "to train their passions').
112 I thank Steve Heyman for his thoughts about this subject, on which this paragraph relies.
113 See infra p. 483.
114 See Freeman v. Adams, 218 P. 6oo, 6oi, 604 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923) (reversing because
"reasonable and prudent man" was described in personal terms); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Gower,
3 S.W. 824, 827 (Tenn. 1887) (reversing judgment for the plaintiff, in part because the trial judge
improperly phrased the standard to the jury as "such care as one of you, similarly employed,
would have exercised').
115 Cf. Reynolds, supra note 47, at 418 & n.sI (describing "extreme judicial statements" result-
ing from attempts to define the reasonable man); Warren A. Seavey, Negligence - Subjective or
Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REv. x, 27 (1927) (concluding that the reasonable man cannot be fully
defined by objective standards).
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son is characterized by common sense and moderation - a prudent,
sensible, centrist member of society, who shares its understandings.
Despite this definitional vagueness, the reasonable person is the fa-
vored device to establish the objective element" 6 of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment complaints." 7 Some virtues of the standard
are evident. It is familiar from other areas of law; it purports to tran-
scend gender, race, and other classifications that divide humanity." 8
The flaws of the standard, however, are also manifest.
i. Does the Reasonable Man Lurk Below? The Cipher of Reason-
ableness. - The reasonable person standard strikes many critics, not
all of them feminists, as peculiarly hollow. Neither "reasonable" nor
"person" gives the factfinder much content to explore. For hostile en-
vironment cases, the reasonable person standard "may be the law," as
George Rutherglen put it, "but it makes sense only if it is not taken too
seriously.""19
For the purpose of resolving sexual harassment claims, the stan-
dard's most crucial omission pertains to gender. As Professor Ruther-
glen elaborates, an employee "is sexually harassed because she is a
woman, or because he is a man, and certainly not because her or his
gender is irrelevant .... Yet a standard framed in terms of a 'reason-
able person' invites us to imagine a genderless victim of harass-
ment.' 20 In search of bland neutrality, courts and commentators who
favor a reasonable person standard confound the purpose of employ-
ment discrimination law.
In positing a genderless victim of sexual harassment, the reasonable
person standard pushes under the rug an embarrassing mass of evi-
dence indicating that gender affects the way men and women perceive
sexual behavior in the workplace. A reasonable person standard im-
plicitly denies that women and men are likely to react differently to
sexual invitations, innuendo, teasing, or displays in the workplace.'
2
'
Yet empirical findings show that men are relatively likely to feel flat-
116 See supra pp. 452-53.
117 One leading reasonable person case established a duty on the trier of fact to "adopt the per-
spective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment under essentially like or simi-
lar circumstances." Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986). The Supreme
Court has also referred to the perspective of the reasonable person in its articulation of a standard
to evaluate the hostility or abusiveness of a work environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510
U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
118 See Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin,
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,267 (1993) (stating that the reasonable person standard includes
consideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim's race, color, religion, gender, na-
tional origin, age, or disability), withdrawn in 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (i994).
119 George Rutherglen, Sexual Harassment: Ideology or Law?, i8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487,
496 (1995).
120 Id.
121 See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1202 (1989).
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tered or amused, whereas women are relatively likely to feel frightened
or insulted, by sex-related behavior or displays at work. 2 2 In par-
ticular, the reasonable woman fears rape, and this fear is so (justifi-
ably) strong that lesser incursions remind her that she could be
raped. 23  When these incursions are pervasive, her environment is a
hostile one. What does the reasonable person think about rape? The
standard keeps silent. It cannot tell judges or juries how much of each
gender's discrete perspective is to be included in the amalgam.
Etymology and legal history are of little help in making the reason-
able person more than a cipher. Despite the lack of specificity con-
veyed by this standard, however, it is clear that the reasonable person
retains some gender: legal scholars agree that the reasonable person
began life as the reasonable man and retains some of his masculine as-
pect.124 In standard reference works, the reasonable man qua man still
exists.125  Many modern authorities prefer to speak of gender neutral-
ity, however, and regard the reasonable man as an anachronism. "Ob-
viously, this form of description is now outdated," declares a popular
122 See DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING 160
(1994); BARBARA GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND
HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS 88, 96-97 (1985); Jolynn Childers, Note,
Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854, 868 n.45 (1993) (citing Joann S.
Lublin, Thomas Battle Spotlights Harassment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, i991, at Bx, BS). But see
Barbara A. Gutek & Maureen O'Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Reasonable Woman Stan-
dard, 5I J. Soc. ISSUES 15I, 155-56, I61 (1995) (retreating in part from Gutek's earlier work that
supported the reasonable woman standard); Michael Rubenstein, Harassment Policies Show
Growing Sophistication, EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES REV., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 32, 33 (quoting a
British survey that found agreement between men and women on whether certain behaviors con-
stituted sexual harassment); cf infra pp. 472-74 (questioning the unitary construct of "woman" to
support generalizations about sexual harassment).
123 See BROWNMILLER, supra note 1O3, at 247-48; Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment
and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, io6 HARV. L. REV. 517, 535-36 (993). Professor
Carolyn Bratt once asked each student in her criminal law class what he or she did on a daily
basis to prevent sexual assault. The male students reported nothing; the women talked about
looking into the back seats of their cars before getting in, sleeping with locked windows in hot
weather, carrying firearms, avoiding dark public places, and other quotidian details. See Lynn
Hecht Schafran, Is the Law Male?: Let Me Count the Ways, 69 CHL-KENT L. REV. 397, 406-o7
(1993).
124 See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 22-23 (1985); Hilary
Allen, One Law for All Reasonable Persons?, 16 INT'L J. Soc. L. 419, 422-24 (1988); Leslie
Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 22-23 (I988);
Collins, supra note 57, at 317-20, 323; Estrich, supra note 4, at 846; Lucinda M. Finley, A Break
in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 57-63
(1989); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
769, 773-74; Wendy Parker, The Reasonable Person: A Gendered Concept?, 23 VICTORIA U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. IO5, io5-o6, 110 (993).
125 The Restatement of Torts states the negligence standard as that of the reasonable man. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283, 291 (1965). The current edition of Black's Law Dic-
tionary provides an entry for "reasonable man" but not "reasonable woman" or "reasonable per-
son." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1266 (6th ed. 199o).
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casebook; "[t]he form used here is the reasonable, prudent person."126
Obviously? If the history of the reasonable person reveals anything, it
reveals disagreement about what the term means. Perhaps the reason-
able person is inevitably a reasonable man, as Leslie Bender
charges,127 incapable of assimilating that which is not "male, white,
and propertied.' 128 Or perhaps the reasonable person - a doctrinal
device frequently turned over to a cross section of lay citizens - is
more likely to promote progress and diversity within authority than
are the elites who decry it.129 Those who despair that the reasonable
person can shed its gendered origins believe that the shift from man to
person is semantic, too shallow to penetrate the longstanding attitude
that the reasonable person is what Susan Estrich once called "a real
man.' 130 Judges, who in the past read the word "person" specifically
to exclude women, 131 may be vulnerable to the same biased tradition.
But these conclusions are speculative; the meaning of reasonable per-
son remains a cipher.
2. Ideologies Embedded in Reasonableness. - Although the rea-
sonableness standard lacks clear content, it is also vulnerable to the
opposite criticism: below the universalism on its surface, reasonable-
ness contains ideologies that are particularistic and oppressive. Be-
cause these meanings of "reasonable" are covert, it is difficult to say
how much danger they represent. Nevertheless, attention to these em-
bedded biases suggests the futility of any progressive remedial stan-
dard based on what is average, shared, or centrist.
a. Pluralism. - In her important article on hostile environment
sexual harassment, Nancy Ehrenreich attacks the assumption behind
the reasonableness standard that sexual harassment law functions in
"an egalitarian and pluralistic world.' ' 32 According to Ehrenreich, the
ideology of pluralism contains certain tenets. First, the ideal demo-
cratic society is comprised of competing subgroups, with none domi-
nating. Second, this society denies the existence of absolute truths.
126 JOHN W. WADE, VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROS-
SER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 146 (9th ed. 1994).
127 See Bender, supra note 124, at 23.
128 Forell, supra note 124, at 770; see also I MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DIScRIM-
INATION: LAW AND LITIGATION 6-34.1 (i99o ) (citations omitted) (stating that "ingrained white
male notions of what is acceptable" define the reasonable person).
129 This suggestion extends slightly an argument made in Paul T. Hayden, Cultural Norms as
Law: Tort Law's "Reasonable Person" Standard of Care, i5 J. AM. CULTURE 45, 50-53 (1992).
130 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 65 (1987).
131 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 442, 445 (1873) (construing "person" in an Illinois
attorney license statute to mean "man"); Parker, supra note 124, at io9 n.28 (describing one court's
construction of a statute to exclude women from practicing law, even though the statute used the
word "persons" rather than "men" and specifically provided that "every word importing the mas-
culine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male").
132 Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1230-31.
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Third, the role of the state is to permit all of these groups to flourish
and contribute to governance.133
Pluralism of this kind thwarts the reformist ambitions of Title VII
and other legal remedies for sexual harassment. By emphasizing tol-
eration and consensus, while disclaiming absolutist statements of truth,
pluralism decrees in effect that the famous plaintiff Vivienne Rabidue
is no more or less entitled to victory in court than Douglas Henry, the
man who plagued her with sex-related insults after she took a job pre-
viously closed to women. 134 Her right to be free from harassment is
mirrored by his freedom to harass. "[Tlhe concepts of freedom and se-
curity are relational (one group's liberty is another's injury),' 135 and
reasonableness cannot explain why one set of interests outweighs an-
other.'36
b. Isolation and Depoliticization. - The reasonable person, until
tinkerers began to modify the standard,'137 could be seen as a human
being without group-related identification. 38 Although people live in
a world influenced by social construction, the reasonableness standard
disavows group-based sources of identity; the reasonable person is
supposed to be free of distracting memories, political commitments,
and group loyalties. 39 Like the Rawlsian creature who peers at the
world from behind his veil of ignorance in order to make ex ante
choices, the reasonable person possesses an absolutely separate and
discrete self.140
Affiliative homo sapiens cannot survive without personal relation-
ships, but group identities press harder on the consciousness of subor-
dinated people - such that, as a general rule, white Americans give
relatively little thought to their race, American Protestants tend to
view their religious identity in spiritual terms rather than as an immu-
133 See id. at 1188-90.
134 See id. at 1221-22 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 8o5 F.2d 6i1 (6th Cir. 1986)).
135 Id. at 1223.
136 Although one might distinguish active from passive courses of conduct in order to conclude
that Rabidue's right to be let alone is stronger than Henry's right to harass, a distinction of this
kind does not indicate which set of wishes is more "reasonable" and leaves open several questions,
some of which are taken up in the literature on criminal law. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Virtue and
Inculpation, lO8 HARV. L. REv. 1423, 1429-31 (1995) (discussing the philosophical conundrum of
applying a "balancing-of-interests" test, a reasonableness approach, to self-defense); Dan M. Ka-
han & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 3o6-23 (1996) (explaining the provocation defense in terms of a reason-based, "evaluative"
conception of emotion).
137 See infra pp. 477-80.
138 Cf. AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 1 (1996) (arguing that American
legal traditions neglect group-based sources of identification).
139 See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A
Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 435, 436-37, 462-67
(198i).
140 Cf Linda R. Hirshman, Is the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 COLUMI. L.
REV. 186o, 1881 (1994) (criticizing Rawls).
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table marker of who they are, and heterosexual men are not much pre-
occupied with gender and sexual orientation. Every human being is
endowed with particularistic traits, but some groups experience their
particulars more consciously and intensely than others, and these
groups will find dissonance in the call to be reasonable. As Guido
Calabresi and others argue, this asymmetry means that the reason-
ableness inquiry reinforces majority dominance. 14 1 Implicitly it posits
a norm in which men and majority groups occupy the center and oth-
ers the periphery.142
In denying group identity and self-concepts that extend beyond the
individual, the reasonableness standard is implicitly opposed to con-
scious political or historical postures. This resolute inattention to
group-based memory is contrary to the kind of thinking that ignites
sexual harassment claims. It may be surmised, for instance, that mi-
nority women are more likely than white women to choose to bring
sexual harassment claims because their experience with past discrimi-
nation causes them to conclude, more quickly and certainly than
would white women, that their work environment is not benign. Dif-
ferent histories yield different judgments of working conditions, de-
spite the claims of universality implicit in the reasonableness standard.
Lifted out of context, one incident at work may seem trivial; history
and political affiliation may cast the incident in a more malevolent
light.143
c. Assumption of Risk and Consensus. - As Catharine MacKinnon
has pointed out, the reasonable person standard carries the risk that
judges and others might infer that the reasonable person would accept
ordinary or widespread behavior, so that "the pervasiveness of an
abuse" could make that conduct "non-actionable.' 44  When Vivienne
141 See, e.g., CALABIRsI, supra note 124, at 27-32.
142 See Bender, supra note 124, at 25; Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1213.
143 For an illustration of this point, consider the recurring problem of pin-ups and nude photo-
graphs of women in the workplace. Commentators disagree about whether such displays cause or
indicate a hostile environment. At the center of this disagreement is a dispute over how these im-
ages of women - objectified, flattened into two dimensions, physically exposed - relate to the
women who work amidst these depictions. Perhaps the reasonable person knows and cares
nothing about MacKinnonite talk of objectification and subordination; such a person might think
that women at work are individuals unaffected by pictures of others. Equally plausible, the rea-
sonable person might believe that these images function to give women in the immediate envi-
ronment a message that they are nothing but flesh, to be used and despised. Although neither
view is precluded by a reasonableness standard, the latter approach requires a level of overt po-
litical engagement that the standard appears to disdain.
144 MAcKINNON, supra note i, at 1s. MacKinnon was quoted with approval in Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 76o F. Supp. 1486, 1526 (M.D. Fla. iggi). Tort law has long recog-
nized the dangers of inferring reasonableness from the pervasiveness of a particular behavior. In
a landmark torts case, Judge Learned Hand wrote that custom alone does not determine reason-
ableness: an entire industry or sector could be wrong, and the custom unreasonable. See New
England Coal & Coke Co. v. Northern Barge Corp. (The T.. Hooper), 6o F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
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Rabidue entered a pornography-strewn workplace as one of a minority
of female employees doing relatively high-status work, and later ob-
jected to the conditions of this workplace, she challenged an environ-
ment that probably seemed reasonable to its inhabitants. Her objec-
tions, which departed from the norm at Osceola, were correlatively
unreasonable, according to the court that heard her claim. 145 Under
this kind of assumption-of-risk logic, the reasonable person standard
coexists comfortably with a certain amount of harassment.
Catharine MacKinnon envisages sexual harassment as business as
usual in a gendered work world, such that any standard grounded in
consensus or average expectations would permit harassment to flour-
ish.146 Her point is supported by research suggesting that both women
and men tend to believe that women dress seductively at work147 and
that some women avidly seek out what other people would deem ha-
rassment.148 A woman who wants to prosper on the job must consider
the expectation that she behave in a feminine manner.149 If women
must be feminine at work, then men must be masculine, and thus
women may feel compelled to project an image of sexual availability,
while men expect women to project such an image.' 50 In this gen-
dered equilibrium, it is a spoilsport complainant, rather than an ag-
gressor, who will seem unreasonable.
d. Misuse of the Reasonableness Standard. - Some proponents of
the principal alternative, a reasonable woman standard, argue that
reference to the reasonable person misdirects courts and jurors. Toni
Lester sees a connection between the reasonable person standard and
misogynous stereotyping.' 5 ' As she points out, judicial opinions that
use the reasonable person standard have blamed women for dressing
provocatively, wondered why complainants took so long to complain,
and disapproved of women who talk about having fantasized. 52
1932) ("Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.").
145 See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 R Supp. 419, 433 (E.D. Mich. 1984), af'd, 805 F.2d
613 (6th Cir. 1986). The trial judge wrote that ubiquitous displays of pornography did not create
an offensive work environment under Title VII because "modern America features open displays
of written and pictorial erotica... Living in this milieu, the average American should not be le-
gally offended by sexually explicit posters." Id.
146 See MACKINNON, supra note I, at iiS.
147 See GUTEI, supra note 122, at 96-99.
148 Almost no women aim this belief at themselves. See id. at 99.
149 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-37 (z989) (discussing the assertion
that the plaintiff was denied a promotion for not conforming to a feminine stereotype); cf. Note,
Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender, io8
HARV. L. REv. X973, 1996 (i995) ("Working women perceived to be too masculine ... may be
deemed bad mothers.").
ISO See MAcKINNON, supra note 4, at 18, 22-23.
151 See Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual Harassment Law - Will It Really
Make a Difference?, 26 IND. L. REV. 227, 232-42 (I993).
152 See id. at 237.
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Whether Professor Lester is right to lay these sins at the feet of the
reasonable person standard may be debated; although female plaintiffs
have arguably had more success using the reasonable woman stan-
dard, 5 3 the "reasonable woman" hardly guarantees victory. 5 4 But one
might agree that the vacuity of the term "reasonable person" could
cause a judicial mind to wander and become distracted by hemlines or
testimony about raunchy office talk. One student commentator makes
a similar point by arguing in favor of a reasonable woman standard
despite endorsing an objective standard; he maintains that the reason-
able person is so amorphous that judges and jurors cannot form any
image when the standard is used. 55 Whether one thinks that univer-
salism should be exalted or despised, the reasonableness standard can-
not deliver it.
II. DOCTRINAL REVISION: THE REASONABLENESS QUANDARY
This Part of the Article advances two propositions. First, by re-
viewing cases and academic literature, it underscores the point made
by Justice Scalia in his Harris concurrence: no satisfactory standard
for hostile environment sexual harassment now exists.'5 6 Judges and
scholars have proved that they can neither frame an appropriate ob-
jective standard, nor argue convincingly that the objective standard
ought to be dropped. These circumstances suggest doctrinal trouble
and the need for an alternative. Second, this Part urges the reader to
draw a pointed inference. As discussed above, "reasonable person"
provides neither gender neutrality nor meaningful content. The fur-
ther failure of "reasonable woman" to improve on "reasonable person,"
the futility of continuing to tinker ad absurdum, and the perils of
abandoning objectivity add up to a strong condemnation of any stan-
dard based on reasonableness. The inference urged is that the adjec-
tive, rather than the noun, needs replacement.
A. Innovation: The Reasonable Woman
The idea of a reasonable woman in the law has long provoked tit-
ters. Recall Alan Herbert's famous little joke:
The view that there exists a class of beings, illogical, impulsive, careless,
irresponsible, extravagant, prejudiced, and vain, free for the most part
from those worthy and repellent excellences which distinguish the Reason-
able Man, and devoted to the irrational arts of pleasure and attraction, is
one which should be as welcome.., in our Courts as it is in our drawing-
1S3 See Childers, supra note 122, at 894 n.I33.
IS4 See id. at goi n.53.
155 See David L. Pinkston, Comment, Redefining Objectivity: The Case for a Reasonable
Woman Standard in Hostile Environment Claims, i993 BYU L. REV. 363, 374-75.
156 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5io U.S. 17, 24 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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rooms. I find therefore that at Common Law a reasonable woman does
not exist.,5 7
Now Sir Alan is gone, and the reasonable woman standard has
been approved in a number of federal courts, 5 8 as well as state courts
called on to interpret analogues to Title VII.159 According to Ellison v.
Brady,160 the objective criterion for a claim of hostile environment
sexual harassment is satisfied if the plaintiff can show that a reason-
able woman would have found the challenged workplace environment
to be hostile or abusive.16' The standard continues to gain influence
but has also provoked resistance.162
i. Different Strokes, or The Charge of False Essentialism. - Con-
sider this exchange:
PLAYBOY: Some courts have held that sexual harassment charges should
be viewed from the standard of a "reasonable" woman. Do you agree?
[NADINE] STROSSEN: There's no such thing as a reasonable-woman stan-
dard. A couple of weeks ago, I did a panel discussion on Court TV with a
female gender discrimination lawyer. We talked about the case known as
Ellison vs. Brady, involving unrequited love between IRS employees: A
male employee asked a female employee out for drinks and dinner. When
she didn't respond, he pursued her with letters. The other female lawyer
on the panel described her own reaction as: "This man wrote notes that
were so threatening and so intimidating that I know if I had gotten them,
I'd have been really frightened." I said, "I can't believe it. I thought
those notes were so pathetic. I felt sorry for the man." And Arthur Miller,
who was the moderator, said: "Well, which one of you is the reasonable
woman?" 1
63
157 A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 20 (ist Am. ed. 1930).
158 See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus. Inc., 989 F2d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 1993); Yates v.
Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp.
283, 294 (E.D. Pa. '99')..
IS9 See Bougie v. Sibley Manor, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. CL App. 1993); Wood v. Em-
erson Elec. Co., No. oi-A-oI-931o-CH00467, 1994 WL 716270, at *15-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. I2,
1994).
160 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Ellison is considered the leading case. How Ellison achieved
this stature is not quite clear. It was not the first federal court opinion to adopt the reasonable
woman standard in a reported hostile environment sexual harassment case; that honor probably
goes to Yates, see 8ig F.2d at 637. Professor Forell, however, describes Ellison as "the first case to
explicitly adopt a feminist version" of the standard. Forell, supra note 124, at 797.
161 See Ellison, 924 Eld at 878-79. A student commentator elaborates that the reasonable
woman has "reasonable expectations concerning what is appropriate and inappropriate, what is
fair and unfair.... [She assesses] that which is fair, proper, just, and suitable under the circum-
stances, while taking into consideration a backdrop of female life experiences." Bonnie B. West-
man, Note, The Reasonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,
18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 795, 819 (1992).
162 See, e.g., Todd B. Adams, Universalism and Sexual Harassment, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 683,
685-89 (i99i).
163 Dorothy Atcheson, Defending Pornography: Face to Face with the President of the ACLU,
PLAY'BOY, Feb. 1995, at 37, 39.
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In a more scholarly medium, Angela Harris argues that postulates
about the nature of "woman" are often tainted with the bias of the
writer.164 Her critique of the essentialism and racism implicit in dis-
cussions of the nature of "woman" also applies to attempts to delineate
the "reasonable woman": those who envision the "reasonable woman"
may actually have a white woman in mind. Minority women's experi-
ences are thus ignored. This point inverts George Rutherglen's criti-
cism of the reasonable person standard.16S Whereas the reasonable
person standard seems to convey specific information about objective
criteria but is actually, according to Rutherglen, vague to the point of
inanity, the reasonable woman standard looks general but is specific.
An examination of the hidden normative premises of the reasonable
woman standard might reveal this profile: white, heterosexual, upper-
income, something of a moderate or liberal feminist, untroubled by in-
tense religious feeling, and a little prissier than the reasonable person
in reacting to office shenanigans. In its hidden specificity, the reason-
able woman standard elevates one type above others such that she re-
quires no modifiers, whereas departures from this norm might include
the "reasonable woman of color," "reasonable lesbian," or "reasonable
blue-collar woman." A woman who does not fit in the confines of the
profile thus may not find a place in the unmodified reasonable woman
standard.
Feminist writers have written extensively about the dangers of
what they call essentialism. 66 While commending attention to gender
and deeming it long overdue within the law, these scholars have urged
courts and scholars not to construct a unitary, polarized "woman" that
would hamper the movements and variations found within the female
population. 67 A gendered variation on the reasonable person implies
a confining standard. As Kathryn Abrams elaborates, one tenet of
feminism - that women have been and remain oppressed - has be-
gotten an entire generation of beliefs about female agency that impede
progress and misdescribe the life experiences of many women. 68
More, perhaps, than the reasonable man or reasonable person stan-
dard, the reasonable woman standard contains the manacles of gender-
164 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581 passim (iggo).
165 See supra p. 465.
166 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of Essen-
tialism, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 43 (i994); Harris, supra note 164; see also Merle H. Weiner, Do-
mestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L. REV. 183, 226-27 & n.200 (i995)
(describing evidence of class and race bias in attempts to generalize about women).
167 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory
and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 566 (1992) ("There is no single
'reasonable woman.'").
168 See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLuM. L. REV. 304, 337 (1995).
1997]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
oppression, even though it seeks to reduce the effects of this oppres-
sion.
2. Holding Men to a Female Standard. - The reasonable woman
standard requires the factfinder to put himself, or herself, in the place
of the complainant. He, or she, must try to suppose how a reasonable
woman would react to a set of workplace conditions. As these awk-
ward grammatical locutions suggest, the exercise may be difficult.
A male juror, judge, or labor arbitrator cannot easily apply the rea-
sonable woman standard. Although the standard implies that men
and women are immutably different and perhaps mutually uncompre-
hending - and also that this gap is especially wide and deep when
hostile environment sexual harassment is alleged - this factfinder is
charged with the task of somehow transcending these differences. 169 If
he uses women he knows well as reference points ("How would my
wife feel?'), he veers into subjectivity and distinctions based on race
and class. If he avoids this kind of specific thinking, then he must re-
sort to speculation, or some self-framed variation on the reasonable
man or reasonable person standard, or perhaps some unauthorized re-
search on the nature of women - all of which compel him to disobey
jury instructions or otherwise fail to apply the law. Of course, this di-
lemma presumes a sympathetic attitude on the part of this well-
intentioned factfinder. He may feel otherwise. As Todd Adams wants
to know, why should courts privilege the beliefs of a reasonable
woman over those of a reasonable man?170 One could certainly make
a case for this sort of affirmative action, but until its proponents ex-
plain it, the reasonable woman standard remains anomalous and per-
haps unjust.
Institutional competence is another concern. From the snickers
that accompanied the inclusion of "sex" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964
- a few racist congressmen thought the idea of making sex discrimi-
nation illegal was so ludicrous that this one word would kill the bill' 71
- through the behaviors of various senators during the Clarence
Thomas confirmation process, and into the present time, legal institu-
169 See Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illu-
sion?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 636 ('993).
170 See Adams, supra note x62, at 687. Nancy Ehrenreich makes a similar point in her discus-
sion of the Rabidue case: if Douglas Henry called Vivienne Rabidue filthy names at work, it is not
possible to know whose freedom should prevail (Henry's to call names or Rabidue's to be free of
name-calling) without resort to some normative premise. See Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1221-
22.
171 See Norbert A. Schlei, Foreword to BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW at xi-xii (2d ed. 1983). The New Republic went on record
calling the amendment a "mischievous joke," Sex and Nonsense, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 1965,
at io, and the contemporary Congressional Record is consistent with this interpretation, see iio
CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith, a sponsor) ("Would you have any sugges-
tions as to what course our Government might pursue to protect our spinster friends in their
'right' to a nice husband and family?").
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tions have not proved their ability to respond well to sexual harass-
ment. They "just don't get it," went the feminist clich6 circa i99i:172
whether the harm is rape, incest, inadequate research about treatments
for disease, lack of access to abortion, violent or degrading pornogra-
phy, unequal pay, unequal education, or any other gender-related in-
justice, the United States legal system is more slothful and complacent
in its responses to harms than many feminists would like. Given a re-
cord of failures, some find it hard to summon any optimism for a rea-
sonable woman standard that could prevail in a hostile, or at least un-
comprehending, environment.
3. Condescension, Stereotyping, and the Pedestal. - Some writers
are offended by the reasonable woman standard, finding it patronizing
to women.17 3 To one critic, the standard divides humanity into per-
sons and women.' 74 It also seems to contemplate a fragile, ultrasensi-
tive victim whose male counterpart is incapable of self-control. 175 The
standard encourages each plaintiff to tell a familiar story of fear, deg-
radation, and failure at self-help. She needs rescue in the form of a la-
bel that credits her with sensitivity and defenselessness. 76 The rea-
sonable woman standard also reminds some writers of prior misplaced
efforts to shield women from a harsh world by restricting their free-
dom. 7 7 One commentator argues that while the reasonable person
172 See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Wages of Cynicism, N.Y. TnMEs, Oct. ii, 1991, at A3i
(faulting members of the Senate Judiciary Committee for insensitivity to "women's experience and
feelings').
173 Women in particular tend to be skeptical of the reasonable woman standard, to offer alter-
natives that refer to "context" and "perspective," or to praise the reasonable woman in guarded
terms. Some women can scarcely contain their contempt for the idea. See, e.g., Tama Starr, A
Reasonable Woman, REASON, Feb. 1994, at 48, 49 ("Mns the menstrual cycle itself the signifier of
female reasonableness? Do our courts and legislators intend that businesses be run on a lunar
cycle, with preordained times for mass edema, irritability, and ovulation?'); Camille Paglia, Re-
marks on Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 26, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Script File (stating that "women must learn how to play hardball" rather than expect the protec-
tion of a reasonable woman standard). One well-respected conservative judge, Edith Jones, has
disapproved of the standard, ruling that harassment must rise to the level of "destroying
[women's] equal opportunity in the workplace" to create a hostile environment claim. DeAngelis
v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Now that most American
women are working outside the home, in a broad range of occupations and with ever-increasing
responsibility, it seems perverse to claim that they need the protection of a preferential stan-
dard.'). In an opinion written by another distinguished woman judge, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ventured a compromise between the reasonable person and reasonable woman standards.
See Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 626 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J. 1993).
174 See Finley, supra note 124, at 64.
175 See Adams, supra note 162, at 686.
176 See Naomi Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in
Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398, 1416 (1992).
177 Cf. Kathleen A. Kenealy, Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 LAB.
LAW. 203, 204 (1992) (warning that the reasonable woman standard could become as controversial
as another altruistically intended reform, race-based affirmative action). One example of these
reform efforts is the protective labor legislation of the early twentieth century that, like the rea-
sonable woman standard, celebrated female vulnerability. By excluding women from hazardous
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standard pays serious attention to a complaint, the reasonable woman
standard subtly exonerates the harasser.178 Instead of having done
wrong, this man merely failed to see the world through women's eyes.
His lapse is trivial, and accordingly sexual harassment is trivial. The
reasonable woman standard implies that "while sexual harassment is
not a serious issue, a remedy will be provided to women because they
find it so upsetting."1 79
The reasonable woman standard implicitly carries a stereotype
about men, not only as offenders but also as victims of sexual harass-
ment. If the reasonable woman is more fragile and sensitive than the
reasonable person, then as a corollary the reasonable man (which
might be the standard when a man complains of sexual harassment'80 )
is less so. Faced with workplace harassment, the reasonable man may
well be expected to take it and like it. This point must be considered
advisedly. I have argued in passing elsewhere that sexual harassment
doctrine tends to overvalue men's dignitary interests,' 8 ' and a slight
bias against some male complainants that the reasonable woman stan-
dard might occasion is not the strongest argument against the stan-
dard. But it is important to bear in mind that men too are harassed at
work, and these victims are ill served by a standard that reinforces
jobs, limiting their work hours, excusing them from overtime, or keeping their reproductive or-
gans away from identified toxins, protective labor legislation removed some harshness from
women's work lives. But by remaining eloquently silent about other dangers that harm women
where they work - poisonous cleaning agents, household drudgery, sexual assaults, domestic
violence - such legislation revealed its lack of real interest in protecting women from harm. Un-
like other law reforms that are sensitive to gender difference, such as the elimination of the "ear-
nest resistance" requirement from rape, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seri-
ously: Rape Law and Beyond, ixi LAw & PHIL. 35, 37 (1992), the reasonable woman standard does
little to advance women's autonomy.
178 See Kenealy, supra note 177, at 204.
179 Id. at 208.
180 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 n.h (gth Cir. iggi). But see Forell, supra note 124,
at 799 n.148 (arguing that even for male complainants the better standard could be the reasonable
woman).
181 See Bernstein, supra note 13, at 1279. This misplaced emphasis is not confined to law.
Consider the two-millennial literary tradition bracketed by the story of Joseph and Potiphar's
wife at one end, see Genesis 39:7-18, and the novel Disclosure at the other, see MICHAEL
CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE (1994). Both works describe a predatory woman who importunes a
man for sex, is rejected, and then falsely accuses him. The Potiphar's wife story dates back to
ancient Egypt and is probably much older than Genesis, whose earliest portions are more than
2000 years old, see HAROLD BLOOM, THE BOOK OF J 7-8 (iggo); the false-accusation plot line
continues through David Maraet's Oleanna and other works, see Colleen O'Connor, Looking at
Gender Bias, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Dec. 16, 1994, at iC (discussing Disclosure and Oleanna
and pointing out that "[flor the past five years, sexual harassment claims filed by men with the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have made up less than io percent of the
total charges filed"). Disclosure is by far the best-selling fictional treatment of sexual harassment.
See Maria L. Ontiveros, Fictionalizing Harassment - Disclosing the Truth, 93 MICH. L. REv.
1373, 1373 n.3 (1995). False accusations of harassment and rape that hurt men, in short, are more
prominent Western cultural tropes than are real harassment and rape.
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old, rigid notions of masculinity 8 2  Stereotypes chafe those who do
not fit easily into their confines. 8 3 The two stereotypes promoted by
the reasonable woman standard - a weakling and a brute - do extra
harm: they are socially regressive and exaggerate the differences be-
tween the genders.
4. The Subjectivity Slope. - That the reasonable woman standard
is a step down the subjectivity slope does not, in itself, make the stan-
dard valueless. But the move toward subjectivity should be cause for
concern. As one student commentator queries, when does one stop
adding identifying details to the reasonable person? 84 It may be arbi-
trary to stop at gender if race, national origin, sexual orientation, mari-
tal status, generational cohort, or religious belief correlates with per-
ceptions of a working environment 85  The list of personal
characteristics could continue. A standard that purports to be objec-
tive becomes confusing when it is flavored with subjectivity. This con-
fusion is aggravated by the problem that in sexual harassment claims
the factfinder must hold the defendant to the standard of a plaintiff's
perspective. Subjectivity, in sum, adds new complications to a stan-
dard already controversial and difficult to use. The next section fol-
lows the standard further down the slope.
B. Tinkering: The Reasonable [Insert Noun]
Judicial efforts to improve on the reasonable person standard in-
clude such constructs as the reasonable person of the same gender as
the victim,8 6 the reasonable person of the same gender and race or
color as the plaintiff,8 7 the reasonable person with the defining traits
of the accuser,18 8 and the reasonable target.'8 9 Some courts have used,
and various academics and commentators have advocated, the reason-
able victim standard; 90 a "contextualized reasonable victim stan-
182 Cf. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that women "are not the
only targets" of sexual harassment and that a court should use "terminology that will meet the
needs of all who seek recourse under... Title VII").
183 Cf. Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities &
Inter-Connectivities, s S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25, 30 (i995) (noting that the author, a
man, will "sometimes claim inclusion in the lesbian category to poke at the sex/gender essential-
isms that rigidly and absurdly confine us all").
184 See T-acy L. 'Reger, Comment, The Reasonable Woman? Unreasonable!!! Ellison v. Brady,
14 WIrTTIER L. REv. 675, 683 ('993).
18S Cf. id. (arguing that if the reasonable woman standard is correct for sexual harassment, then
the reasonable person standard in torts should logically be replaced by standards such as "reason-
able blind person" or "reasonable elderly person"); Orlando Patterson, Race, Gender and Liberal
Fallacies, N.Y. TamEs, Oct. 20, x99i, at §§ 4, z5 (suggesting that what may look like sexual har-
assment to white observers may be a "down-home style of courting" to African-Americans).
186 See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1993).
187 See Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D. Ariz. 1992).
188 See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1994).
189 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 884 (9th Cir. i9i) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
190 See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-79.
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dard";191 a "flexible reasonable person standard" that would take into
account sexual preference, sex, race, and class;192 and a pluralistic ar-
ray whereby plaintiffs would "have the ability to claim that a particu-
lar perspective fits the circumstances of the case."'193 Although schol-
ars should, of course, argue for any rule they like, judicial tinkering
with the reasonable person standard carries costs to litigants as well as
to individuals in the workplace who seek guidance from the law.
As noted above, modifying the reasonable person standard to ac-
commodate the plaintiff's context slides down the slope of subjectivity.
Hostile environment sexual harassment begins to mean something like
an environment in which a single aggrieved employee did not prosper.
Even more than the reasonable woman standard, the tinkered-with
reasonable person standard scoffs at a plaintiff's wish to have her ex-
perience judged by a universalistic measure.194 Many criticisms of the
reasonable woman standard apply generally to standards proposed by
the tinkerers; to these arguments one must add the costs of mixing
even more subjectivity with objective standards.
Reworking the reasonable person standard also diminishes the
benefits of uniformity. These benefits are significant: some evidence
suggests that practicing lawyers favor uniformity rather than any one
standard.195 If all tinkerers could get together and agree on a uniform
alternative to the reasonable person, they could produce an effective
substitute. Instead they refine old paraphrases, now and then taking
race or group membership into account, sometimes remembering and
sometimes forgetting that male victims exist, and so forth, thereby
generating confusion.
191 Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping
of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 15 1, 154 (1994).
192 Forell, supra note 124, at 8i n.I98 (attributing this view to Professor Jean Love).
193 Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual
and Racial Harassment Litigation, i Tx-x. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 140 (1992). Although Professor
Chamallas is skeptical of the idea of objectivity, her prescription falls within the objectivity tradi-
tion in that she does not favor a purely subjective standard. See supra pp. 464-71.
194 In her critique of standards that replace the reasonable person, Kathleen Kenealy mentions
Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone, 863 .2d i5o3 (iith Cir. 1989), in which co-workers of the Afri-
can-American plaintiff hung a noose over her work station. Kenealy suggests that a "reasonable
African-American standard," if used in Vance, would have been not only unnecessary but insult-
ing. Kenealy, supra note 177, at 208 & n.26; see also Garcia v. Andrews, 867 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ibx.
Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the reasonable woman standard in favor of "even-handed disposition of
all claims without regard to whether the plaintiff is a woman or a man, is young or old, or is a
member of any one of numerous and varied sub-groups in our society").
19S See Forell, supra note 124, at 8x5. When Caroline Forell polled eleven practitioners in Ore-
gon - of whom four represented mostly plaintiffs, six represented mostly employers, and one rep-
resented both sides - asking them to name the standard they preferred, the reasonable woman
commanded a clear majority, even though the lawyers were free to suggest some contextualized
alternative to the reasonable person. Professor Forell surmises that living under the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Ellison rule led these lawyers to adjust to this legal novelty. See id.
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More confusion emerges on closer study of the tinkerers' work
product. Some authors acknowledge the ambiguity of their proposed
formulations. For example, one student commentator favoring a rea-
sonable person standard coupled with jury instructions that "reflect
the female perspective,"196 struggles mightily to distinguish this ap-
proach from the reasonable woman standard, but by the end of the
piece concedes the common practical difficulties of the two stan-
dards. 9 7 Similarly, Martha Chamallas, who proposes that the reason-
able woman standard be read to mean the perspective of progressive
women who have feminist inclinations, also acknowledges the ambi-
guity of her formulations.' 9  Other revisionists seem less careful about
misinterpretation and confusion, as is evident by their use of "reason-
able woman" as interchangeable with "reasonable victim." 99
Tinkering seems to have encouraged a perverse mini-revival of the
reasonable person standard. The Supreme Court hinted in Harris that
it prefers the reasonable person to the reasonable woman standard.2 0 0
Similarly, when its principal hostile environment case was pending, the
Michigan Supreme Court received amicus briefs that argued not only
for the reasonable woman but also for purely subjective approaches;
the court ultimately rejected a gender-specific standard for a reason-
able person standard.20 1 Other cases decided after Harris and Ellison
have reaffirmed the reasonable person standard.20 2  Occasionally,
judges have written that under either a reasonable person or reason-
able woman standard their decision must be the same, revealing some
196 Robert Unikel, Comment, "Reasonable" Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Stan-
dard in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 326, 372 (1992).
197 See id. at 373 n.295.
198 See Chamallas, supra note 193, at 135-37.
199 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-80 (9th Cir. x9gi); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims
of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1459 (1984); Sally A.
Piefer, Comment, Sexual Harassment from the TVctim's Perspective: The Need for the Seventh Cir-
cuit to Adopt the Reasonable Woman Standard, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 99 (i993) (equating "rea-
sonable woman" with "victim's perspective"); see also Adams, supra note 162, at 683 (stating that
the reasonable victim standard "effectively divides the world into reasonable men and reasonable
women").
200 In describing the objective referent in sexual harassment, the Harris Court referred to the
reasonable person. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (X993). See generally Liesa L.
Bernardin, Note, Does the Reasonable Woman Exist and Does She Have Any Place in Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII After Harris, 46 FLA. L. REv. 291, 299-
3oi (1994) (explaining that the Harris Court chose the reasonable person standard over the dis-
trict court's reasonable woman standard).
201 See Radtke v. Everett, 5oi N.W.2d i5, i58 (Mich. 1993).
202 See, e.g., Watkins v. Bowden, io5 F3d '344, 1356 (iith Cir. 1997) (holding that a reasonable
person jury instruction was proper); Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 E3d ix68, 1172 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that a reasonable person instruction was not reversible error); see also Fowler v.
Kootenai County, 918 R2d 1185, i89 (Idaho 1996) (favoring the reasonable person over the rea-
sonable woman).
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frustration or weariness with the entire endeavor of tinkering.20 3 To
some commentators, the next step is obvious. Below I examine their
claim that the objective criterion of hostile environment sexual ha-
rassment must be jettisoned.
C. Despair: The Subjective Alternative
Making a statement along the lines of "I didn't like my working
environment; I found it hostile" cannot, without an additional objec-
tive referent, take a plaintiff to the jury in a Title VII or dignitary-tort
action. Although judges have shown their receptiveness to new for-
mulations of the objective criterion in hostile environment sexual ha-
rassment claims, to date no court has accepted the argument that the
objective criterion should be dropped altogether. Thus, the argument
appears only in litigants' briefs and law review articles.10 4 The argu-
ment reflects a longstanding feminist mistrust of objectivity:20 5 aca-
demic feminism and postmodernism doubt that anything, including a
hostile environment, can exist in some unoccluded, value-free, neutral
state.20 6 Objectivity is a "myth,"207 and, accordingly, all criteria relat-
ing to reasonableness for sexual harassment actions must be dropped.
Although she ultimately opposes such a standard, Caroline Forell
points out that a purely subjective standard has several virtues. It
avoids stereotyping, essentialism, and majoritarian universalism; 208 it
also eliminates the burdensome and perhaps redundant demand that
the plaintiff prove both that she did not (subjectively) welcome the
challenged conduct and that the challenged conduct was (objectively)
203 See King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Saxton v. AT&T Co., xo F.3d 526,
534 n.13 (7th Cir. 1993); Marquart v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 859 F. Supp. 366, 367 n.2 (E.D.
Mo. r994), aff'd without opinion, 56 F.3d 69 (8th Cir. x995); French v. Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d 20, 28
n.io (Alaska 1996). Some social science evidence exists to justify this view. See Richard L. Wie-
ner, Barbara A. Watts, Kristen H. Goldkamp & Charles Gasper, Social Analytic Investigation of
Hostile Work Environments: A Test of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 1g LAW & HuM. BEHAV.
263, 276 (1995) (describing a controlled study that found virtually no difference in result between
the reasonable person and reasonable woman approaches).
204 See, e.g., Eileen M. Blackwood, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law and the
Case for Subjectivity, I6 VT. L. REV. ioos, ioo5-o6 (1992); Brief of the Women's Legal Defense
Fund, The National Women's Law Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., So U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs
File (urging abandonment-of all "reasonableness" standards for hostile environment sexual har-
assment).
205 See SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING FROM
WOMEN'S LIvEs 157-59 (ig9i) (discussing the feminist belief that norms of objectivity support
existing power structures). See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Rea-
son in Literature and the Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 714 (1994) (summarizing feminist perspectives
on objectivity).
206 See Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encoun-
ter Between Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMvMISM/POSTMODERNISM 19 (Linda J. Nichol-
son ed., 199o).
207 See Blackwood, supra note 204, at 1024.
208 See Forell, supra note 124, at 8oi.
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Justice Scalia,2' s who is not known for his devotion to feminism or
postmodernism. Even if the idea of objectivity were not problematic,
moreover, attempts to express it through an objective standard for hos-
tile environment sexual harassment have failed.
Nevertheless, a purely subjective standard cannot fit within impor-
tant traditions: the United States legal system has always insisted that
in order for conduct to be condemned by the law, it must violate
shared principles. A purely subjective standard for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment permits a litigant to claim a violation of the
law based primarily, if not entirely, on her assertion that she deems
herself injured. To be sure, many observers believe that current sexual
harassment doctrine already inclines too far in this direction. 2' 9 But
even the most expansive variations on the reasonable person standard
do not abandon the objective referent - some norm that goes beyond
a plaintiff's special pleading.
At a pragmatic level, the subjective approach would do mischief to
the efforts of activists who seek equality and fair treatment, in the
workplace. It would expose sexual harassment law to a level of ridi-
cule only hinted at by the jeering that followed the formulation of rea-
sonable woman approaches.2 20 Journalists would likely permit a cari-
cature - the idiosyncratic, hypersensitive, vindictive straw-woman -
to grow to grotesque proportions in the media. Class actions for hos-
tile environment harassment would become much harder to bring.221
Juries would be cast adrift.222 Workers of empathy and good faith,
unmoored from any reference to objectivity, would worry about being
held accountable for peculiar reactions among their colleagues. 223 Al-
though the jettisoning of an objective standard derives from a well-
founded skepticism, it throws away too much.
III. THE RESPECTFUL PERSON
The survey of how reasonableness standards function in sexual
harassment doctrine, undertaken above in Parts I and II of this Arti-
cle, has praised as well as criticized "reason" and "reasonableness." Al-
though these terms do not fit all the needs of sexual harassment theory
or doctrine, they are valuable. "Reason" stands for much of what
makes human beings unique and important. "Reasonable," although
218 See supra pp. 448-49.
219 See Star, supra note 173, at 48; Adams, supra note 162, at 685-87.
220 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
221 See Forell, supra note 124, at 801-02.
222 Cf. Harris, 5IO U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Harris standard leaves
juries unable to apply the law).
223 See Forell, supra note 124, at 8o3; see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 E2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991)
(expressing concern about "the rare hyper-sensitive employee" who could render the entire place
of employment vulnerable to idiosyncratic claims of harassment).
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hostile or abusive.20 9 As another feminist argues in advocating a sub-
jectivist revision of negligence, subjectivity is congruent with any doc-
trine of compensation (which necessarily takes account of the harm
suffered by the victim), whereas objective standards comport more
with the criminal law.210
Of the commentators wanting to dispense with the objective stan-
dard in hostile environment sexual harassment, Eileen Blackwood goes
furthest, arguing forthrightly for "subjectivity. 211 According to
Blackwood, a plaintiff should reach the jury on the barest prima facie
case: sex-related behavior in the workplace, and an aggrieved worker
who has indicated to her employer that this behavior is unwelcome.
212
Less starkly, Jane Dolkart advocates what she calls an "individualized
test," which she describes as a renamed equivalent to a subjective ap-
proach.213
One of the most influential writings on the subject offers a varia-
tion on the subjective standard that would be achieved through a shift
in the burden of proof. 214 Kathryn Abrams proposes that the plaintiff
be required to show that sex-related behavior occurred in the work-
place, and that this behavior affected her working environment. Upon
such a showing, the burden would shift to the employer to show that
the plaintiff's reaction was idiosyncratic or unreasonable. 215 Professor
Abrams thus preserves the analytic distinction between subjective and
objective criteria but establishes a rebuttable presumption that subjec-
tive and objective approaches will yield the same conclusion about
what happened at a worksite.216
These writings deserve serious reception. Doubts about the rele-
vance of objective reasonableness in hostile environment sexual ha-
rassment are persuasive. There is even evidence that as hard-headed a
feminist as Justice Ginsburg shares these doubts21 7 with her colleague
209 See id.; see also Estrich, supra note 4, at 833 (arguing that requiring both the subjective and
objective showing is unfair to plaintiffs).
210 See Robyn Martin, A Feminist View of the Reasonable Man: An Alternative Approach to
Liability in Negligence for Personal Injury, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 334, 354-55 (1994).
211 See Blackwood, supra note 204, at ioo6.
212 See id. at 1025 ("If, after receiving notice that sexual behavior is unwelcome, an employer
fails to address her concerns, the woman does and should have a claim against her employer. It
does not really matter whether her concerns are reasonable or not. The subjective effect upon her
is the key consideration.').
213 Dolkart, supra note 191, at 166 n.47.
214 See Abrams, supra note 121, at 1209-15.
215 See id. at 1210-1i.
216 See id. at I2o9-1o, 1214.
217 Justice Ginsburg suggested that conditions in a work environment violate Title VII when
"members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed" - a test quite distinct from reasonableness - notwith-
standing Ginsburg's acceptance elsewhere of reasonable 1ierson language. Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 51o U.S. 17, 25 (993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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more vague, contains rich and useful connotations. A respectful per-
son standard, therefore, ought to preserve the benefits that both words
offer.
To understand the link between reason and respect, one may begin
with the work of Immanuel Kant, which contends that entitlement to
respect originates in human reason. The capacity to be rational, ac-
cording to Kant, sets human beings apart from other living crea-
tures.224 This trait allows human beings to escape brute causality; per-
sons overcome the straits of nature through their thinking and
choices.225 Aided by reason, human beings can favor one course of ac-
tion and disdain an alternative, and thereby express their moral
agency. Reason also gives persons a way of experiencing the past and
the future: with the help of reason the past becomes intelligible, a
source of perfecting oneself, and the basis of plans for one's life. Be-
cause of these characteristics - all of them variations on and out-
growths of reason - human beings, according to Kant, possess intrin-
sic value and are entitled to respect.2 26
To accept a respectful person standard, one need not endorse all of
this valorization of reason, but the association between reason and re-
spect is useful in the construction of such a legal standard. Kantian
ethics, widely (although not universally) esteemed for their breadth
and compelling clarity,227 comport with the worldviews of many per-
sons - indeed, many religions and societies 228 - and suggest a con-
sensus upon which lawmaking may build. Moreover, the connection
between reason and respect indicates that a respectful person standard
for hostile environment sexual harassment does not depart signifi-
cantly from existing doctrine. The Kantian framework also provides
guidance about the particulars of a respectful person standard.
A. Entitlement to Respect: Toward a Conservative Standard
r. Recognition Respect. - Of the many meanings associated with
the word "respect," the most pertinent to sexual harassment is what
224 See IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 116, ix8-i9
(Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949).
225 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDwORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 77 (H.J. Paton
trans., 2d ed. 1953).
226 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE 99 (Mary J. Gregor trans., 1964).
Locke similarly linked reason and respect by arguing that the obligation not to harm another is
owed because of other persons' capacity to reason, and that human beings learn and accept this
duty via their own faculty of reason. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 148-
5 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (i6go).
227 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD 12-13 (1994) (summarizing the reception of Kant's ethical philosophy).
228 Cf. H.T.D. ROST, THE GOLDEN RULE: A UNIVERSAL ETHIC 8 (1986) (describing worldwide
acceptance of analogies to Kant's categorical imperative).
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Stephen Darwall calls recognition respect. 229 Recognition respect con-
sists of the acknowledgment that another person is a free, separate,
unique, and independent human being. Dictionary definitions of re-
spect as a noun in this recognition sense include "an act of noticing
with attention; the giving of attention to; consideration." 230 As a verb,
respect in its recognition sense means "to consider, deem or heed"
something.231 Recognition respect looks at the object with the intent
of determining how to act vis-h-vis that object. 3 2 No admiration is
necessarily rendered.233
The competing meaning, appraisal respect, is briefly noted for pur-
poses of contrast: appraisal respect is "high or special regard: deferen-
tial regard as from a servant to his master: esteem"; or "the quality or
state of being esteemed."234 As a verb, to respect in the appraisal sense
is "to treat or regard with deference, esteem, or honour. 235 Appraisal
respect, unlike recognition respect, considers the question of excellence.
When a professor respects her colleague because he has written the
best book in his field, she renders appraisal respect, grounded in a
comparison or a scale of merit.
As Darwall argues, Kantian respect for persons qua persons falls
within the category of recognition respect. 236 Appraisal respect, ren-
dered for excellence, is not owed to all persons,237 whereas "to have
recognition respect for persons is to give proper weight to the fact that
they are persons"238 - a formulation in the tradition of Kant. It is
229 See Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 38 (1977). A parallel philo-
sophical literature on "recognition," derived from the work of Hegel and others, emphasizes the
rights and duties that are identified by the acknowledgment that persons are free and equal. See
ROBERT R. WILLIAMS, RECOGNITION (1992); Cf. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMs 16-17 (William Rehg trans., 1995) (establishing mutual recognition as a predicate to dis-
course).
230 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1934 (3d ed. 1981).
231 Id.
232 Stephen Hudson identifies three categories of respect that correspond to Darvall's recogni-
tion respect: obstacle respect, directive respect, and institutional respect. See Stephen D. Hudson,
The Nature of Respect, 6 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 69, 70 (198o). Robin Dillon notes that examples
of obstacle respect include the tennis player's respect for an opponent's backhand and the moun-
tain climber's respect for the elements. See Dillon, supra note 43, at xio-zi. Directive respect
lies behind the regard for the content of contracts, constitutions, and corporate bylaws. See id.
Institutional respect is expressed in terms like "your Honor," bowed heads during prayer, and ref-
erences to the president of the United States as "the President" even by those who know him inti-
mately. See id. In all of these situations of recognition respect, the agent acknowledges the cate-
gorical importance of the object, even if she thinks the tennis player a fool, the United States
Constitution flawed, the judge corrupt, the prayer vacuous, or the president an ordinary man.
See id. at iii.
233 See Darwall, supra note 229, at 45-47.
234 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 230, at 1934.
235 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 732-35 (2d ed. 1989).
236 See Darwall, supra note 229, at 45.
237 See id.
238 Id. at 39.
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also recognition respect that Robert Nozick, claiming the mantle of
Kant, has in mind when he faults utilitarianism for its failure to "re-
spect and take account of the fact that [the individual] is a separate
person, that his is the only life he has."239 Simultaneously premised on
the ideas that all human beings have respect-warranting traits in
common and that each person is uniquely free,240 recognition respect
unites the disparate ideals of autonomy and equality.2 4 1
Although recognition respect implies freedom, it also mandates du-
ties. In this sense, respect is different from other attitudes - particu-
larly affection or liking - that an agent may have toward an object.2 42
Because it originates in a trait of the object, respect makes its own
demands. The agent is not free to withhold or furnish respect based
on a whim.
The demands of recognition respect are well known not only within
sexual harassment law, which affirms these ideals of dignity and free-
dom, but also in a variety of legal and extralegal settings.2 43  One ex-
tralegal example is self-respect, a variant of recognition respect that
implies duties and entitlements. 244  Recognition respect for persons is
implicit in the legal and extralegal concept of consent, especially in-
formed consent.245  In the political arena, the demands of recognition
respect are eclectic. They buttress both a claim to minimum income
and certain arguments in favor of abolishing welfare,246 for instance,
and support feminism while raising questions about the right to abor-
tion.247 They also cast doubts on affirmative action as well as on rac-
239 ROBERT Nozicr, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 33 (1974).
240 See Margaret A. Farley, A Feminist Version of Respect for Persons, 9 J. FEMINIST STUD.
RELIGION X83, 194-96 (1993).
241 See Richard Norman, Respect for Persons, Autonomy and Equality, 43 REVUE INTERNA-
TIONALE DE PHILOSOPIE 323 (1989); see also Christopher W. Gowans, Intimacy, Freedom, and
Unique Value: A "Kantian" Account of the Irreplaceable and Incomparable Value of Persons, 33
AM. PHIL. Q. 75, 84-85 (1996) (arguing that both uniqueness and equality of persons derive from
their exercise of freedom).
242 Affection or admiration originates in the caprice of an agent. One might be fond of a person
for any reason or for no reason, but respect implies certain criteria. Put another way, respect is
object-generated, whereas affection is agent-generated. See Dillon, supra note 43, at IO9-io.
243 See infra pp. 512-21 (describing recognition respect in current American legal doctrine).
244 See Robin S. Dillon, Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional, Political, 107 ETHICS 226, 230 (i997)
(noting the demands and expectations generated by self-respect). The phrase "have you no self-
respect?" urges another to recognize the rights and responsibilities of being a person. See Dar-
wall, supra note 229, at 47.
245 See Bernard v. Char, 9o3 P.2d 667, 671-75 (Haw. i995); Smith v. Reisig, 686 P.2d 285, 288
(Okla. 1984); Adler ex rel. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 5o0-o3 (Wis. x996); Danuta
Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts of Consent to, and Refusal
of, Medical Reatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 1-6 (1996).
246 On this paradox, see James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic Citizenship, and Welfare
Reform: The 7roubling Case of Workfare, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. io3, 123-24 (1996).
247 See Farley, supra note 24o, at 195; Don Marquis, Justifying the Rights of Pregnancy: The
Interest View, CRIm. JUST. ETHICS, Winter-Spring 1994, at 67 (book review) (discussing the rela-
tionship between the personhood concept and abortion ethics).
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ism. 248 Familiar from ordinary life experience as well as legal pre-
cepts, the dictates of recognition respect have in common their insis-
tence that one must "take certain considerations seriously as reasons
for acting or forbearing to act. '249  It is this last idea - the duty to
forbear to act - that expresses the power of recognition respect to de-
scribe, prevent, and remedy hostile environment sexual harassment.
2. A Duty to Refrain. - The division between positive and nega-
tive liberties, famously expounded by Isaiah Berlin, 250 is fundamental
in American law.25' Courts describe the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights as charters of negative liberties.252 According to many scholars,
concepts of negative rights were widely shared among those who built
the American republic, whereas positive rights rested on less sturdy
support.25 3 A tradition traceable to Berlin and beyond associates nega-
tive rights with freedom and positive rights with the affirmative com-
mands of a dictator. 5 4 Effective law reform honors the distinction be-
tween negative and positive rights, favoring negative liberty because it
describes legal change in relatively unthreatening terms.25  Although
positive duties of respect may take shape in the future, negative ones
necessarily must come first.
248 See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Discrimination and Affirmative Action, 57 THEOLOGICAL STUD.
286, 295-300 (1996).
249 Darwall, supra note 229, at 48.
250 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Twvo Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122-23
(1969). Berlin finds positive and negative liberty to be the central conceptions of liberty, among
more than 200 types. See id. at 118.
2S Criticisms of the dichotomy in the law reviews include Susan Bandes, The Negative Consti-
tution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2318-2o (I99o), and Steven J. Heyman, Positive and
Negative Liberty, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 81-83 (1992). As one writer notes, however, "there is
no indication that the Supreme Court or the lower courts" will abandon the dichotomy. Susan
Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication under the Profes-
sional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 667 n.138 (1992).
252 See Bowers v. De Vito, 686 F.2d 6x6, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (proclaiming "the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights'). In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff after characterizing his
lawsuit as a demand for positive rights. See id. at 194-97. In dissent, Justice Brennan recast the
issue as one of government action rather than inaction - a stance that underscores the powerful
appeal of negative liberty arguments. See id. at 203-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
253 The clash between the Federalists and anti-Federalists over political theory closely mirrors
the debate over positive and negative liberty. See William W. Fisher III, Ideology, Religion, and
the Constitutional Protection of Private Property z760-1860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 71-75 (199o);
John Patrick Diggins, Class, Classical, and Consensus Views of the Constitution, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 555, 556 (1988) (book review) (noting the anti-Federalist opposition to the establishment of a
centralized federal government).
254 See, e.g., BERLIN, supra note 250, at 131 (claiming that proponents of the theory of negative
liberty regard the notion of positive liberty as "no better than a specious disguise for brutal tyr-
anny'); Heyman, supra note 251, at 82 (attributing Berlin's dichotomy to the Cold War backdrop
against which he wrote).
25S See Anita Bernstein, Better Living Through Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L. REv. 169, 182-83
(1996) (describing uses of negative and positive liberty in law reform efforts).
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The distinction between positive and negative liberty is central to
political liberalism, the stance that lies behind the respectful person
standard outlined here. The liberal seeks primarily to avoid cruelty.25 6
Wider ambitions - such as the desire to promote goodness - to the
liberal imply coercion. This minimalist concern with avoiding harm
may readily be extended from the physical to the psychological. Ac-
cordingly, a duty arises to avoid forms of cruelty such as bringing in-
dignity or humiliation upon another.257 A liberal and minimalist con-
ception of recognition respect thus emerges. The ethical duty to render
respect becomes a negative one: a duty to refrain from unjustified or
cruel manifestations of disrespect.2 58
In the context of sexual harassment, this negative duty has at least
three distinct applications. Recognition respect requires first that an
agent not treat another person only as a means of achieving the ends
of the agent.259 Second, the actor has a duty to refrain from humiliat-
ing another.2 60 Third, the agent must not engage in conduct that re-
jects or denies the personhood and self-conception of another.261 Sub-
ject to the constraint of minimalism, these broad and deep precepts
provide specific guidance.
a. Ends and Means. - Contrary at its heart to consequentialist or
utilitarian ethics, recognition respect resists many of those influences
on law and philosophy that are associated with economic analysis.
Persons may choose to behave instrumentally, but they cannot with-
256 See Alan Wolfe, Before Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, May 27, 1996, at 33, 34 (crediting this
view to political philosopher Judith Shklar).
257 See id.
2S8 Of the many variations on the Golden Rule surveyed by the Bahl'f scholar H.T.D. Rost, the
Confucian version is noteworthy for stating the maxim in negative terms: "What you do not want
done to yourself, do not do to others." ROST, supra note 228, at 49 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Centering on "the fundamental principle of social propriety," id. at 47, Confucian ethics
posits a respectful person who knows his place in the social order, rather than one who fulfills a
religious or spiritual ideal, see id. at 47-48, - a social reformer's approach to the Golden Rule
that may be better suited to emulation by reformers than are religious models.
I do not mean to continue the academic folly of overdrawing the distinction between posi-
tive and negative liberty. For a pertinent warning on this danger, see Heyman, cited above in
note 251, at 82. Statutory and common law protections against sexual harassment imply a modi-
cum of government energy and action that is contrary to a simple-minded endorsement of nega-
tive rights paired with a repudiation of positive rights. The basic duty, though embellished with
affirmative incidentals in the workplace, see infra pp. 495-96, remains one of forbearance and
restraint.
259 See KANT, supra note 225, at 95-96, 102-03. One philosopher elaborates that to be treated
simply as a means rather than an end in oneself is to be disparaged as to one's stances, determina-
tions, commitments, and points of view - all aspects of human choice. See Bernard Williams,
The Idea of Equality, in MORAL CONCEPTS 155, 159-63 (Joel Feinberg ed., 1969).
260 Cf. AvisHmA MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY I (1996) ("A civilized society is one whose
members do not humiliate one another.. .).
261 Cf. Elizabeth V Spelman, On 7reating Persons as Persons, 88 ETHICS 150, 152 (1977) (ar-
guing that treating another as a person implies that one has authority over one's own definition of
oneself).
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hold or deliver recognition respect for utilitarian reasons. Certainly
they may pretend to render respect, and this hypocrisy - an emphasis
on respectful behavior rather than respectful attitudes - can be so-
cially useful; the law might encourage it. For this pragmatic constraint
on a respectful person standard, we are again indebted to Holmes.2 62
But legal doctrine predicated on recognition respect will pay little heed
to quasi-economic apologies for harassment, such as the belief that the
market will pay a wage premium to workers willing to endure mis-
treatment or that the costs of preventing harassment in the workplace
are too high. As the "respicere" antecedent of the word implies, re-
spect is rendered because of past or present characteristics. It does not
look forward to a future time of greater utility but backward to as-
pects worth valuing or noting,2 63 and so it rejects a central premise of
economics-flavored suggestions for law reform.
Just as recognition respect contradicts utilitarian ethics in general
and utilitarian defenses of disrespectful workplace conditions in par-
ticular, it does not tolerate the aggregation of workers into a class that
exists simply as the means to the ends of an agent. A worker might
regard women at work simply as terrain from which he can take sex-
ual release. Alternatively, this worker might harbor animus towards
women and use mistreatment as a weapon to keep fellow workers
down and out. Sexual harassment case law, though necessarily specu-
lative about the motives of harassers ' 64 contains numerous accounts of
both libidinous exploitation and general hostility towards women in
the workplace.2 65  These two motives, among many that may lie be-
262 See supra notes 40, 91 (noting the contribution of Holmes to ideologies of reason and rea-
sonableness). In a famous 1925 letter to Harold Laski, the elderly Justice declared that the law
ought to look to outward behavior and its consequences rather than seek true desert:
I am entirely impatient of any but broad distinctions. Otherwise we are lost in a maze
of determinism. If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have
hanged (or electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you
but to make it avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You
may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the law must keep
its promises.
BAKEP, supra note 9i, at 289.
263 See Carl Cranor, Toward a Theory of Respect for Persons, 12 Am. PHiL. Q. 309, 311 (1975).
264 See Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 999 (ioth Cir. i996) (differing with the
lower court about the motive of harassers); Gerd v. United Parcel Servs., 934 F. Supp. 357, 36o-6i
(D. Colo. 1996) (discussing the problem of mixed-motive harassment); see also Shermer v. Illinois
Dep't of TIYransp., 937 F. Supp. 781, 784 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (noting that motive is often difficult to
prove in same-sex harassment litigation).
265 See King v. Board of Regents, 898 F2d 533, 539 (7th Cir. i9go); Snider v. Consolidation
Coal Co., No. 86-3462, 199o WL 484975, at *5 (S.D. Ill. June 27, 1990). In other cases courts have
attributed harassment to a general hostility towards women. See EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31
F3d 891, 897 (9 th Cir. z994); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d X459, 1463-64 (9th Cir.
1994); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 199i). Femi-
nist commentators generally dismiss these motives, noting that whether harassment originates in
concupiscence or in hatred, the result - gender subordination - is the same. See Abrams, supra
note 21, at 12o8; Dolkart, supra note i9i, at 184-85; cf. Case, supra note 102, at 6o (noting that
sexual harassers often allude simultaneously to women's receptive role in fellatio and their pur-
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hind sexual harassment, illustrate disrespect that is characterized by
treating others as the means to an end. Although a person may be an
object of another person's concupiscence or fear, it is wrong to treat
the person as simply a means to allay the disquiet of the agent.
b. Humiliation. - Defining humiliation as "the rejection of human
beings as human, that is, treating people as if they were not human
beings but merely things, tools, animals, subhumans, or inferior hu-
mans, "266 the Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit extends this Kantian
injunction into the realm of dignity. To violate the first negative duty
mandated by a respectful person - that is, to treat another person
simply as the means to an end - is to engender a feeling of indignity
and self-rejection in the human object so treated. The person humili-
ated may know that she is the victim of "an appalling injustice," ac-
cording to Margalit, but she cannot ignore this treatment because as a
human being she is a member of a commonwealth and thus is never
entirely self-reliant. 267 Humiliation is both partially avoidable (not-
withstanding the claims of anarchist philosophers who deem humilia-
tion ever-present) and real (notwithstanding the credo of Stoic philoso-
phy).268
Ever since sexual harassment became actionable in federal courts
as a violation of Title VII, courts have implicitly acknowledged that
sexual harassment is humiliating to the one harassed.269 In attempting
to list the elements of an abusive work environment, the Supreme
Court has contrasted "threatening or humiliating" behavior with be-
havior that is "merely offensive" and has deemed the former conduct
an integral part of the plaintiff's case. 270 The contrast between threat-
ening and humiliating harassment is not stark - humiliation and
threatening circumstances are generally present together - but one or
the other condition may predominate. Of the two Title VII hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment cases decided by the Court, Meritor Say-
ported incompetence at work). Starting from the somewhat contrary premise that sexual harass-
ment law must not overlook motive and fault, the respectful person standard offered here also
relates these two strands of libidinous harassment and animus-based harassment; I argue.that the
two are alike not only because they subordinate women but because they violate the duty not to
treat others simply as the means to an end.
266 MARGALIT, supra note 260, at 121.
267 Id. at 124-25.
268 See id. at 13-15, 22-23.
269 The landmark case is Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655-56 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated
sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Later decisions also note the humilia-
tion of sexual harassment. See Williams v. Banning, 72 E3d 552, 555 (7 th Cir. '995); Ascolese v.
Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351, 36o-6i (E.D. Pa. 1996); cf. Coney v. Depart-
ment of Human Resources, 787 F Supp. 1434, 1443 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (noting the humiliation of
racial harassment); Martone v. State, 611 A.2d 384, 385 n.i (R.I. 1992) (observing that the plain-
tiff-employee, who had been terminated, deserved "a severe sanction" for having caused humilia-
tion through harassment).
270 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (I993).
1997]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 271 describes a threatening environment,
complete with stalking and rape;272 Charles Hardy of Harris v. Fork-
lift Systems, Inc.,273 however, subjected his employee to various hu-
miliations. He jeered at the plaintiff and called her names that
shamed her for being a woman; he told her to pull coins out of his
front trouser pockets; he liked to toss objects on the ground and order
women to pick them up so that he could view exposed portions of their
bodies274 - all gestures that academic writers, and tacitly Justice
O'Connor for the Court, have deemed humiliating.275 The humiliation
manifested itself: Teresa Harris testified that Hardy's behavior made
her feel stupid and degraded; she said that she began drinking more
and that her relationships with her husband and children became un-
happy. Although the judges who heard what went on at Forklift Sys-
tens disagreed on whether Harris had a claim under Title VII, they
agreed that her reactions were "reasonable," in bounds, and causally
linked to mistreatment at work.2 76  The elements of humiliation
emerge paradigmatically from Harris: humiliation is both an action
and a reaction,2 77 a state that outsiders can perceive,278 and a concept
amenable to categorical norms and thus to law.
The duty not to humiliate another requires the agent to consider
the dignity of the other and refrain from injuring that dignity, unless
injury is either justified or unavoidable.279 The actor is obliged to re-
member the community - in employment law, the workplace - that
unites the agent and the object.28 0  Sexual harassment at work has a
271 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
272 See id. at 6o.
273 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
274 See id. at 19.
275 See Dolkart, supra note x91, at 158; Kerry A. Colson, Comment, Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.: The Supreme Court Moves One Step Closer to Establishing a Workable Definition for Hostile
Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 441, 441-42 (1996); Deanna
Weisse Turner, Recent Case, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE RoCK L.J. 839, 841 (1995).
276 Harris first reached a magistrate, who deemed Hardy "a vulgar man" and his behavior of-
fensive to a reasonable woman, but nonetheless ruled against Harris because of her failure to
show severe psychological injury. The Sixth Circuit adopted the magistrate's findings in full.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, condemning Hardy's degrading behavior and repudi-
ating the demand that a plaintiff prove severe psychological injury. See Harris, 51o U.S. at 22-
23.
277 See Henry J. Reske, Scarlet Letter Sentences, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 16-17; Jeremy Wal-
dron, On Humiliation, 93 MIC. L. REV. 1787, 1792 (i995) (book review).
278 Several cases have discussed harassment witnessed by fellow employees at the workplace
and the humiliating effect of such treatment. See Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd., 893 F
Supp. 672, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, zoo .3d 952 (5th Cir. 1996); Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860
E Supp. 1401, 14o5-o6 (D. Neb. 1994), aft'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir. 995); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 199i).
279 On justification and unavoidability, see pp. 498-504 below. On the moral ambiguity of even
"justified" humiliation, see Waldron, cited above in note 277, at 1795-96.
280 Writing more generally about institutional humiliation, Margalit calls this community "the
'Family of Man.'" MARGALIT, supra note 260, at 135-40 (describing further "encompassing
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public, communal dimension, even when the offending behavior takes
place behind a closed door. Being humiliated at work can diminish
settled beliefs about one's competence and relative status vis-4-vis
other workers. Humiliation can also make a worker wonder what her
job description really is and whether prior feedback must be reinter-
preted in light of an erosion of her dignity.281 This response is natural,
almost universal, and so the harassing employer must be presumed to
understand that his actions humiliate.
c. Personhood. - The three statements of negative duty express
the obligations of a respectful person through separate emphases
rather than sharp contrasts. The duty not to treat others simply as the
means to an end serves as a warning about aggregation and conse-
quentialism. The duty not to humiliate emphasizes dignity and com-
munal status. The duty not to violate the personhood and self-
conception of another, which completes the negative duties of recogni-
tion respect, expresses a concern about the boundaries that separate
individuals from one another.
Every object is distinct from every agent; and in situations perti-
nent to sexual harassment rules, both agent and object are persons
who are competent, autonomous, and separate. Distinct life plans -
designs that create order out of diverse experiences and commitments
- distinguish persons. No two life plans, and no two persons, can be
exactly the same. These designs warrant recognition respect.282
Examples may help to clarify the duty to respect the personhood
and self-conception of another. Elizabeth Spelman gathers familiar
complaints about failures to respect personhood: "You only pay atten-
tion to my body" and its less famous counterpart, "You only pay atten-
tion to my mind"; "Think about who I am, rather than how old I am,"
from an elderly person; and the resentment of a person identified only
as the wife or husband of another.2 83  These complaints, Professor
Spelman argues, make demands more strenuous than rights; the com-
plainant has demanded to be treated as the person he or she is,284 even
though it may not be possible for a heeding agent to comply. But a
lesser duty is possible. The agent must acknowledge the separate life
plan of the object. The agent must regard the object "as a source -
groups'); see also WILLIAM IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION 144-45 (1993) (describing humiliation as
"a social fact" that causes the identity of the humiliated to collapse in public view).
281 One student commentator finds these indignities so intense that she deems sexual harass-
ment a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, a "badge of slavery." Jennifer L. Conn, Note,
Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. S19, 539
(995).
282 See STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY IN
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 47 (igi) (adding that life plans must claim some origin in ra-
tional thought in order to warrant respect).
283 Spelman, supra note 261, at i5o.
284 See id. at I6o-6i.
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albeit not an unimpeachable one" - of information about the ob-
ject.28 5 The agent cannot expect another person to conform to, or be
subjugated by, the plans of the agent. Accordingly, the agent must ac-
cept communication from the object. Obliged to listen, to pause, to
absorb new information, and sometimes to be deterred from action, the
agent acknowledges the equality and autonomy of another person.
Equality and autonomy cannot, of course, dictate a precise path of ac-
tion for the agent, as his or her own equality and autonomy are at
stake too. The duty to hesitate in recognition respect may be fulfilled
in an instant, and the agent need not obey the command of the object
in order to fulfill the demands of recognition respect. What is needed
is receptiveness to communication, such as taking no for an answer.
The respectful agent also refrains from using stereotypes as a short-
cut around the harder work of seeing another as he or she truly is.
Spelman gives as examples of such laziness the assumption that an-
other person is defensive because he is short, or vain because he is
handsome .2 6 These stereotypes offend the tenets of recognition re-
spect because they presume. Incidentally they violate the self-
conception of the other, but it is their denigration of individual per-
sonhood that implies a betrayal of recognition respect.
B. Respect as a Legal Standard for Sexual Harassment Cases -
The Employment Context
In addition to providing a means of understanding sexual harass-
ment, a respectful person standard can illuminate some of the more
vexing problems of current employment law doctrine. This section
considers three of these problems in turn: first, the question of em-
ployer liability for the harassing behavior of employees; second, what I
have called (somewhat imprecisely) the problem of justification for ap-
parent disrespect, which includes such concepts as assumption of risk,
welcomeness, and the hypersensitive plaintiff; and third, the difficulty
of separating questions of law from questions of fact, a problem that
has bedeviled courts in sexual harassment cases.
i. Agency and Responsibility. - Although sexual harassment and
sex discrimination generally are committed by individuals, employees
seeking redress for hostile environment sexual harassment often bring
actions against business entity employers. Dignitary-tort actions are
more likely to be remunerative to plaintiffs when employers as well as
individuals are included as defendants. For Title VII actions, such in-
clusions were in the past absolutely necessary: until the 199i amend-
ments, money damages were unavailable under Title VII,287 and tradi-
tional remedies such as back pay and injunctive relief could be had
28S Id. at 154.
286 See id. at 153, x57 n.6.
287 See Civil Rights Act of ggI, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 19 77a(b), io5 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991).
IVol. XIX445
TREATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT WITH RESPECT
only from employers. 28  The post-199I availability of monetary dam-
ages has not lessened the tendency of plaintiffs to seek judgments
against employers. Legal standards for sexual harassment claims,
therefore, must address the question of when employers become re-
sponsible for the harassing acts of their employees.
In Menitor, the Supreme Court commended "agency principles" to
help answer this question of responsibility;28 9 and whether a business
entity ought to be liable for harassment because of the conduct of its
employees seems a straightforward problem of agency. But little is
straightforward in sexual harassment law, and in this area the lower
courts have simultaneously applauded and repudiated the common
law of agency.290 Courts try to follow the teaching of Meritor yet con-
tinually advert to fault principles rather than agency law as a basis for
employer liability.291
The lower court decisions in Meritor offered several different ap-
proaches to agency in the context of Title VII claims for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment. The Mentor trial court ruled against the
plaintiff, who alleged harassment as a Title VII sex-discrimination
violation, and found that no harassment had occurred; in dicta, the
court added that the employer could not be liable because it had no
notice of the harassment.292 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, reversing, rejected the common law agency rule and
held Meritor Savings Bank automatically liable for the harassing acts
of its agent, the harasser-supervisor. 293  According to this opinion, a
common law approach would treat employers too leniently and was in
any event irrelevant to this statutory problem. 294 An opposing per-
spective on the agency question came from a dissent in the appellate
court, in which Judge Bork argued forthrightly for a rejection of
agency principles. 295
288 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 7o6(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261 (x964); Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 803, 107 (1972).
289 Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
290 See Glen Allen Staszewski, Note, Using Agency Principles for Guidance in Finding Em-
ployer Liability for a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L.
REv. 1057, io62 (8995) (explaining that courts have been erratic and inconsistent in their use of
agency law in sexual harassment cases); cf Rachel E. Lutner, Note, Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment: The Morass of Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 589,
589 (arguing that "reliance on agency law has not established a clear standard" for employer li-
ability for sexual harassment).
291 See Kenneth L. Pollack, Special Project, Current Issues in Sexual Harassment Law, 48
VAND. L. REv. 8009, 1017 (i995).
292 See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 898o), rev'd, 753 F.2d
148 (D.C. Cir. x985), affrd sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
293 See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-5o (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Meritor Say.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
294 See id. at I5o.
295 Judge Bork wrote a separate opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in Vin-
son. See Vinson v. Taylor, 76o F.2d 8330, 8330 (D.C. Cir. 8985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
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When Meritor reached the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall wrote
separately to defend the use of agency principles in Title VII sexual
harassment claims.296  Justice Marshall agreed with the court of ap-
peals that employers should generally be liable for harassment by a
supervisor even without notice, but acknowledged the possibility of
rare exceptions to this rule of employer liability.297 In his opinion for
the Court, Justice Rehnquist hedged, maintaining that the record could
not support a clear rule about the common law of agency in Title VII
harassment cases. Justice Rehnquist deemed agency principles useful
for "guidance" and, consistent with these principles, refused to require
employer notice for liability in all cases.298
These approaches to employer liability - all found within one case
- barely skim the surface of options available to the courts. One stu-
dent commentator, tracing the application of Meitor-decreed agency
principles in the federal circuits, finds chaos: some circuits favor a
fault-based analysis; others prefer strict liability; several circuits have
freely written their own variations on these themes.29 9 According to
another writer, the law of agency as applied to Title VII is a potpourri
of consequentialist and deontological rationales, disputes over the
meaning of jargon like "respondeat superior," empirical confusion
about incentives, and partial overlaps of doctrine.300 The concept of
agency is integral to understanding and remedying workplace sexual
harassment, but agency law in its particulars points in varying direc-
tions. This judicial uncertainty is the result of uncertainty about the
nature of hostile environment sexual harassment. In their present in-
attention to what makes sexual harassment wrong, courts cannot un-
derstand what is responsible for this phenomenon.301 The concept of
respect, however, offers coherent guidance and a unifying theme.
296 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
297 Justice Marshall suggested that an individual could be a supervisor yet lack supervisory
authority over the complainant if "the two work in wholly different parts of the employer's busi-
ness." Id. at 77. The court of appeals opinion would apparently have favored employer liability
in such a situation, and Marshall would have used agency reasoning to exonerate the employer.
See id. at 76-77.
298 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
299 See Justin S. Weddle, Note, Title VII Sexual Harassment: Recognizing an Employer's Non-
Delegable Duty to Prevent.a Hostile Workplace, 95 CoLum. L. REV. 724, 734-37 (1995).
300 See Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A
Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1239-46 (i99i).
301 One example of this incoherence is found in the notice requirement embraced by Judge
Bork, see Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1332 (D.C. Cir. i985) (Bork, J., dissenting), as well as
several other judges, see, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 .2d 88x, 899-901 (ist Cir.
1988) (interpreting Title IX); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the plaintiff must establish actual or constructive knowledge). The notice requirement ab-
solves employers who did not know about the harassment. As the student commentator Glen
Staszewski points out, advocates of a notice requirement tend to dispense with notice when the
harassment is of the quid pro quo variety, even though hostile environment harassment is much
more noticeable by a third party. See Staszewski, supra note 290, at io83 n.154.
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Consider what a respectful place of employment would look like.
In order for respect to flourish in a workplace, the employer must ac-
knowledge the status, opportunities, communicative functions, and
vulnerabilities of each worker. 0 2 Title VII makes parallel demands.303
For purposes of its duty to prevent and remedy sexual harassment,
therefore, the employer must be seen as an agent as well as a principal;
its responsibilities - direct and nondelegable - arise from its own
obligations not to promote or condone a hostile workplace. 4
In the role of an employer, the respectful person is aware that offi-
cial authority, peer pressure, and anxiety about change in the work-
place - all natural and inevitable at a job site - can contribute to
unlawful injury. The respectful employer therefore must structure a
workplace to reduce and to prevent these effects: within the narrower
perspective of Title VII, this employer must design its workplace to
reduce and to prevent those effects that are addressed by Title VII.
Under a respectful person standard, an employer has a nondelegable
duty to maintain an attitude of responsiveness and attention.305 As
one court put it, "energetic measures"306 of correction must be avail-
able to employees who believe that they are being harassed. Because
the respectful person listens and heeds in good faith,307 it would vio-
late the standard to imply that a complaint, rather than the wrongful
conduct itself, is a problem; thus the respectful employer who finds a
complaint credible must confront the harasser, rather than merely
separate him from the complainant.30 8 The tenet of respect also re-
302 See supra pp. 484-92.
303 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cir. i97i); cf. Note, supra note i99, at 2464 (arguing that Title VII's purpose is to
prohibit all practices that create inequalities in the workplace among identifiable social groups).
304 See Weddle, supra note 299, at 742 (urging courts to view the working environment "as a
whole"). As Weddle notes, agency principles acknowledge the existence of nondelegable duties,
thus establishing a nondelegable duty to avoid a hostile environment is consistent with the
"agency principles" directive in Meritor. See id. at 743; see also Phillips, supra note 300, at 1252-
S5 (detailing agency principles pertaining to nondelegability).
30S Responsiveness and attention, crucial constituents of respect, are expressed doctrinally in
the requirement that the employer take "prompt action" to remedy a complaint. Cross v. State of
Ala., 49 .3d 1490, 1507 (iith Cir. x995). The respectful employer has additional duties relating
to prevention, but this object-focused, attentive, and responsive respect is the most central ele-
ment of the standard.
306 Pinkney v. Robinson, 913 F Supp. 25, 34 (D.D.C. 1996); cf. Carmon v. Lubrizol Corp., 17
F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that "[i]mmediately [the employer] sprang into action" in re-
sponse to a complaint).
307 See supra pp. 486-92.
308 Compare Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1993) (approving of the
transfer of the complainant), with Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 .3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.
1994) (disapproving of the reassignment of the plaintiff to a new shift away from the harasser).
The question whether an employer can satisfy Title VII's nondiscrimination mandate by merely
separating accuser and accused illustrates again the need to acknowledge the theme of moral fault
that pervades the statute. Inattention to the quasi-tort concerns of Title VII, in favor of a sterile,
depersonalized emphasis on "environment," leads to remedial error. A harassed worker has a cor-
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quires sincerity in remediation: if an employer responds to a complaint
by reprimanding the harasser and threatening more severe action
should he fail to desist, respect demands that the employer make good
on its threat when the harassment continues. 30 9  Current interpreta-
tions of the statute, coupled with the respect-based tenet that indi-
viduals should be viewed and judged as unique beings, mandate such
affirmative behavior.
This use of respect, which treats the employer as a person, salvages
the best elements of current fault-based and strict liability approaches.
Fault-based inquiries of hostile environment sexual harassment claims
brought under Title VII address the agency question by focusing on
whether the employer knew or should have known of the harass-
ment.3 10  The virtues of this inquiry are analogous to the advantages
of negligence over strict liability. 311 The knew-or-should-have-known
standard is also congruent with the fault-based themes that pervade
Title VII. With good reason, courts favor this approach to employer
liability in hostile environment cases. 312  The respectful person stan-
dard affirms these critical themes of duty and connection. Yet the
knew-or-should-have-known standard manifests shortcomings in prac-
tice that the respectful person standard would ameliorate. When using
the knew-or-should-have-known standard courts have sometimes been
too quick to sever links of responsibility between management and er-
rant employees, thereby encouraging aloofness and inattention.3 13
Such a fault standard is flawed because it urges employers to remedy,
rective justice right to have her working environment restored - that is to say, given back to her
- with the harassment removed. The statute also entities workers to the prevention of harass-
ment Both of these moral claims are slighted by cases like Steiner that regard the simple shifting
of a complainant, to a new space or time within the workplace, as an adequate response to the
harm. In a more egregious display of inattention to moral fault, the Tenth Circuit in Buchanan v.
Sherrill, Si F.3d 227 (ioth Cir. I995), dismissed one hostile environment claim on the sole ground
that the plaintiff had been offered a transfer. See id. at 229. In deeming the employer's conduct
acceptable, the court cited Saxton v. AT&T Co., 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993), in which the perpetra-
tor, not the complainant, had been transferred.
309 See Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 1992) (faulting the employer for the
idleness of its threat).
310 See Saxton v. AT&T Co., 1o F3d 526, 535-36 (7th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881
F.2d 1504, i515-i6 (9 th Cir. 1989); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d ioi, ioi5 (8th Cir.
1988).
311 See Phillips, supra note 3oo, at 1263-64.
312 See LiNDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 35, at I91-92 (1992); Weddle, supra note 299, at 734.
313 See, e.g., Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 E2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1992)
(condoning the employer's unawareness of harassment that took place in Oswego, New York, be-
cause central management was located in Rochester); Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F.
Supp. 1101, 1117-21 (N.D. IL 1996) (blaming the plaintiff - who did not follow employee-
manual procedure for reporting harassment because she feared retaliation - for the employer's
ignorance), aff'd in part and rev'd in part en banc sub noma. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America,
123 E3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Thompson v. Berta Enters., Inc., 864 P.2d 983, 989
(Wash. CL App. 1994) (noting that the plaintiff had never reported harassment to the manage-
ment and that the harassment had taken place behind closed doors).
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but not to prevent, sexual harassment.31 4 Knew-or-should-have-known
analysis also subtly bifurcates employers and employees, leading to a
fragmented perception of the wrong.3 15
In contrast, the respectful person standard tempers fault-based ap-
proaches to employer liability by looking at the workplace as a unit.
Yet its attention to human conduct and individual choices rescues the
standard from the major failings of strict employer liability. Courts
invoke strict liability in the relatively rare context of Title VII quid pro
quo sexual harassment, and some commentators argue for broadening
this application to hostile environment claims. 3 16 Vicarious liability for
any harm usually creates incentives to prevent injury.31 ' But when
divorced from the idea that a workplace consists of relationships
among individuals, strict employer liability also suggests evils of its
own: threats to privacy due to policing,3 18 occupational segregation,31 9
and inattention to the conditions that allow workers to flourish within
a group.3 20 The respectful person approach thus mediates between
fault-based and strict liability views of hostile environment sexual ha-
rassment, flavoring each with the strengths of the opposite approach.
In this process, the respectful person standard comports with agency
law and operates under its specific guidance - for example, agency
law helps to say whether an action took place inside or outside the
worksite - but does not become ensnared in its contradictions.
2. Justifications for Apparent Disrespect. - Can hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment be justified? Courts have had scant opportu-
nity to consider this question. Title VII doctrine permits a defendant
to introduce evidence of justification after a plaintiff has completed
her prima facie case,321 but in sexual harassment cases few defendants
314 See Weddle, supra note 299, at 737-38 & n.98 (pointing out that Title VII encourages pre-
vention as well as redress).
315 See id. at 738 & nn.ioI-io3 (citing Baker v. Weyerhauser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (ioth Cir.
I99o)).
316 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 71
(i995); Christopher P. Barton, Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A Consideration of
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual Harassment, 67 B.U. L. REV. 445,
460-62 (1987). For a more tentative endorsement of expanding liability, see Note, cited above in
note x9g, at 1462.
317 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, ioi HARV. L. Rv. 563, 607 (1988).
318 See Vinson v. Taylor, 76o F.2d 1330, X331 n.3 (D.C. Cir. x985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
319 See Kozinski, supra note io8, at x-xi (warning that women employees could be trapped in a
"gilded cage" and separated from opportunities); Epstein, supra note 12, at 4o8 n.57; Barbara Paul
Robinson, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Tims, Jan. 1S, 1996 (referring to a New York bar associa-
tion study that suggested that many male lawyers respond to expanded liability for sexual harass-
ment "by avoiding working with women").
320 See Kozinski, supra note io8, at xii.
321 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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do so formally. One court has professed to find it "hard to see how an
employer can justify harassment. '32 2 The question of justification be-
comes more pressing, however, when hostile environment sexual ha-
rassment is seen in the contours of fault. Antidiscrimination law, fo-
cusing on the workplace rather than on individual dereliction, cannot
consistently be concerned with the righteous motives of a personalized
employer any more than it can demand proof of intent to injure. Even
if traditional antidiscrimination doctrine had room for justification,
moreover, judges have noted that when they focus on the work envi-
ronment as a whole, claims of justification begin to appear false or
pretextual.323
Fault-based doctrine, by contrast, generally permits defendants to
escape liability when they acted with justification.324  Hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment, envisioned in this Article mainly in terms
of Title VII and thus only partially fault-based, has a role for justifica-
tion, albeit a circumscribed role. The concept of justification in the
context of sexual harassment jurisprudence has eluded the under-
standing of the judiciary, which has failed to set forth a conceptual
framework for the doctrine.
Here the work of Joel Feinberg on offensiveness is pertinent. Pro-
fessor Feinberg writes that subjective perceptions of offense must be
tempered with qualifications: "the standard of reasonable avoidability,"
the maxim volenti non fit injuria, and the discounting of abnormal
susceptibilities.3 25  Feinberg acknowledges that these qualifications on
offensiveness partake of a reasonableness standard, yet he insists that
offensiveness exists apart from reasonableness and reason.3 26 By anal-
ogy to offensiveness, then, choices on the part of the victim of alleged
harassment can diminish the full force of what would otherwise be
disrespect.
One may derive three criteria from Feinberg. First, could the of-
fender reasonably have avoided behaving in a disrespectful manner?
Second, does the complainant fall within the volenti maxim: is she "the
willing" for whom there is no injury?327  Third, do the complainant's
322 Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 266 (N.D. Ind. 1985), overruled by Reeder-
Baker v. Lincoln Nat. Corp., 644 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ind. i986).
323 See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Vance v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 .2d 1503, 151o (iith Cir. 1989)).
324 To move along the fault continuum, criminal law provides the most elaborate scheme of
justification, distinguishing it from excuse and grading levels of justification; next comes tort law,
which recognizes privileges to commit a prima facie intentional tort. See John Lawrence Hill,
Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 631, 65 1-52 (1994).
325 FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 35-36.
326 See id.
327 See BLAcK's LAW DiCTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 199o) ("The maxim ... means that if one,
knowing and comprehending the danger, voluntarily exposes [her]self to it, though not negligent
in so doing, [s]he is deemed to have assumed the risk and is precluded from a recovery for an in-
jury therefrom.").
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abnormal susceptibilities weaken her claim of having been treated
with disrespect?
Because these questions fit within justification as it is understood
in Title VII doctrine, they ought to burden the defendant rather than
the plaintiff. Menitor Savings Bank v. Vinson, misguided on this
point,328 has created confusion in the lower courts. This confusion
would be remedied by a change to a respectful person standard. Un-
der the new standard, defendants could, in a pretrial motion, raise the
possibility that a complaint is diminished by one of the Feinberg-
derived justification conditions. Judges would apply summary judg-
ment criteria to decide whether the defendant could pursue discovery,
or introduce evidence, as to these defenses. These changes in theory
and litigation practice are simple and flow logically from the respectful
person standard. As I argue below, moreover, all of the Feinberg-
derived criteria have counterparts in current Title VII case law, and
these counterparts would ease the transition.
The first criterion, avoidability, parallels something that at first
blush may look different: the Title VI requirement of pervasiveness.
Avoidability resembles pervasiveness because both emphasize ques-
tions of proportion: How bad was the challenged conduct? Fleeting
hostility or abusiveness does not affect the work environment enough
for courts to find liability.3 29 As doctrine, the requirement of perva-
siveness has been relatively uncontroversial, although some courts and
commentators have considered whether a single act can amount to
pervasive hostility.33 0 This twinge of analytic doubt suggests that it
may not be possible to count the number of relevant acts to determine
whether it is large enough to indicate pervasiveness.331
328 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The correct inquiry is
whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome
329 See id. at 67 (holding that harassment must "alter the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
ment" (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
330 The EEOC seems to think not but keeps the question open. See EEOC Policy Guidance on
Current Issues of Sexual Harassment (Mar. ig, 199o) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance], re-
printed in LINDEMANN & KADTUE, supra note 35, at 661, 67o-71 (suggesting that, among possible
isolated instances, an extremely aggressive physical violation would most likely suffice for liabil-
ity).
331 Consider the peculiar use of the phrase "isolated incident" in case law. The phrase does not
mean "one incident" but rather indicates some number too low to impress the court: in other
words, the question of pervasiveness is answered before the court enumerates the number of ha-
rassing incidents. See ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND
PRACTICE 49 n.i66 (Iggo) (citing "isolated incidents" cases involving "5o incidents over io years,"
"five incidents over three years," and "three isolated incidents of harassment over [a] three-year
period" (citations omitted)); see also Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 824-25 (6th Cir.
1997) (noting that the magistrate judge deemed the harassment to have been an "isolated inci-
dent," even though the plaintiff had complained to her employer's general counsel: "Has it always
been like this?... [The harassment] takes up so much time" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Here a respectful person standard, tempered by the defense of rea-
sonable avoidability, conveys what is desirable about doctrinal atten-
tion to pervasiveness - that is, the chance to weigh and to measure
the wrongness of workplace action - while at the same time rescuing
what is desirable about the idea of reasonableness. It may be reason-
able, for example, for company management to pay less attention to a
few sexual harassment complaints in the middle of its own hostile
takeover crisis. As the harassment becomes more encompassing -
lasting longer, affecting more people - it becomes less reasonable for
management to neglect these conditions of disrespect, even if funda-
mentals of company ownership happen to be in turmoil. At this point,
one may say that pervasiveness has been achieved. The quality to
look for is not simply the breadth of harassment, as attention to "per-
vasiveness" in its current state suggests, but the additional dimension
of avoidability.
Volenti non fit injuria - a theme sounded in the student note
whose title begins "Did She Ask for It?"332 - influenced Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Menitor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson333 and the Meritor-derived rule that a plaintiff must prove that
she did not welcome the challenged conduct.3 34 As many commenta-
tors argue, the rule about "welcomeness" is akin to the common law
belief that rape claims are often lies that are asserted to nullify past
consent: according to the prejudice, a woman who is now a plaintiff or
a prosecutrix was a willing participant when the conduct occurred. 335
Trial courts have acquiesced to this effort by allowing defendants to
argue welcomeness with an array of testimony - for instance, that the
plaintiff used coarse language at work, talked to colleagues about her
sexual activities, or told risqu6 jokes.3 3 6 Lawyers who defend Title VII
332 See Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. Rv. 1558 (1992).
333 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (stating that the complainant's "fantasies" and "sexually provoca-
tive speech or dress" are "obviously relevant" to the issue of voluntariness (citation omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
334 See Moylan v. Maries County, 792 E2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff
must prove that she was subject to "unwelcome" sexual harassment); Mary F. Radford, By Invita-
tion Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 519
(i994) (noting that almost all federal circuits follow this rule); Childers, supra note X22, at 862 n.29
(reading Meritor to state a presumption of welcomeness that the plaintiff must rebut).
335 See Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the Unwelcome
Influence of Rape Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 125, 132 (i995); Estrich, supra note 4, at 816;
Juliano, supra note 332, at 1573-75.
336 See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491-92 (7th Cir. iggi) (ruling against the plaintiff in part
because of her history of enjoying sexually suggestive jokes); Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D.
311, 316 (S.D. Iowa 2992) (permitting discovery, on the question of welcomeness, regarding the
complainant's practice of sending and pinning up risqu6 cards); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639, 639 (E.D. Mo. 2982) (noting sexually explicit remarks of the plain-
tiff). In Weinsheimer v. Rockwell International Corp., 754 F. Supp. I550 (M.D. Fla. x99o), affid
without opinion, 949 F.2d 1162 ('ith Cir. i99I), the plaintiff made extensive allegations of ha-
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sexual harassment claims have said that welcomeness is among their
best weapons of defense.337
The rule about welcomeness shuttles uneasily between two truths.
One is that people are different: one person's meat is another's poison.
As Justice Scalia has noted, once the courts are willing to hear com-
plaints of sexual harassment without proof of severe injury, the most
straightforward way to judge the magnitude of the harm is to ask
what the conduct meant to the complainant, and the subjective theme
of the welcomeness requirement reaches toward an answer.338 Al-
though this reasoning might argue for retaining the welcomeness rule,
it would also argue for its banishment - it is equally true that a wel-
comeness inquiry sometimes slurs the complainant, overlaps at least
partially with her burden to prove an objective wrong,339 and exposes
her to pretrial maneuvers likely to prove humiliating.3 40
As with avoidability, the Feinberg-derived volenti criterion can
work with a respectful person standard to encourage simultaneously
the respectful treatment of workers and attention to individual circum-
stances that could support a defense. This approach would mark an
important contrast. The opinion of the Court in Meritor asks: Did she
ask for it? Did she deserve it because of her clothes and conversation?
Meritor indulges trial judges who want to evade their duties with a
stereotype. The respectful person standard, however, chooses another
query: Did the defendant behave as a respectful person? That is, did
the defendant regard the complainant as a person, self-propelled and
unique, with a range of potential reactions to sex-based conduct in the
workplace? This range is intelligible to actors willing to render re-
spectful attention; they may blunder, but their respect will be discern-
able. Indeed the concept of welcomeness, when used appropriately to
evaluate the conduct of an actor rather than the reaction of a com-
plainant, is at its root a question whether respect was rendered.
rassment, including a claim that one defendant had pressed his penis into her hand while she was
looking elsewhere. See id. at i56i. The court found that although this "incident" was "graphic,"
the plaintiff had reported it to management too casually and had generally failed to make a case
because of her "proven, active contribution to the sexually explicit environment." Id. at 1563-64.
337 See Jared H. Jossem, Investigating Sexual Harassment Complaints: Guidelines for Employ-
ers, in LrrIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra note 95, at 103, 113 (suggesting that,
as part of trial preparation, lawyers for employers should investigate the clothing and joke-telling
proclivities of complainants).
338 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (noting the sparseness of the plaintiff's prima
facie case under current doctrine).
339 See Estrich, supra note 4, at 830.
340 See Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 5oo, 502 (D. N.M. 1996) (limiting the defendant's effort to
seek discovery on a "sexual aggressor" defense); Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 757 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (quoting intrusive questions posed by defense counsel); Ellen E. Schultz & Junda Woo,
Plaintiffs' Sex Lives Are Being Laid Bare in Harassment Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at
Ai.
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Courts obscure this essence when they impose the burden of proof
on this question on the plaintiff. Like the defenses associated with
volenti non fit injuria - consent and assumption of risk - welcome-
ness ought to be proved by the defendant. Volenti, if successful, en-
ables a defendant to describe a situation in which the plaintiff received
just what she wanted, in a fair exchange. Good defense lawyers can
sketch a plausible motive to explain the bargain.341 The complainant's
autonomy and clearheadedness are demonstrated.3 42  As numerous
cases indicate, courts can work capably with this understanding of
willingness.3 43
The third Feinberg-derived criterion, relating to hypersensitivity,
requires careful construction. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has declared that Title VII cannot vindicate "the petty
slights suffered by the hypersensitive";3 44 this declaration seems logical
and sensible.3 45 As feminist commentators point out, however, hyper-
sensitivity is a problematic term, tending to marginalize the experi-
ences and perceptions of women. 346 In practice, a concern with hyper-
sensitivity lessens focus on the actor and focuses scrutiny on the
complainant instead.3 47 Yet it is difficult to dispense with the category
of the hypersensitive plaintiff if one wishes to retain an objective ref-
341 See Swentek v. USAir, 830 F.2d 552, 555-56 (4th Cir. 1987) (describing the partial success of
the "bargain" tactic).
342 For a parallel argument, compare the reasoning with Abrams, cited above in note 121, at
1214-15, which raises the possibility that defendants may attempt to demonstrate that the plain-
tiff's response to the defendant's behavior is idiosyncratic. A classic instance of volenti appears in
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929), in which Chief Judge Cardozo
regarded the hapless plaintiff with respect: a man, he reasoned, might want to take a rough ride
in an amusement park. See id. at 174. So too might a woman want to hear rough jokes at the
job, or to have another employee touch her breast. The respectful person standard admits these
possibilities.
343 See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1or1 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The asymme-
try of positions must be considered. She was one woman; they were many men.'); Burns v.
McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 Ezd 959, 963-64 (8th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that the workplace
behavior could have offended the complainant despite her having posed nude for a magazine, and
noting that the trial court's contrary rationale "would allow a complete stranger to pursue sexual
behavior at work that a female worker would accept from her husband or boyfriend'); Jenson v.
Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 883 (D. Minn. 1993) ("[The fact] [tihat women say 'fuck'
at work does not imply that they are inviting any and every form of sexual harassment.'); cf
Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to admit
evidence of plaintiff's abortions, taste for pornography, and prior sexual history).
344 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 33o , at 669 (quoting Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589
. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
345 One reformer admits that there is some validity to this point of view. See Frank S. Ravitch,
Hostile Work Environment and the Objective Reasonableness Conundrum: Deriving a Workable
Framework from Tort Law for Addressing Knowing Harassment of Hypersensitive Employees, 36
B.C. L. REV. 257, 265-66 (g995).
346 See Abrams, supra note 121, at I2i; Dolkart, supra note 191, at 2 o; cf Estrich, supra note
4, at 845-47 (arguing that the mere fact of a complaint may brand a woman as hypersensitive).
347 See Sara Needleman Kline, Comment, Sexual Harassment, Wrongful Discharge, and Em-
ployer Liability: The Employers Dilemma, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 191, 199-200 (1993).
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erent for hostile environment sexual harassment claims. 3 48 The re-
spectful person standard suggests a cautious interpretation of hyper-
sensitivity that preserves the gains of the objective standard but still
accommodates the need for a standard that guides behavior in the
workforce.
On this question, the respectful person standard would, following a
framework used in dignitary-tort law, function as follows. Once the
plaintiff produces evidence that the defendant did not conform to the
standard of a respectful person, the court would permit the defendant
to argue that he did indeed conform to the standard, and that the
plaintiff's feeling or experience of disrespect resulted from her hyper-
sensitivity. Liability would depend on whether the plaintiff's unusual
sensitivity was known by or knowable to the defendant.3 49 If the de-
fendant could not have known or predicted the reaction, then the de-
fendant would not be liable. If, however, the defendant knew about
the hypersensitivity and acted deliberately to provoke a pained reac-
tion, then the defendant would be liable.3 50 A corporate employer
would be liable if it knew of and condoned its employee's deliberate
exploitation of the plaintiff's hypersensitivity.35'
Parallels to current doctrine are evident. The question of hypersen-
sitivity is embedded in the dialectic between objective and subjective
assessments of conduct.352 The respectful person standard, which par-
takes of both objective and subjective measures of behavior, validates
both the (objective) principle of reasonable knowledge and the (subjec-
tive) principle of individual difference. At the same time, however, the
348 See supra p. 477. Consistent with this view, tort law generally discourages plaintiffs from
labeling themselves as extremely sensitive. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j,
§ 313 cmt. c, § 652D, cmt. c (1965).
349 Frank Ravitch offers as an illustration a female worker whose boss thinks that women do
not belong in the workforce. In an effort to drive her out, the boss exploits what he knows to be
her sensitivity to loud noise and sets up a noisy machine near her office. The noisy machine
would not bother the "reasonable person." Under current analysis, a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim would fail, even though the supervisor deliberately imposed detrimental work-
ing conditions based on the gender of his subordinate. See Ravitch, supra note 345, at 257.
350 Longstanding tort rules are in accord. See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, io5 F.2d
62, 65-67 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (allowing a remedy for the deliberate exploitation of the plaintiff's vul-
nerability to stress); Bundren v. Superior Court ex i-eL Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., 193 Cal. Rptr.
671, 676 (Cal. CL App. 1983) (reversing a grant of summary judgment for the defendant in a case
in which the plaintiff sought recovery for the defendant's rude questioning of plaintiff while
plaintiff was recovering from surgery); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Roch, 153 A. 22, 23 (Md.
1931) (allowing similar recovery for defendant grocer's packing a dead rat in a loaf of bread);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1965) (noting that, in the case of an actor who
knows of the plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility "conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and out-
rageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge').
351 This summary is largely congruent with the recommendation of Ravitch, cited above in note
345, except that Ravitch is committed to the concept of the "objectively reasonable person." Id. at
271. It is also congruent with the burden-shifting argument proposed in Abrams, cited above in
note 121, at 1214-15, and Childers, cited above in note 122, at 862 n.29.
352 See supra pp. 480-82.
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respectful person standard departs from, and improves on, current
doctrine by providing redress for deliberate, hostile conduct aimed at
an employee because of her gender. Although the ultrasensitive em-
ployee appears to be more a creature of worried imaginations than real
cases,3 3 sexual harassment doctrine ought to have a place for this in-
dividual. In dealing with the possibility of a claim by such a litigant,
the respectful person builds on traditions of both objectivity and indi-
vidual attention.
3. The Law/Fact Divide. - Inasmuch as courts have admitted the
difficulty of their task of dividing "the law" from "the facts" in sexual
harassment cases,3. 4 one may wonder how the respectful person stan-
dard would function to preserve this distinction with its attendant
benefits.355  Supporters of the distinction can endorse the respectful
person standard; in supplanting references to reason in hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims, the respectful person standard
would coexist with the current dichotomy between questions of law
and questions of fact. Summary judgment and dismissals of com-
plaints would still be available to defendants on most of the same
grounds currently deemed dispositive in federal courts. Procedural
bases for dismissals and summary judgments, such as the statute of
limitations356  and the failure to exhaust administrative reme-
353 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. igg) (referring to "the rare hyper-sensitive
employee'); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 199o) (stating that the
objective standard is necessary to protect employers from "hypersensitive" employees). Reported
case law contains few decisions in which a court ruled against a plaintiff on the ground that the
plaintiff was hypersensitive. One such case may be Sand v. George P Johnson Co., 33 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 716, 720 (E.D. Mich. 1982), although the Sand rationale included other consid-
erations. Instead the issue of hypersensitivity emerges as a defense lawyer's tactic, a label to pin
on a plaintiff. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.RD. 525, 53' (M.D. Fla. 1988)
(denying a defense motion for a compelled psychiatric examination that was intended to show
that the plaintiff was hypersensitive to pornography); Feldman-Schorrig & McDonald, supra note
II, at 28 (recommending this tactic).
354 See Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 54 E3d 931, 935-36 (ist Cir. 1995); cf. Swanson v.
Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Under Rule 52(a) we are
obliged to correct errors of law including mixed findings of law and fact, and any finding of fact
premised upon a rule of law." (citations omitted)).
35S A distinction between law and fact offers the possibility of consistency among like cases,
and appropriate reliance on the relative capabilities of lay persons and legal experts. See Stephen
A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Tal and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1867, 1922-25
(1966). Criticism of the distinction comes from varied quarters. See, e.g., JANICE SCHUETZ, THE
LOGIC OF WOMEN ON TRIAL: CASE STUDIES OF POPULAR AMERICAN TRIALS X44 (994)
("[B]oth law and fact are framed by the culture of the interpreters who create narratives to ex-
plain them."); Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact orJustice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487, 489 (1986) (of-
fering a deconstructionist critique). This criticism precedes that of the Legal Realists. See James
B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Tals, 4 HARv. L. REV. 147 (189o). For one Realist view, see
LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 279 (1930), which calls the distinction a tautology.
356 See Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996);
Ellert v. University of Tex., 52 F.3d 543, 545 n.8 (5th Cir. 1995).
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dies,3 7 would continue unchanged. The plaintiff would retain fully
her burden of proof; the substitution of a defendant-focused respectful
person for a complainant-focused reasonable person (or woman, target,
or the like) would not relieve plaintiffs of their current obligation to
support their complaints with evidence.358
Even when the plaintiff can clear these hurdles, and even when the
defendant did not behave as a respectful person, a Title VII claim
might fail under the respectful person standard because of its poor fit
with the antidiscrimination purposes of the statute. Disrespectful con-
duct not based on sex would remain outside the remedial boundaries
of Title VII, consistent with the view now prevailing in the courts.35 9
When disrespectful conduct is too trivial, isolated, or ambiguous to be
deemed "pervasive," summary judgment would be proper under the
respectful person standard 60 The respectful person standard is also
analytically severable from the question whether same-sex harassment
ought to be actionable under Title VII;361 like current "reasonableness"
standards, the respectful person approach does not necessarily man-
date acceptance of same-sex claims.
The law/fact divide may appear at odds with a respectful person
standard. In everyday language, treating another person summarily, as
in "summary judgment," or with "dismissal," challenges respect in
some sense. Yet by supporting pretrial disposition, the respectful per-
son standard honors the concept of respect. In preserving the virtues
3S7 See Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 57
(996); Humphrey v. Potlatch Corp., 74 F3d 1243 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 616
(1996).
358 On this burden in sexual harassment cases, see Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv-
ice Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996); and Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 88 F.2d 1126, 1128
(4th Cir. 1987).
359 See Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 19 F.3d 533, 538 (1oth Cir. 1994); Walk v. Rubbermaid,
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1023, 1027 (N.D. Ohio 1994), affid without opinion, 76 .3d 380 (6th Cir. 1996).
Some conduct may be based on sex and yet not be central to Title VII's concern with discrimina-
tion; thus, it too would fall outside the scope of the respectful person standard. See Goluszek v.
Smith, 697 R Supp. I452, 1456 (N.D. I1. 1988) (rejecting a claim based on heterosexual man-to-
man harassment, in which plaintiff was teased for having no wife or girlfriend and for living with
his mother, and stating that this behavior, though rude and childish, did not fall within Title VII's
concern with "discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group").
360 For current treatments of pervasiveness, see Callanan v. Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293, 1296 (8th
Cir. 1996), and Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 53 F3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. z995). Present
doctrine treats severity and pervasiveness as mixed questions of law and fact. See Jordan v.
Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1375 n.7 (9 th Cir. 1988); Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F. Supp.
1435, 1447 (E.D. Cal. 995). The respectful person standard would comport with this approach.
361 The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether Title VII covers same-sex harassment.
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997). This issue has divided the
circuits. Compare Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that same-sex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under Title VII), with Hopkins v. Bal-
timore Gas and Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir. 1996) (allowing the claim, but imposing extra
burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that harassment was based on his gender), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 70 (1996), and Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (C.D. Ill.
1995) (allowing the claim).
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of an objective standard, the respectful person standard validates a
subset of all sexual harassment complaints as grievances about be-
havior that is wrong, contrary to statute, and amenable to universal
judgment. The respectful person approach spares defendants from
protracted court proceedings when no reasonable factfinder could con-
clude that the plaintiff was entitled to relief. More generally, the di-
chotomous law/fact distinction is consonant with the central impor-
tance of dichotomies within respect - between individual and group-
based identities; between the object as something other than the sub-
ject and the object as critically like the subject; between separation as
isolating punishment and separation as affirmation - and thus in its
basic questions comports with a respectful person standard.362 In bar-
ring some accounts of harassment, the respectful person standard does
not implicitly slur them as a reaction contrary to reason, unlike the
prevailing objective criterion for hostile environment case analysis. In
other aspects, the two standards are similar for purposes of pretrial
disposition as a matter of law.
IV. SOME VIRTUES OF THE RESPECTFUL PERSON
A respectful person standard would improve the law of sexual ha-
rassment in several ways. Because it grasps the distinction between
agent and object - a distinction that the reasonableness standards ob-
scure - the respectful person standard improves the descriptive func-
tion of sexual harassment law, a function that the judicial opinions of
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the precedent of race discrimination
have illuminated. Development of a respectful person standard would
also connect sexual harassment law with important strands of Ameri-
can jurisprudence: the concept of respect permeates American law, and
the respectful person standard reveals the common ground of this new
legal subject and venerable terrain.
A. Descriptive Accuracy: Offensive Behavior and Harm to Dignity
"It is the accused, not the victim who is on trial, and it is therefore
the conduct of the accused, not that of the victim, that should be sub-
jected to scrutiny," wrote Judge Albert Lee Stephens, dissenting from
the reasonable woman and reasonable victim prescriptions in Ellison
v. Brady.363 Stephens, a senior district court judge sitting by designa-
tion on the Ellison panel, brought to Ellison an important trial-focused
perspective on the objective standard problem, and his sensible doubts
about the reasonable woman standard have won praise in the law re-
362 See supra pp. 484-92.
363 924 F.2d 872, 884-85 (9th Cir. i99i) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
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views.3 64 But the Stephens criticism,3 65 extended, logically, would
cover the entire set of reasonableness standards in sexual harassment
cases. Whether embodied as man, woman, person, victim, or any
other noun, this entity diverts attention from the conduct of a putative
harasser and forces the complainant to justify her perspective. Instead
of laying down a standard of conduct, reasonableness tests purport to
judge a reaction.3 66
By contrast, the respectful person is a standard that measures ac-
tion rather than reaction. The actor is charged with a duty to refrain
from offending others by keeping his behavior within the boundaries
of respect. Compliance with this duty should lead to conduct similar
to that encouraged by conventional reasonable person rules, but it is
critically different in that the actor knows it is he, rather than his ac-
cuser, who will be held directly to the standard. Emphasis on the ac-
tor's offense, rather than on the victim's perception of the offense,
would move hostile environment doctrine closer to the analytical cen-
ter of civil law.
This shift would acknowledge that reasonableness inquiries work
well in a range of other situations, as long as such inquiries focus on
the person whose conduct has been challenged as unlawful. Negli-
gence law uses reasonableness to examine the actions of a defendant 367
or of a plaintiff accused of contributory negligence.368 Criminal negli-
gence is also established with reference to reasonableness.3 69 Criminal
procedure permits searches by police officers based on their reasonable
suspicion,370 which in turn is based on "specific and articulable facts"
that "would lead a reasonable person to conclude that criminal activity
was afoot."371 The law holds trustees to a reasonableness standard:
"reasonable care, skill, and caution."372 In their analyses of contested
understandings in commercial contract litigation, courts use reason-
ableness tests in order to determine what the parties wanted.373 All of
364 See Johnson, supra note 169, at 633; Walter Christopher Arbery, Note, A Step Backward for
Equality Principles: The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Title VII Hostile Work Environment
Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 GA. L. REv. 503, 545 & n.269 (1993); Turner, supra note 275, at
860.
365 See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
366 See Juliano, supra note 332, at 1570.
367 See supra note 125.
368 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d i69, 172 (2d Cir. 1947).
369 See, e.g., State v. Crowdell, 487 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Neb. 1992) (inferring mens rea from con-
duct); Hill, supra note 324, at 651-52.
370 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
371 Robert J. Burnett, Comment, Random Police-Citizen Encounters: When Is a Seizure a Sei-
zure?, 33 DuQ. L. REv. 283, 284 (1995) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
372 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992).
373 See, e.g., 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:52, at 611
(Michael A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 199o) (applying a reasonable person standard to the interpretation of
silence as acceptance of an offer); see also Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., ioS
S.W. 777, 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (placing the plaintiff in the role of"reasonable man").
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these reasonableness standards address actors rather than recipients of
action.
Broader references to reason pay tribute to an indispensable con-
cept in the law. "Beyond a reasonable doubt" reminds the factfinder to
rely on its reason when assessing whether the evidence supports the
intellectual proposition of criminal liability. The law of tax,3 74 securi-
ties,375 evidence,376 antitrust,377 administrative decisionmaking, 378 and
constitutional interpretation 379 cannot be explained without the words
"reason" and "reasonable."
These areas in which reason is of the essence are so widespread
that it makes for a much shorter exercise to study the areas of law in
which reason plays a relatively unimportant role. Dignitary harm is
part of this latter category. Reason can be found only at its periphery.
The infliction of an indignity has almost no relation to the core world
of reason, nor to the search for resolution of doubt and disagreement
that reason facilitates.380
The work of Joel Feinberg on offense381 again suggests a valuable
parallel. According to Feinberg, offensive conduct must be judged with
reference to several variables, including its magnitude and the diffi-
culty of avoiding the offense.382 But reasonableness is not a proper
374 See, e.g., National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (i979) (estab-
lishing criteria for reasonableness of tax regulation).
375 See, e.g., Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 .3d
2o8, 213 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing "reasonable care" standards as applied to broker-dealers);
Therese H. Maynard, The Affirmative Defense of Reasonable Care Under Section 12(2) of the Se-
curities Act of '933, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 113-15 (993).
376 See, e.g., Bourque v. FDIC, 42 F.3d 704, 711 (ist Cir. 1994) (using a reasonableness standard
to decide whether a document was probative); FED. R. EviD. 2oi(b) (discussing reasonableness as
applied to judicial notice); FED. R. EvID. 7o6(b) (permitting "reasonable compensation" for court-
appointed expert witnesses).
377 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (i9ii) (setting forth the antitrust
"rule of reason").
378 See Aylett v. Secretary of Hous. and Urban Dev., 54 F3d 156o, 1567 (ioth Cir. 1995) (dis-
cussing the nature of "reason" in reviewing the decision of an administrative judge).
379 See Michael L. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and the Question of Minimalism, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 84, 119-20 (1993) (describing the role of reasonableness within a minimalist para-
digm of constitutional interpretation); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 824 n.2I (1994) (noting the interpretive difficulty posed by the word "rea-
sonable" in the Fourth Amendment).
380 One of the handful of doctrines that refer to the perspective of those who receive action is
the tort of offensive battery - that is, intentional contact that "offends a reasonable sense of per-
sonal dignity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § i9 (1965). This formulation of an objective
standard addresses actors primarily, with only secondary emphasis on the recipients of action.
The adjective "reasonable" serves to assert an objective standard and to define out hypersensitivi-
ties unknown and unknowable to the actor. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS:
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 7 (i995).
381 See FEINBERG, supra note 33; JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUND OF
LIBERTY 96-109 (198o).
382 See supra pp. 498-501.
Vol. 111:445
TREATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT WITH RESPECT
element of the inquiry.38 3  Offended states, writes Feinberg, are "nei-
ther reasonable nor unreasonable but simply 'non reasonable."' 384 In-
dignity and humiliation, equally nonreasonable, fall within the under-
standing of a respectful person standard. The boundary crossing
implicit in offense to others relates fundamentally to the delineation
around individual persons, which is central to respect.385 Defamation
law provides another analogy to the harm of hostile environment sex-
ual harassment and additional support for a respectful person stan-
dard. To be defamatory, a statement need not be unreasonable, nor
need it seem defamatory to the reasonable person.38 6 Offering a nota-
ble precedent for sexual harassment law, defamation law rejects plu-
ralism and consensus as core principles, using these concepts only to
set the outer limits of liability: a statement is not defamatory if it will
offend only those whose standards are so clearly antisocial as to be of-
fensive.387 Like the respectful person standard, moreover, defamation
law shows that repudiating reasonableness does not entangle doctrine
in a bog of subjectivity. This doctrine is relational, sited firmly in a
community.3 88
That hostile environment sexual harassment is fundamentally an
injury to dignity escapes few who have experienced and studied the
phenomenon. The majority of such persons are women, and although
one hesitates to join the unending discussion of whether Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor speaks in a feminine voice,3 9 during her twelve years
as the only woman on the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor produced
several distinct assertions concerning discrimination in employment
383 See FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 35.
384 Id. at 36. Feinberg adds that some offended states are understandable with reference to
reason: it is "perfectly reasonable" to take offense at a racial epithet, for example, and "profoundly
contrary to reason to be offended by the sight of an interracial couple." Id.
385 See id. at 24; cf. Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary,
and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. i95 (i995) (invoking boundary imagery).
386 See Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, i89-9o (igog) (rejecting the defendant's contention
that a defamatory statement must tend to offend a "general consensus," and noting that defama-
tory nature "is not a question of a majority vote"); Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733,
735 (2d Cir. 1945) (rejecting the contention that the communication must offend "right-thinking
people").
387 See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAvID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § III, at 778 (5th ed. r984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
388 See id. at 771.
389 "One author has even concluded that my opinions differ in a peculiarly feminine way from
those of my colleagues," wrote Justice O'Connor, sounding skeptical. Sandra Day O'Connor, Por-
tia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1553 (1991). Compare Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and
the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 592-613 (1986) (making
the above argument noted by Justice O'Connor), with Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal
Scholarship: Can We Claim "A Different Voice"?, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 37, 6o-64 (1992) (dif-
fering with Sherry). The debate, which has engaged political scientists as well as lawyers, is
summarized in Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND.
L.J. 89x (i995).
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that were broader than the proposition advanced here. To Justice
O'Connor, employment discrimination is a tort in all but name.390
Deliberate, restrained in her analytic approach, and inclined to
read statutes narrowly,391 Justice O'Connor cannot properly be ac-
cused of distending antidiscrimination doctrine in pursuit of a remedial
agenda.39 She offers her judicial positions on workplace dignity con-
tinually in the spirit of careful statutory construction.3 93 In their re-
fusal to frame sex discrimination as indignity, her colleagues on the
Court have never effectively refuted Justice O'Connor's cogent posi-
tion that employment discrimination is a tort in all but name.394
The respectful person standard falls modestly within the confines
of Justice O'Connor's approach to Title VII and related statutes.
Whereas Justice O'Connor deems all employment discrimination a
kind of indignity, the respectful person standard addresses sexual ha-
rassment only, and harassment (unlike other types of sex discrimina-
tion, such as the gender-biased pay schedules at issue in United States
390 Writing separately in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (I989), Justice O'Connor
emphasized the value of tort concepts - causation, deterrence, compensation, and "evil" - in the
adjudication of sex-discrimination actions brought under Title VII. See id. at 261-65 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). In an earlier case, she wrote separately to insist on a fault-like intent standard for
employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 612 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In a third case, United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), in which the majority characterized the plaintiff's sex-discrimination
award as quasi-wages rather than personal injury damages for purposes of federal income taxa-
tion, see id. at 242, Justice O'Connor dissented to insist that Title VII "offers a tort-like cause of
action to those who suffer the injury of employment discrimination." Id. at 254 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor asserted. "Functionally, the law operates in the traditional manner
of torts: Courts award compensation for invasions of a right to be free from certain injury in the
workplace. Like damages in tort suits, moreover, monetary relief for violations of Title VII serves
a public purpose beyond offsetting specific losses." Id. at 250.
Some years later, in the context of a discrimination claim based on disability, Justice O'Connor
reasserted her view that employment discrimination is equivalent to tortious conduct. See Com-
missioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
391 See sources cited supra note 389.
392 See Tammy Bruce & Julianne Malveaux, Can We Talk?, ON ISSUES, Summer 1996, at 16, 17
(faulting Justice O'Connor for demanding proof of past discrimination in affirmative action
cases); Sheila M. Smith, Comment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sexual Harassment Law:
Will the Second Female Supreme Court Justice Become the Court's Women's Rights Champion?,
63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1893, 1893 (1995) (calling Justice O'Connor's record on sex discrimination
cases "somewhat mixed').
393 See sources cited supra note 389.
394 Some Justices have attempted to refute her position. See, e.g., Burke, 504 U.S. at 243
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (using the Latin maxim noscitur a sociis to contend that
the phrase "personal injuries or sickness" should be read narrowly); id. at 248 (Souter, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (stating that although "good reasons tug each way," the plaintiff's award
must be characterized as taxable because "exclusions from income must be narrowly construed).
The Burke majority opinion by Justice Blackmun is narrower and does not constitute a barrier to
the respectful person thesis offered here, because the injury in Burke pertained to gender-biased
salary schedules rather than the indignity of sexual harassment; moreover, in rejecting the tort
analogy, the Court relied on portions of the Civil Rights Act of x964, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe (1994),
that are now superseded by the i99i amendments, see Burke, 504 U.S. at 237 n.8.
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v. Burke395 ) closely resembles tort-remedied indignities such as inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.3 96 Whether or not the American
judiciary, under the leadership of a prominent woman Justice of the
Supreme Court, will treat gender discrimination as a violation of a
person's sense of dignity, the respectful person standard offers a pru-
dent doctrinal expression of this understanding.
The respectful person standard also brings to sexual harassment
doctrine a strong influence of African-American culture. As in other
areas of antidiscrimination law, the precedents of racial history pertain
closely to the building of new sexual harassment rules.3 97 Respect, for
many years a core theme of African-American literature and legal
scholarship, 398 needs to be integrated more closely with current judi-
cial understandings of antidiscrimination doctrine. Toward this end,
consider Robin Dillon's description of respect:
Respect is, we might say, object-generated rather than subject-generated;
it is something we render, something that is called for, commanded, elic-
ited, due, claimed from us. Thus it differs from liking or loving, and from
fearing, to take another emotion with which respect is sometimes con-
fused, all of which have their source in the agent's own desires and inter-
ests. When we respect something, we heed its call, accord it its due, ac-
knowledge its claim to our attention.3 9 9
If Dillon is correct to view respect as a vector extended and received,
then it is appropriate to think about conditions that impede this
movement. Among these conditions is the obtuseness that derives
from comfort. Gaps in social power block the flow of respect, espe-
cially its rendering by the subject. In a relation of respect, the subject
must acknowledge the claims of the object while refusing the tempta-
tion and distraction of feeling too socially exalted to render what is
'39 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
396 Cf Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 267, 273-74 (99I) (presenting the argument that racist speech should be treated as a dig-
nitary tort).
397 See Vande Zande v. State Dep't of Admin., 44 E3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing an
analogy between race and physical disability); Dittman v. General Motors Corp., 941 F. Supp.
284, 286-87 (D. Conn. 1996) (exploring an analogy between "reverse age discrimination" and "re-
verse race discrimination"); Barton, supra note 316, at 455 n.58 (noting analogies between race
discrimination and sex discrimination); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy:
Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 149 (1988).
398 Among the mid-twentieth-century classics, see CLAUDE BROWN, MANCHILD IN THE
PROMISED LAND (1965); RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952); LORRAINE HANSBERRY, A
RAISIN IN THE SUN (1959); and RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940). For the argument that
respect ought to be an urgent priority for African-Americans, see MALCOLM X, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X, at 275 (1965). Legal scholars widen the discussion. See, e.g.,
Okianer Christian Dark, Just My 'Magination, io HARv. BLAcKLETTER J. 2X, 22-25 (1993) (de-
scribing race in the law school environment, including the belief that African-American female
professors lack credibility); Ali Khan, Lessons from Malcolm X: Freedom by Any Means Neces-
sary, 38 How. L.J. 79, 124-32 (1994) (linking respect to a human-rights conception of racial strug-
gle).
399 Dillon, supra note 43, at io8.
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due. Racial inequality makes white Americans more susceptible to
this self-perception of superiority and, when unexamined, tends to ob-
struct the rendering of respect.
Attention to racial equality accompanies a respectful person stan-
dard in other particulars. As the English philosopher Richard Nor-
man argues, respect is crucially different from sympathy; unlike sym-
pathy, respect emphasizes separateness, "a reaction of distancing
oneself."400 The African-American struggle to achieve respectful sepa-
ration - coexistence combined with living apart401 - has echoes in
the struggle of women workers to be left enough "alone" to do their
jobs; the argument advanced for respect here recalls African-American
and social science judgments of the need to acknowledge separateness
as a step toward equality.402 Finally, African-American experience
sheds light on sexual harassment itself. In case law, African-American
women have collectively described workplace behavior whose con-
temptuous and oppressive nature becomes clear through the lens of
race and cannot readily be dismissed as badinage or good fun.40 3
Many sexual harassment claims draw powerfully and directiy on the
racial precedent of caste oppression. 40 4 Sexual harassment law cannot
cohere when it neglects its debt to race-based perception, and a re-
spectful person standard helps to keep this ancestry at the heart of
doctrine.
B. Doctrinal Harmony: Respect Elsewhere in the Law
American law frequently encourages, and even requires, citizens to
render respect of the sort described in this Article. This section sug-
gests that analogies can be drawn between the ideas of respect that are
implicit in many of the current legal doctrines and the respectful per-
son standard proposed here. Frank acknowledgement of respect as a
constituent of law, rather than a part of a system of morality that is
400 Norman, supra note 241, at 325-26.
401 See LERONE BENNETT JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA
217 (5th ed. 1982) (citing Frederick Douglass's plea of "let him alone'); GEORGE M.
FREDRICKSON, BLACK LIBERATION: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF BLACK IDEOLOGIES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFPrcA 137-78 (i995) (discussing a utopian separatist movement
led by Marcus Garvey).
402 See Alex M. Johnson, Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism
Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1432 (X993).
403 See sources cited supra note 49.
404 See Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (describing
the plaintiff'i effort to persuade the court, using statistical evidence, that the sexual harassment
she suffered constituted race discrimination); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory,
or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 17-2 I (1991) (describing the
racial identity of Mechelle Vinson, the plaintiff whose experience of sexual harassment became
famous following Meritor); cf. Conn, supra note 281, at 548-50 (arguing that "the sexual exploita-
tion that accompanied slavery has merely evolved into sexual harassment).
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wholly separate from the law, would refine understandings of law in
many areas apart from sexual harassment.
i. Visual Artists' Rights. - The continental doctrine of droit
moral, which recognizes an artist's unique rights of integrity, attribu-
tion, modification, and withdrawal relating to her work,40° has long
been acknowledged in the United States. 40 6 Under this doctrine, the
artist retains rights that inhere in the work itself, even after she no
longer possesses or owns the work.40 7 One of these rights is known
expressly as the "right of respect,"408 but all of these rights fall within
the category of recognition respect. 409
The Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA") refers specifically to the
"honor" of the artist, noting that modifications and alterations of a
work can be prejudicial to an artist's honor.410  One commentator ex-
plains honor in this context as an entitlement "to preserve the authen-
ticity of [a] visual message."411 Another commentator notes that, con-
sistent with the general obligation of recognition respect, the duties
generated by "honor" are in essence negative, restraining harmful ac-
tions.412 Although some object to the presence of this "medieval" and
"carcane" term in the United States Code,413 its presence is useful to re-
formers who seek to improve the law of hostile environment sexual
harassment.
Drawing on VARA, its predecessors in the common law, and intel-
lectual property agreements between nations, one can extract concepts
pertinent to sexual harassment doctrine. One is the relation between
separation and affiliation. The visual artist is separate from her work
(for example, some rights conferred under VARA are waivable) but
also bound up in that work (such that harm to a thing may be equated
with harm to her).4 14 A second pertinent concept is the repudiation of
market-thinking and market analogies. VARA deems the artist con-
nected to her work notwithstanding its sale. Similarly, claims of enti-
405 See JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT & ARCHITECTURE LAW § 9.o31i] (x995).
406 This acknowledgement has been somewhat reluctant in the common law but has been man-
dated by federal statute since i9gi. See Visual Artists Rights Act of i9go, Pub. L. No. ioi-650,
104 Stat. 5128, 5132 (i9gi) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § io6A (1994)).
407 See DARRABY, supra note 405, at § 9.o3[i].
408 Id.
409 On the extensive secondary literature discussing moral rights, see the sources cited in Geri J.
Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTs &
ENT. L.J. 79, 8I n.6 (1996).
410 See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5 (i99o). The word "honor" comes from the statute's prede-
cessor, the Berne Convention.
411 Edward J. Damich, A Critique of the Visual Artists Rights Act of x989, 14 NOVA L. REv.
407, 408 (1990).
412 See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. x, 36-37 (i994).
413 See DARRABY, supra note 405, at § 9.o3[I].
414 I make an analogous argument concerning products liability. See Anita Bernstein, How
Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 DuKE L.J. I, 43 (i995).
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tiement to respect in the workplace should not be diminished by re-
joinders that the plaintiff chose the job and was paid to accept work-
ing conditions.415 Both VARA and the respectful person standard
relegate reasonableness to a supporting role and, in particular, confine
it to exceptions and defenses. Both VARA and the respectful person
standard guard against incursions and boundary crossing, rather than
impose affirmative duties. The visual artist is entitled to injunctive
relief against intentional or grossly negligent distortion, modification,
or destruction that would be prejudicial to the work;416 the worker is
entitled to respectful distance.
2. Environmental Law. - As the phrase "hostile environment"
suggests, environmental law can inform a respectful person approach
to sexual harassment in the workplace. As the philosopher Paul
Thompson writes, "a respectful person is a person who measures his or
her action in terms of its consistency with[,] and [effect] on[,] a network
or web of relationships." 417 Within this ecosystem - the worksite,418 a
larger social community,419 or the physical world - the respectful per-
son accepts the mediating effects of external circumstances. Thomp-
son points out that both consequentialist ethical philosophy and Kan-
tian absolutism tend to understate the impact the environment has on
ethics. Noble character traits may become vices when taken to ex-
tremes, but the environment in which a virtuous person lives will rein-
force the tendency of virtues to balance one another.420 The environ-
mental constituent of ethics, which Thompson calls the ecology of
virtue, suggests that environmental law can inform and guide the de-
velopment of a legal standard of respect.
Consider, for example, the precautionary principle,42' an environ-
mental tenet endorsed in the 1992 Rio Declaration 422 and by American
courts.423 The precautionary principle asserts that society should an-
ticipate, rather than simply attempt to remedy, activities that harm the
415 See supra pp. 469-70.
416 See 17 U.S.C. § io6A (a)(3)(A)-(B) (1994).
417 Electronic mail from Paul B. Thompson, Director of the Center for Biotechnology Policy
and Ethics and Professor of Agricultural Economics at Texas A & M University, to Carolyn Raf-
fensperger, Director, Science and Environmental Health Network (May 12, 1997) (printout on file
with the Harvard Law Review).
418 See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
419 See supra p. 489.
420 See Thompson, supra note 417.
421 The precautionary principle, or vorsorgeprinzip, emerged in West Germany in the 1970S.
See Konrad von Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy, in ROYAL
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, TWELFTH REPORT: BEST PRACTICABLE ENVI-
RONMENTAL OPTION app. 3, at 58 (I988).
422 See David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps
Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 634 (1995). I elaborate on the precau-
tionary principle in Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure for
Toxic Exposure, 97 COLuM. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
423 See infra note 427.
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environment. 424  Urging policymakers to err on the side of nonen-
croachment and distance, the precautionary principle expresses re-
spect.425 This emphasis on avoiding harm rather than maximizing
utility has affronted economics-focused critics, who argue that "better
safe than sorry" as a policy provides little guidance about the optimal
mix of risks and contains a tacit prejudice in favor of the status quo.42 6
These criticisms stem from a utilitarian premise that runs contrary to
the concept of recognition respect. Despite this utilitarian criticism,
however, the principle retains strong appeal for courts, administrative
agencies, and commentators.427 Like the ethical duty to refrain, 428 the
precautionary principle counsels hesitation; the respectful person un-
derstands the prudence of caution.
Elsewhere, current environmental law recognizes the tenet of re-
spect. Animal rights, linked analytically to environmentalism, 429 are
enforced by an array of laws. At the federal level, statutes protect
vulnerable species430 and provide for the humane transport of ani-
mals.431 At the state level, anticruelty statutes declare the wrongful-
424 See von Moltke, supra note 421, at 57-s8.
425 I discuss the connection between the respectful person standard and the precautionary prin-
ciple in a forthcoming work. See Anita Bernstein, Precaution and Respect, in STRATEGIES FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickener eds.,
forthcoming I998).
426 See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 851, 859-61 (1996); see also Bernstein, supra note 422 (summarizing these criticisms).
427 Several courts have discussed the attraction of the precautionary principle. See Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst, 448 U.S. 607, 656 (i98o) (plurality opinion)
(endorsing "risking error on the side of overprotection rather than underprotection"); ASARCO,
Inc. v. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483, 495 (9th Cir. 1984) (deferring to agency cautions); Lead Indus. Ass'n
v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1155 (D.C. Cir. i98o) (rejecting feasibility considerations in setting air
quality standards and choosing "to err on the side of caution"); Central Platte Natural Resources
Dist. v. City of Fremont, 549 N.W.2d. 112, 122 (Neb. 1996) (White, C.J., concurring) (supporting
the decision to "err on the side of caution"); see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE 47 (i993) (describing the tendency to overstate risks); Cross, supra note 426, at 853 (find-
ing a precautionary principle theme in California state law and the United Nations World Charter
for Nature); id. at 857 (noting the conservatism of EPA risk-assessment procedures).
428 See supra pp. 486-92.
429 See THE ANIMAL RIGHTS/ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS DEBATE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE, at ix-x (Eugene C. Hargrove ed., 1992); JUDITH D. SOULE & JON K. PIPER,
FARMING IN NATURE'S IMAGE: AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO AGRICULTURE passim (1992);
Laura Westra, Ecology and Animals: Is There a Joint Ethic of Respect?, ii ENVTL. ETHICS 215
passim (1989).
430 See Marine Mammal Protections Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (x994); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992, 16
U.S.C. §§ 4901-4916 (1994).
431 See 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (i994).
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ness of gratuitous animal suffering.432 Even negligence vis-h-vis an
animal may constitute a crime.433
Inanimate objects also receive recognition respect in the law.434
From the archaic law of deodands, which attributed blame to an ob-
ject that caused the death of a person, through modern forfeiture,
American legal traditions affirm the separate identity of things distinct
from the identity of their owners, makers, buyers, and users.435 State
statutes criminalizing graffiti and vandalism rest on the premise that a
thing possesses a unique identity, even integrity, that is violated by
meddling or alteration. 436 Statutory and judge-made law also enforces
respect for corpses: negligent mishandling of a dead human body was
an accepted basis of claims for emotional injury long before a general
recognition of negligent infliction of emotional distress emerged in the
common law of torts.437 State statutes demand decent treatment of
432 See GARY FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAw 121-22 (1995). Professor
Francione, an animal rights activist, notes that these laws are far from self-enforcing and, in any
event, never challenge the flawed "humancentric" premise that animals may, or perhaps must,
suffer when such suffering would benefit human beings. See id. at 129-3 o . Whether or not
Francione is right to quarrel with the scope and enforcement of anticruelty statutes, their exis-
tence demonstrates a degree of recognition respect of animals.
433 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-202(l) (1996) (criminalizing negligent overworking and
confinement as well as "criminal negligence" in failure to feed or shelter an animal in one's
charge); N.Y. AGRIC. & MIKTs. LAW § 353 (McKinney i996) (referring to the "failure to provide
proper sustenance).
434 In a 1985 sequel to his classic claim that trees warrant respect, Christopher Stone grouped
together entities that, though not persons and hence not moral agents, nevertheless command "le-
gal or moral attention." Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far
Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1985). These
entities include embryos, animals, corpses, living organisms, habitats, "species, tribes, nations,
corporations," even intangibles like "the quality of the light in the Arizona desert at sunset." Id. at
21-22. Stone uses special language - "disinterested entities," moral "obligees," "moral patientqs]"
- that elucidates the infirmities of a reason-based standard for judging offensiveness and harm to
dignity. See supra pp. 456-71. The term "moral patient," for example, which Stone borrows from
the philosopher Tom Regan, see Stone, supra, at 45 & n.125 (citing TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR
ANIMAL RIGHTS 15 -56 (1983)), suggests a terrain of respect extending beyond the Kantian pe-
rimeter. Like the respectful person standard, Stone's argument about moral pluralism accepts
that moral claims can be object-generated as well as subject-generated. At its crux, Stone's ar-
gument is that disinterested entities are fundamentally entitled to recognition respect. Such rec-
ognition varies depending on the entity - the entitlements of embryos differ from those of
corpses, which differ from those of natural habitats - but the claims of all include attention, fo-
cus, awareness of separation, and combinations of universal and particularistic regard. See Dil-
lon, supra note 43, at xo8-io. On behalf of disinterested entities, Stone asserts the claim made in
the respect-for-persons literature - the person's right to be treated as the person he or she is. See
Spelman, supra note 261, at 152-53.
435 See Bernstein, supra note 414, at 44.
436 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 640.5 (West 1996) (criminalizing the making of graffiti); HAv.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 298-27 (Michie 1996) (addressing vandalism on public school property).
437 Some early judicial writing expressed respect for corpses. See England v. Central Pocahon-
tas Coal Co., 104 S.E. 46, 47 (W. Va. i92o) (allowing a claim for unauthorized disinterment); Lar-
son v. Chase, 5o N.W. 238, 240 (Minn. x891) (allowing a widow's claim for unauthorized dissec-
tion); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supa note 387, at 362 (referring to "a series of cases allowing
recovery for negligent embalming, negligent shipment, running over the body, and the like').
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corpses, including decent burial,438 and federal legislation recognizes
sacred land.439
3. The First Amendment.
a. Speech. - Those who assert the primacy of civil rights over civil
liberties,440 or who argue that freedom of speech must be understood
in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment promise of equality,44 1
stake out territory covered by recognition respect. Robin West
sketches a recognition respect approach in an article that defends the
suppression of hate speech on communitarian grounds.4 4 2  Rejecting
pure civil-libertarian views of free speech, West and other writers iden-
tify the vast power and appeal of a countervailing concept of respect.
The respect-oriented side of this debate has lost several key Su-
preme Court cases, in which freedom of speech arguments have tri-
umphed over statutory attempts to enforce recognition respect. 443 Al-
though respect-based arguments often fail to carry the day, they have
been influential in shaping understandings of what is at stake, as even
their antagonists have admitted.444  The debates over speech regula-
tion thus describe recognition respect, showing that it is amply prece-
dented in American law, and incidentally help to refute the claim that
remedies for sexual harassment in the workplace violate the right to
free speech.445
In Toward a First Amendment Jurisprudence of Respect, West con-
trasts a "communicative" interpretation of speech with the dominant,
438 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.230 (Michie 1996) (mandating "decent burial"); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4200(X) (McKinney 1996) (decreeing that "every body of a deceased person, within
this state, shall be decently buried or incinerated within a reasonable time after death"). See gen-
erally William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Prop-
erty Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693, 704-07 ('995) (summarizing com-
mon law precepts regarding corpses).
439 See 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994) (mandating that land worshipped by Native Americans be pro-
tected and preserved).
440 For an expression of this dichotomy and a summary of the contrasting views, see OWEN M.
Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH io-i8 (1996), and Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil
Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 81, 81-83 (1991).
441 See 2 HATE SPEECH AND THE CONsTrrUTION (Steven J. Heyman ed., 1996) [hereinafter
HATE SPEECH].
442 See Robin West, Toward a First Amendment Jurisprudence of Respect: A Comment on
George Fletcher's Constitutional Identity, r4 CaRnozo L. REV. 759, 762 (1993). Although West
rejects the idea of privileging equality over liberty, her hybrid equality/liberty argument describes
many of the elements of recognition respect. See id.
443 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 411-14 (1989). The Supreme Court summarily affirmed a Seventh Circuit case that had
struck down an ordinance defining pornography-caused harms as civil rights violations and cre-
ating a private right of action to redress these injuries. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hud-
nut, 771 E2d 323, 324, 325 (7th Cir. i985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. iooi (1986).
444 See Henry Louis Gates Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil Liberties Pose No Threat to Civil
Rights, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at 37, 46-47 (addressing the harms of racist speech).
445 See sources cited supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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liberal understanding of speech as "expressive."446 Speech "creates a
bond, a relationship, or a community that was not there previously be-
tween speaker and listener or writer and reader, the creation of which
is both the primary purpose and primary consequence of the
speech. '447 Despite the importance of this community, West continues,
it would be a mistake to suppress speech simply because it can have
"belittling, injurious, endangering, subordinating, spirit murdering
consequences."448 What West calls the progressive alternative to the
dominant liberal tradition should not use the Fourteenth Amendment
as a weapon against the First and argue that equality outweighs lib-
erty. By protecting communication rather than words themselves,
West argues, the First Amendment is faithful to ideals of both liberty
and equality.449
Similarly rejecting the premise of a zero-sum contest between lib-
erty and equality, Steven Heyman offers another respect-focused ac-
count of speech rights.4 0 According to Professor Heyman, society may
restrict hate speech because of its tendency to deny recognition and
personhood to its target.45' The First Amendment, never understood
as an absolute endorsement of unrestricted free speech,4 2 is part of a
wider social contract that mediates rights and restrictions based on a
concern about harm to others.45 3 Recognition-denying speech, Hey-
man continues, is a violation of the respect that ordinary citizens owe
to one another.4 4 Under the social contract, each speaker must recog-
nize others as "co-rulers," and render "a minimal degree of civility and
respect."455
Like other instances of recognition respect encountered in this Arti-
cle, the duty Heyman identifies - to refrain from inflicting the disre-
spect of hate speech - is at odds with metaphors of the market. The
marketplace of ideas, championed in famous Supreme Court opinions
of the early twentieth century,45 6 stands for an aggregation that con-
446 See West, supra note 442, at 761.
447 Id.
448 Id. at 762. West credits PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 73
(iggi), for the phrase "spirit murder." West, supra note 442, at 761 & n.7.
449 See West, supra note 442, at 765-66.
450 See Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, in i HATE SPEECH,
supra note 44i, at ix, xli.
451 See id. at xv.
452 See id. at xvii.
453 See id. at xviii. For elaboration in another context, compare Steven J. Heyman, Founda-
tions of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REv. 673, 690-99 (x994).
454 See Heyman, supra note 450, at lvii.
45S Id.
4S6 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that
open debate pursues truth), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
449 (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ('[T]he best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
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centrates power without necessarily promoting the fittest and best ob-
jective truth.45 7 Just as notions of transaction misdescribe the objec-
tive criterion of hostile environment sexual harassment claims458 and
the nature of visual artists' rights,459 they do not build a satisfactory
ideal of free speech. For purposes of recognition respect, however,
metaphors of market and transaction retain value in that they describe
the free discussion among persons who credit one another with free-
dom and reason.460
The free speech debate in general explores the limits of recognition
respect, a quest that I describe in this Article but do not try to resolve
except with specific reference to the area of sexual harassment law. A
respectful person standard, implicit in the West and Heyman visions of
the right to free speech, may eventually enter First Amendment doc-
trine. But rather than argue here in favor of this migration, I connect
respect and free speech only to contend that one cannot posit a right of
free speech without considering a distinction between expression and
communication. The idea of recognition respect sums up what makes
free speech a valuable right, what limits the right to free expression,
and what is at stake in construing the First Amendment guarantee.
b. Religion. - The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment similarly link recognition respect with civil liber-
ties. One famous metaphor envisions the boundaries that characterize
recognition respect 461 by perceiving constitutional religious protection
as shielding a garden from the encroachment of wilderness.462 The re-
spectful person, as discussed above, maintains a distance from others
and recognizes that individual will arises uniquely in each human be-
ing.463 Pointing occasionally in opposite directions, the Free Exercise
457 See Heyman, supra note 450, at lix-lxi.
458 See supra p. 488.
459 See supra p. 513-14.
460 See Heyman, supra note 45o, at lxii.
461 See supra p. 509.
462 See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965). James Madi-
son, whose view of the Religion Clauses commands strong allegiance today, see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115g-61 (2d ed. 1988), maintained that in the United
States religions must stay separate from one another and from the state. See Letter from James
Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 107, 107-08
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (urging that the government abstain from dealing
with religious establishments, except to preserve the "public order" and to protect "each sect
[against] trespasses on its legal rights by others'). Laurence Tribe identifies the main themes of
constitutional religious freedom as "voluntarism" and "separatism," both of which are central to
recognition respect for persons. See TRIBE, supra, at 116o-6i (defining voluntarism as the free-
dom from "compulsion in matters of belief" and separatism as the principle that "religion and
government function best if each remains independent of the other').
463 See supra p. 492.
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and Establishment Clauses express a common concern about autono-
mous human will and the danger of disrespectful encroachment. 464
In recognition of the value of commitments to - or principled
stances against - religion, the American judiciary has lent support to
conscientious postures and practices, favoring the perspective of re-
spect for persons over alternative buttresses for religion that other so-
cieties have chosen.465 And as with free speech, the Supreme Court
cases that strike down statutory attempts to achieve recognition re-
spect for religious practices or institutions illuminate the ways in
which American law seeks to foster recognition respect. The Estab-
lishment Clause may be seen as a constraint on statutes that advance
recognition respect for religions, but when the Court invalidates such
statutes, it renders respect to the religion in question while insisting on
the principle of separation between church and state. 466 The recent
invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act similarly reveals
a solicitude for liberty of conscience: in deeming this statute unconsti-
tutional, the Supreme Court based its decision on congressional powers
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, taking care not to im-
pugn religious freedom as a legislative goal.467 Failed claims for ex-
emption likewise reveal the Court's respect for religious liberty: every
one of the great free-exercise precedents ruling against conscientious
practitioners of religion contains at least a bow, if not a paean, to spiri-
tual freedom. 468 The tangled claims of religious liberty and religious
neutrality continue to vex judges and scholars, who struggle over
which value comes first. These writers have found common ground in
recognition respect. 469
464 See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. iiS, i68
(1992) ("The great evil against which the Religion Clauses are directed is government-induced
homogeneity....").
465 Cf Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems,
45 Am. J. CoMp. L. 5, 23 (1997) (noting that the Western legal tradition, unlike other legal sys-
tems, relies on a separation of law from religion); Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Public Square and the
Jew as Religious Other, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 865, 867-68 (1993) (describing role played by anti-
Semitism in European nationalism leading up to the Holocaust); Richard Smith, Why the Taint to
Religion? The Interplay of Chance and Reason, 1993 BYU L. REv. 467, 468 (adverting to rell-
gion-state relations in Germany).
466 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (observing that tenets of Sat-
mar Hasidic faith do not require a separate school district); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962) (noting that a union of church and state would threaten "to destroy government and to de-
grade religion").
467 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. CL 2157, 2172 (I997).
468 See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shebazz, 482 U.S. 342, 344, 352 (1987) (discussing efforts of
prison administrators to cooperate with inmates' "sincerely held" Muslim beliefs); Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 700 (x986) (quoting with approval congressional resolutions concerning American
Indian religious freedom); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) I45, i66 (1878) (noting that
laws "cannot interfere with... religious belief and opinions").
469 See JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 31-32 (1995) (referring to "indignation" and "of-
fense"); Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. I6II, 1643
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c. Association. - First Amendment doctrine connects personhood
and human dignity to build a freedom of association:470 in the words
of Laurence Tribe, "virtually every invasion of personhood is also an
interference with association .... ,,471 For Charles Fried, the essence
of privacy - another constitutional liberty linked with the First
Amendment - is the power of an individual to share and withhold in-
timacy based on individual choice.472 Supreme Court case law on the
freedom of association expounds on these values, connecting associa-
tional rights with boundaries,473 self-definition, 474 and protected sanc-
tuaries.475
Like the concept of respect, freedom of association rests on both
liberal and communitarian bases. From a liberal vantage point, asso-
ciational rights recognize that persons cannot flourish in isolation. A
communitarian perspective emphasizes that association in groups is
more than a right: communities are as central as individuals are to this
First Amendment-guaranteed liberty.4 76 Here the contrast between
reason and respect reappears. Successful claims of associational rights
have come from groups and communities united around various values
and characteristics - religion, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity,
family status - all of which, like sexual harassment, have little or
nothing to do with reason. The impulse to associate comes from a de-
sire of individuals to find their place in a community. This place can
be identified, expressed, confirmed, refined, modified, and rejected
only through the function of respect.
V. COMMON SENSE AND RESPECT
Having discussed respect as a matter of philosophy and socio-
cultural history as well as legal doctrine, we may now explore respect
as a commonsensical norm that lay persons understand and apply.
The proposed jury instruction below, interspersed with commentary,
(1993) (concluding that political participation rights depend upon a recognition of religious con-
science as well as a stance against religious establishment); William P. Marshall, The Concept of
Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. LJ. 35', 373 (1991)
(noting, with disapproval, the theme of offensiveness in Religion Clause case law).
470 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (noting that although the freedom of
association "is not expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making
the express guarantees fully meaningful").
471 TRIBE, supra note 462, at 1400.
472 See CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 142 (1970).
473 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; see also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Century
Comm'n, 489 U.S. 214, 224 (x989) (identifying a right to determine the boundaries of a political
association); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) (applying an associational
right to political parties); Bates v City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. Vi6, 523 (i96o) (holding that an
associational right protects organizations from government "attack" and "interference").
474 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
475 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
476 See SOIFER, supra note 138, at 51-52.
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describes the respectful person standard in ordinary language. Fol-
lowing the pattern set elsewhere in this Article, I have written this
model jury instruction with Title VII claims in mind, but one may
readily alter this instruction to fit dignitary-tort actions.
X [the plaintiff] has alleged that she has been forced into a
hostile work environment because of sexual harassment. To es-
tablish a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment, X
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the work-
place was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult that is related to sex, and that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create
an abusive working environment. Examples of such conduct are
sexual propositions, sexual innuendo, the display of sexually ex-
plicit materials, and sexually derogatory language.
Comment: This summary introduction would follow a more general
opening, readily available in the pattern books and not of direct con-
cern here, that would describe the nature of a Title VII claim.477 The
above paragraph quotes almost verbatim an ABA-authored model jury
instruction.478 Tellingly, the passage contains no reference to reason
and reasonableness. 479
Under the law, an employer must provide a working envi-
ronment in which men and women are treated equally, and that
is not hostile or abusive. You may need some guidance about
what it means to treat people equally and to provide an envi-
ronment that is not hostile or abusive. To help you in your de-
liberations, I ask you to ask yourselves: Did ABC [the employer]
behave as a respectful person toward X? If ABC treated X as a
respectful person would, then ABC is not liable to X.
Comment: Following the contention that the duties of a respectful
person are principally negative - the respectful person refrains and
forbears, and stands back from boundaries480 - this part of the in-
struction includes negative locutions. Evidence suggests that although
multiple negative statements can harm jurors' comprehension of in-
structions,481 judges can reduce or eliminate these harmful effects by
477 See, e.g., 3 EDWARD J. DEVITT, CHARLES B. BLACKMAR & MICHAEL A. WOLFF, FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 104.01, at 1012-13 (4th ed. 1987 &
Supp. i996).
478 See Employment & Labor Relations Comm., Model Jury Instructions: Employment Litiga-
tion, 1994 A.B.A. SEC. LIT. 40.
479 These terms appear in the ABA model jury charge. See id.
480 See supra pp. 486-92.
481 See Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 13o6, 1324-25 ('979) (finding
only small effects on comprehension when instructions use single negatives, but identifying double
and triple negatives as particularly incomprehensible to jurors).
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stating the negatives as contrasts.482 In this model instruction, nega-
tive locutions are therefore accompanied by contrasting affirmatives.
To be a respectful person is to treat other human beings as
persons who are as valuable as you are - even if you have had
advantages that they have not had. It is to acknowledge their
dignity and humanity, to recognize that they are like you, yet
have their own goals and wishes. It is to pay attention to other
people - how they react and what they say. When we respect
people we accord them basic dignity, and we acknowledge their
stake in how we behave.
For purposes of the law, the respectful person must refrain
from doing to other people what he or she would not want done
to him or her, except when that is impossible to avoid. For in-
stance, it may be necessary to fire an employee, and the respect-
ful person may do so when this decision is necessary.
The respectful person does not humiliate another person. The
respectful person appreciates the dignity of another person. This
obligation does not mean that X is entitled to feel good about her
job all the time, nor that ABC must spare her feelings at all
times.
A respectful person does not have to be perfect. An employer
acting as a respectful person is entitled to do unpleasant things,
to make a profit from employment, to hire and fire, and to act as
it needs. The respectful person does not have to be generous or
patient, for instance. Nor does the respectful person need to
have a high opinion of everyone. Respect is not the same as ad-
miration. You might respect Q [name an athlete] because he is
so good at his game. That's the kind of respect that comes with
admiration for a person's special skills or talents. Respect in the
workplace, however, means the fundamental dignity due to every
person regardless of unique ability or exceptional talent.
Comment: Jurors are likely to want guidance on the outer bounda-
ries of a respectful person standard. The instruction lists delineated
virtues to clarify what the respectful person is not,483 by specifically
contrasting appraisal respect. The instructions also condone work-
place capitalism, the absence of altruism at a worksite, and general
unsaintliness, all of which are ubiquitous in employment.
You know what it means to be a respectful person outside the
courts of law. You have been called to jury service because of
your daily life experiences - because you have known both re-
spectful and disrespectful persons in real-world situations. You
482 See Jamison Wilcox, The Craft of Drafting Plain-Language Jury Instructions: A Study of a
Sample Pattern Instruction on Obscenity, 59 TEMP. L.Q. I159, 1167 & n.28 (1986).
483 Wilcox incorporates contrasts in his proposed model instruction on obscenity, stating that
such an instruction, "in telling the juror to reject certain ideas, helps the juror to make some im-
portant distinctions." Id.
19971
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
should draw on your own experience as you determine whether
ABC acted toward X as a respectful person would.
CONCLUSION
Outside the precincts of law, sexual harassment is understood to be
a kind of disrespect. Examples of this understanding abound. Of the
multitude of statements about respect in relation to harassment -
from ancient literature to conversations with friends, in employment
manuals and in television programming, through newspapers and all
other media 4 4 - I have pulled one example from the business com-
munity for this Conclusion. This statement of harassment as disre-
spect indicates an understanding that has yet to permeate legal doc-
trine.
The American Management Association, addressing managers con-
cerned about accusations of harassment, urges them to think before
they speak:
Would you say [a dubious remark] in front of your spouse, parent, or
child?
Would you say it if you were going to be quoted on the front page of the
newspaper?
Would you behave that way toward a member of your own sex?
Why does it need to be said at all? What business is it furthering? 48 5
Would you say that in front of your mother? Taken as more than
rhetorical, this question identifies sexual harassment as wrongful con-
duct, a simple assertion that many courts and scholars have declined to
make. The management association criteria state burdens in terms of
an actor rather than his target. They allude to public reaction - "the
front page of the newspaper" - and thereby express concern with
public humiliation and threats to one's good name. The criteria have
nothing to say about reason and reasonableness. They understand the
basic sexual harassment duty to be built around restraint. In short,
this commonsense understanding about sexual harassment rests on the
idea of respect. The American Management Association invites the
reader to be or become a respectful person, as a way to avoid both the
484 A vast array of references to respect in the context of harassment appear in the media. See,
e.g., Sexual Harassment and Misconduct in the United States Army: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, iosth Cong. (Feb. 4, 1997) (statement of General Dennis J. Reimer,
Chief of Staff, United States Army), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File; Women
Readers React, BANGOR DAILY NEws, Jan. 28, 1997, at A8 (gathering comments from women
newspaper readers); Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 16, 1997), available in LEXIS,
New Library, Script File (debating whether opening combat positions to women would result in
greater respect for women soldiers and reduced sexual harassment).
485 Thomas Head & Mickey Veich, Would You Say That in Front of Your Mother? Sexual
Harassment, SECURITY MGMT., Feb. 1994, at 43, available in 1994 WL 2823114.
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practice of harassment and the accusation that one has committed this
violation of employment law.
Sexual harassment law needs to absorb the teachings of common
sense and daily experience. Doctrine in this subject must be trued,
brought honestly into alignment with good sense. This process in-
cludes several discrete steps.
As this Article has detailed at some length, the respectful person
must replace the reasonable person as the gauge by which courts de-
termine whether the alleged harasser has violated the law. Respect
and reason are neither mutually preclusive nor oriented in contrary di-
rections. However, centuries of experience have connected reason with
various biases - relating to gender and race in particular and caste
oppression in general - that obstruct the remediation of sexual ha-
rassment. Emphasis on reason also neglects the emotional and sexual
nature of sexual harassment. Standards that demand reasonableness,
in the sense of shared understandings or centrist views, have proved
problematic in both theory and practice. Indispensable elsewhere in
the law, the reasonable person must play a lesser role in sexual harass-
ment doctrine.
Another step is more theoretical and must be taken slowly. Recog-
nizing respect as a legal concept comes close to treading on the princi-
ple that the law ought to refrain from teaching or enforcing virtue, ex-
cept in the minimal sense of deterring citizens from endangering one
another. Philosophical conflict between those who favor the right and
those who emphasize the good has been underway for centuries, with
insufficient application to specifics. 486 Sexual harassment law should
enter this liberal-communitarian debate at a point near the edge of lib-
eral minimalism. 487 I have suggested that the respectful person falls
within the boundary of what the liberal state is competent to under-
take. The path of such a person may be stated in narrow and negative
terms: the respectful person has a legal duty to refrain from disrespect,
rather than a duty to affirm or esteem another person. Respect in this
sense - I have used the philosophical label "recognition respect" - is
consistent with various relations now mandated by longstanding doc-
trine.488  Embedded legal rules of respect are taken for granted. A
stronger understanding of the way in which the law demands respect-
486 Authors have explored the liberal-communitarian spectrum in specific areas of law and pol-
icy. See, e.g., 'royen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health Care Insurance Reform, X9
AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 47-5 (1993) (extrapolating from medical ethics to create an ethic of access to
health care); Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America:
Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221,
278-310 (I994) (rejecting the strict liberallcommunitarian dichotomy to argue that vulnerable
groups are entitled to services necessary for the good life); Fox, supra note 246, at 171-78 (criti-
cizing welfare reform).
487 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
488 See supra pp. 512-21.
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ful behavior will clarify values now obscured and shed light on liberal
political theory in American law.
To complement this theoretical advance, working lawyers should
continue to introduce new extralegal understandings about sexual ha-
rassment into the development of the law. One source of input comes
from the jury, standing by in both Title VII and dignitary-tort actions.
Jurors grapple with respect in their daily lives. The formality of a
courtroom, though a workaday setting for lawyers and judges, causes
persons in the jury pool to think about what Robin Dillon has called
institutional respect;48 9 although legal scholars and courtroom regulars
may find respect an alien concept in tort or antidiscrimination law,
those persons assembled to serve on a jury bring a heightened sense of
the word into the court proceedings.490 Other influences on the devel-
opment of respect in sexual harassment proceedings may come from
the work experiences of those familiar with other respect-focused do-
mains of the law. Environmental lawyers and intellectual property
specialists, for instance, might be well positioned to explain the legal
concept of respect.
'reating sexual harassment with respect must begin with the ac-
knowledgment that sexual harassment is wrong. Such a statement, far
from impeding the progress of women workers or mixing tort improp-
erly into civil rights law,4 91 is essential to the prevention and remedia-
tion of sexual harassment. Only after it is deemed wrong can sexual
harassment be abjured and condemned. Injurers and recipients of
harassment will then be able to locate their decisions and behavior in a
design that is congruent with morality.
The two legal domains that address sexual harassment - tort and
antidiscrimination law or, put more quaintly, law and equity - con-join to demand this moral design. Once it is agreed that sexual ha-
rassment is a wrong and hence warrants a claim at law, the principle
of equity behind the civil rights statutes "lays the stress upon the duty
of the defendant, and decrees that he do or refrain from doing a cer-
tain thing because he ought to act or forbear. It is because of this em-
phasis upon the defendant's duty that equity is so much more ethical
than law."492 The obligations of sexual harassment law derive from
489 See supra note 232; see also VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 249
(1986) ("[Jury service] imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged, and with the notion
of right" (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
490 Several articles discuss jurors' experience of respect in the courtroom. See, e.g., Stephanie
B. Goldberg, Caution: No Exemptions, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 64, 65; Joseph H. Hoffman,
Where's the Buck? Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 7o
IND. L. REv. 1137, 1155 (i995); Bob Sablatura, Sword and Shield: Grand Juries in Texas,
HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 25, 1996, at A5.
491 See supra note 39.
492 Ames, supra note 52, at io6. Although the emphasis of Title VII enforcement has shifted
toward law from equity since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Developments in the
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the tenets of ethical personal relationships. A standard of respect for
sexual harassment cases would emerge from this origin in day-to-day
life, improving the American workplace on its way to improving the
law.
Law - Employment Discrimination, iog HARv. L. REV. I568, 1573-74 n.26 (1996), pre-i991 Title
VII enforcement provided exclusively equitable remedies, see Note, supra note i99, at 1464.
